Opinions Archive

1. Statutory immunity under Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1) (2024), extends to a person who makes a mandated report under chapter 260E (2024), in good faith, even if the report is not made immediately. 2. Statutory immunity under Minnesota Statutes section 260E.34(a)(1) extends to a person who makes a voluntary report under chapter 260E, in good faith, regardless of whether the person is also a mandatory reporter. 3. Good faith, for the purpose of statutory immunity under section 260E.34(a)(1), is established if the report is made without an ulterior motive, without malice, and for a proper purpose. Affirmed.

Appellant challenges his convictions for first-degree drug possession, fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle, and fleeing a police officer by means other than a motor vehicle, arguing that the district court erred in denying his continuance request and violated his right to counsel. Because we discern no error by the district court, we affirm.

We affirm the district court's evidentiary decision to admit a letter purportedly sent by appellant Anthony James Cox because it was properly authenticated under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 901. We also conclude that Cox's due-process rights were not violated by the destruction of non-material video footage, and that the district court did not plainly err by admitting surveillance footage offered by the state at trial.

Appellant Jamaal Terrance Tanna appeals from a conviction for controlled- substance crime in the first degree—possession, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.021, subdivision 2(a)(1) (Supp. 2023). He argues that (1) his conviction must be reversed because the state did not offer sufficient evidence to prove the weight element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) he is entitled to a new trial because the district court erroneously instructed the jury, and (3) he is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its discretion in admitting a search warrant into evidence. We affirm.

In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for second-degree intentional murder, appellant presents four arguments, which we have reorganized somewhat for ease of discussion. First, appellant contends that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's guilty verdict, requiring reversal of his conviction. Second, appellant argues that four trial errors warrant a new trial: (A) the district court abused its discretion during jury selection; (B) the district court abused its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a Schwartz hearing on alleged juror misconduct; (C) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence in error; and (D) the prosecuting attorney committed prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments. Third, and alternatively, appellant argues that cumulative trial errors denied appellant his right to a fair trial. Fourth, appellant maintains that the district court abused its discretion during sentencing by imposing a "top of the box" sentence. Because the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, the challenged trial issues either lack merit or do not require correction in a new trial, cumulative error does not warrant a new trial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence that followed the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, we affirm.

A high-school athletic trainer cleared an athlete to complete his wrestling match after the referee stopped the contest concerned that the athlete may have been injured when his head struck the mat. The athlete sued his coach, the school district, the referee, the trainer, and the trainer's employer, alleging, among other things, that he was injured by the negligent decision to return him to competition. The district court denied all five defendants' motions for summary judgment on that negligence claim. The coach, school district, and referee appeal, relying on direct or vicarious official immunity. We affirm in part, because the referee has not advocated on appeal that he is entitled to official immunity on the theory that he unsuccessfully relied on in the district court (that immunity extends to him as a contractor-agent providing services for the school district), and on appeal he relies on a theory neither considered nor decided by the district court (that he was employed by the school district). But we reverse in part, because the coach is entitled to official immunity for his discretionary decision to return the athlete to compete after the evaluating trainer cleared the athlete to do so, and the school district is entitled to vicarious official immunity for the coach's decision.

This appeal is taken from an order filed in consolidated probate cases concerning the estates of a married couple who died within four months of each other. An adult child of the decedents petitioned the district court for an order determining that the decedents' former residence was their homestead when they died, despite the decedents' failure to file notices of homestead rights within six months of their respective relocations from the residence to a nursing home. The district court denied the petition on the ground that there is no evidence that either decedent was under a legal disability that precluded the filing of homestead notices during the relevant six-month periods. We conclude that the district court did not err in that ruling. Therefore, we affirm.

In this appeal from the final judgments of conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree assault, and violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO), appellant John Robert Olson argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court committed reversible error by denying his request for a continuance of the trial and failing to sequester the lead investigator in the case. Alternatively, Olson challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an aggregate sentence of 584 months' imprisonment, because the sentence is disproportionate, and an 18-month consecutive sentence for the felony DANCO violation that was an unauthorized upward durational departure. Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied Olson's motion for a continuance, denied his request to sequester the lead investigator, and imposed the aggregate sentence on him, we affirm as to those issues. But, because the district court applied the wrong severity level when it sentenced Olson to an 18-month, rather than 12-month, consecutive sentence for his felony DANCO violation, we reverse and remand for resentencing as to that issue.

In this trust dispute, appellant argues that the district court erred by refusing to remove the trustee because the trustee (1) breached his duty to keep appellant informed of the trust, (2) unilaterally lowered the sale price of farmland, and (3) failed to impartially administer the trust. Appellant also argues that the district court erred in its interpretation of the trust. We affirm.

Appellant insured challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to respondent insurer, arguing that the district court erred in not applying the reasonable-expectations doctrine to a reducing clause when interpreting an insurance policy. We affirm.