Opinions Archive

Appellant Bridgette Williams appeals the district court’s order dismissing her claims on the pleadings. We affirm.

Respondent-landowners brought this litigation after trees were removed and the land was reshaped on their properties during a municipal project to restore a creek. Appellants are the watershed district overseeing the project, the soil and water conservation district that supported the watershed district in securing easements for the project, and the entities that were contracted to carry out the work. The landowners’ claims include breach of temporary easement agreements, fraud in the inducement, and trespass. The landowners seek damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. 2 The procedural history in this case is complex, but the issues raised in these consolidated, interlocutory appeals are narrow. Each appellant asserted either statutory immunity or common-law official immunity as a defense to the litigation and the district court rejected those assertions on cross-motions for summary judgment. Appellants challenge only those immunity decisions on appeal. We agree with the district court that none of the appellants are entitled to immunity and therefore affirm.

Relators challenge the licensing order with penalty issued against them by respondent Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (the department), arguing that the commissioner of labor and industry’s final order was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. Because the commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the commissioner did not legally err, we affirm.

Following the summary-judgment dismissal of their defamation claim against an owner of a residential rental property, appellants argue that the district court (1) erred by determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to any element of the defamation claim and (2) abused its discretion by denying appellants’ motion to amend the complaint to add “defamation by implication” as an alternative theory of relief. Because the record evidence taken in the light most favorable to appellants does not present any genuine issue for trial under the identified theories of defamation, we affirm.

On certiorari review, relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that relator is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged for employment misconduct. Relator argues that the ULJ’s decision must be reversed for four reasons: (1) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) relator’s conduct falls under certain statutory exceptions to employment misconduct; (3) the ULJ based its determination on a single incident of misconduct; and (4) relator’s employer discharged her as a pretext for age discrimination. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s misconduct determination, relator’s conduct does not fall under any of the statutory exceptions relator cites, relator’s conduct was a serious violation of her employer’s reasonable expectations, and relator failed to raise a claim of age discrimination in proceedings before the ULJ and therefore forfeited the issue. Thus, we affirm.

Appellant homeowners challenge the district court’s dismissal of their negligence and mandamus claims against respondent county for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Appellant-wife challenges the district court’s denial of her petition for an order for protection (OFP). Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Appellant challenges the district court’s orders granting respondent-county’s petitions to recommit her as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness and to allow her treatment with neuroleptic medications, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over appellant due to respondent-county’s failure to serve appellant with notice of the hearing on its petitions. Because appellant was entitled to personal service under Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 4 (2024), and did not receive it, we reverse.

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for felony domestic assault and fifth-degree assault, appellant argues that his convictions should be reversed because the district court abused its discretion by (1) instructing the jury that the defendant had a duty to retreat from the victim’s home, (2) allowing the state to admit prior convictions as impeachment evidence, (3) admitting prior relationship history as character evidence, and (4) denying appellant’s request for a Schwartz hearing after a juror admitted to lying about the verdict. We affirm.

We are asked to review the district court’s division of marital assets after Alisha and Christopher Steinolfson’s divorce. The parties had separated shortly after Christopher purchased a company and the couple refinanced their marital home to obtain $100,000 for him to operate it. A business appraiser valued the company at $100,000 when the parties bought it and $370,000 on the parties’ stipulated valuation date. The district court accepted the $370,000 valuation but, because it found that Alisha had not contributed to the increase in value, awarded the increase solely to Christopher in the division of marital assets. We affirm that decision because it resulted from the district court’s exercise of its broad discretion in deciding how to equitably distribute marital property. But we reverse in part because the circumstances obligated the district court to grant Alisha’s motion for need- based attorney fees and remand for the district court to determine the proper award.