Opinions Archive

Appellant challenges the postconviction court's treatment of his sentence-correction request as a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2024), and the postconviction court's subsequent denial because of procedural bars. Appellant argues that he properly filed a motion for a corrected sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, which is not subject to the same procedural bars. We conclude that the postconviction court erred by construing appellant’s request as a petition for postconviction relief. But because the issues raised by appellant do not provide a basis for relief, we affirm.

A court deciding a post-permanency juvenile-protection matter does not have jurisdiction to address child support. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Relators challenge a decision by the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Review Board (the Board) that dismissed their appeal. Relators assert that the Board erred by determining that it does not have authority to hear appeals from administrative-law judge (ALJ) decisions related to alleged retaliation under Minnesota Statutes section 182.669 (2024). The Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (the Department) (respondent) agrees that the Board erred. Because the Board is statutorily required to hear the appeal, we reverse and remand.

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and following a stay and remand for postconviction proceedings, appellant argues (1) the postconviction court erred in denying appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the district court abused its discretion in excluding the victim's prior statements about being good at lying, (3) the prosecutor committed several instances of misconduct, and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived appellant of a fair trial. We affirm.

This case arises from a dispute between appellant Cleveland-Cliffs Minnesota Land Development LLC (Cliffs) and respondents Mesabi Land LLC and Mesabi Metallics Company LLC (collectively, Mesabi) over a 50-year mineral lease agreement (the lease). Following Mesabi's written notice to terminate the lease, the district court compelled arbitration at Cliffs' request. The arbitrators dismissed the arbitration proceeding on the ground that Cliffs made an untimely demand for arbitration and, in reaching that decision, concluded Mesabi properly terminated the lease. The parties filed competing motions in district court regarding the arbitration award. The district court granted Mesabi's motion to confirm the arbitration award and denied Cliffs' motion to vacate the arbitration award. On appeal, Cliffs raises numerous legal arguments to contest the district court's decision. We conclude the district court appropriately granted the motion to confirm the arbitration award, and we therefore affirm.

Respondent-wife Dawn Deana Rutzke King petitioned to dissolve her marriage with appellant-husband Danny Scott King. Husband moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The district court denied husband's motion to dismiss. We affirm.

This is a direct appeal from final judgments of conviction for second-degree assault, domestic assault, threats of violence, and violating a no-contact order. Appellant contends (1) that the district court plainly erred by granting the state's request to amend the complaint during trial, (2) that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because counsel did not object to the amended charge, (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his domestic-assault conviction, and (4) that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay restitution relating to a separate district court file that was dismissed. In a self-represented brief, appellant (5) seeks reversal of his convictions based on additional arguments. We affirm appellant's convictions but conclude that the district court abused its discretion by ordering appellant to pay restitution. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing with instructions for the district court to vacate the restitution order and to amend the warrant of commitment.

Appellant challenges the district court's order sustaining the revocation of her driver's license. Because the record supports the district court's determination that law enforcement had reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, we affirm.

In this appeal from final judgments of conviction for first- and second-degree assault, appellant Tra'shun Lacameron Haywood argues that the district court abused its discretion in two ways: (1) denying appellant's motion to present expert testimony about "the general characteristics of false confessions" and (2) denying appellant's motion to reopen the omnibus hearing after respondent State of Minnesota's late disclosure of a body-camera video of appellant talking to law enforcement just before he gave a recorded statement confessing to the assault. We conclude, first, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proposed expert testimony. Second, even if we assume the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to reopen the omnibus hearing, we conclude that a new trial is not warranted. Third, we conclude sua sponte that the district court erred in convicting appellant of both first- and second-degree assault based on Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2020), which prohibits convictions for included offenses for the same criminal act. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to vacate the conviction for second-degree assault.

In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of criminal sexual conduct, appellant Ahmed Mohamed Hassan argues that we should reverse because the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. In the alternative, he argues he is entitled to a new trial because (1) the court abused its discretion by improperly admitting prejudicial consciousness-of-guilt evidence, (2) the court plainly erred by failing to strike vouching testimony by a witness, or (3) those errors cumulatively require a new trial. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that Hassan's evidentiary challenges do not call for a new trial. We therefore affirm.