Opinions Archive

1. For purposes of allowable fees for legal services under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an answer to a workers’ compensation claim petition can serve as the basis for a genuine dispute under Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(c) (2020), when it creates an authentic controversy between parties and the employer or insurer had sufficient time and information to take a position on liability. 2. The applicable standard when we review whether the WCCA properly substituted its own finding for a conflicting finding of the compensation judge is if there is any evidence in the record that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the compensation judge’s finding. 3. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals erred in substituting its findings for those of the compensation judge because the compensation judge’s findings that a genuine dispute existed entitling the attorney to contingent attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(c), were supported by substantial evidence. 4. The standard to award additional fees under Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 7 (2020), is distinct from the standard to award contingency fees under Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(c), and whether to award fees under each subdivision must therefore be analyzed separately. Reversed and remanded to the compensation judge.

Appellant argues that evidence seized as the result of a vehicle search should have 1 been suppressed and that he was improperly denied a Schwartz hearing on alleged juror misconduct. Because the warrant for the vehicle search was supported by probable cause and because appellant failed to state a prima facia case for juror misconduct to justify the Schwartz hearing, we affirm.

To avoid constitutional infirmity, "immoral character or conduct" that is grounds for denial of an application for a teaching license under Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1) (2020), must relate to professional morals in the occupation of teaching and indicate that the individual is unfit to teach. Reversed and remanded.

In this condemnation appeal, appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence regarding appellants’ access to a newly constructed controlled-access highway and evidence using the development cost approach. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in these evidentiary rulings, we affirm.

Appellant challenges the revocation of his probation and execution of his prison sentence for impaired driving. Because the district court did not make the required findings as to whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation, we reverse and remand.

Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of his uninsured motorist claims, asserting that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the car he collided with was uninsured. We conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and affirm the district court’s summary judgment decision. 1

Appellant challenges the revocation of his probation, arguing that the district court (1) denied him due process by precluding him from testifying about whether he intentionally or inexcusably violated his probation, and (2) abused its discretion in revoking probation because the district court failed to make required findings on whether the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation and instead based its decision on his homelessness. We affirm.

Appellant challenges his conviction of felony driving while impaired (DWI), arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication because law enforcement impermissibly expanded the traffic stop. We affirm.

Appellant-father challenges the involuntary termination of his parental rights (TPR) to two of his children, arguing that the record does not support the district court’s determinations that (1) respondent-county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and 1 reunify father with the children; (2) the TPR is in the children’s best interests; and (3) it 1 was reasonable to adopt the county’s proposed order verbatim. We affirm.

Appellant challenges his conviction for fourth-degree assault of a police officer. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the specific intent to transfer saliva onto a police officer. Because we see sufficient evidence, we affirm.