Opinions Archive

LARKIN, Judge In these consolidated appeals, appellant-attorneys argue that the district court erred by sanctioning them for publicly filing a memorandum of law and by disqualifying them and their law firm from serving as trial counsel. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

A woman awoke to find her boyfriend in a different, darkened room standing over her five-year-old granddaughter. Her boyfriend, Vincent Sims, quickly covered his crotch and knocked the woman’s phone from her hand when she tried to call the police, yelling, “It’s not what you think!” After a bench trial, the district court convicted Sims of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and interference with an emergency call. Sims argues on appeal that the district court erroneously admitted hearsay statements from the child victim and that his sentence must be reversed to correct a conflict between the district court’s oral sentencing pronouncement and its written sentencing order. Sims’s hearsay challenge fails because the child’s statements to the forensic interviewer were properly admitted under Minnesota Statutes section 595.02, subdivision 3 (2022), and because admitting into evidence her statements to the police officer was harmless error. We therefore affirm in part. But we reverse in part and remand for the district court to clarify the sentencing ambiguity.

Appellant challenges his conviction of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that his Norgaard plea was not supported by a strong factual basis and that the district court erred by imposing a ten-year conditional-release term. Because appellant’s guilty plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis and was therefore invalid, we remand to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. And because it was not authorized, we reverse the district court’s imposition of a ten-year conditional-release term.

Appellant uncle challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for adoptive placement of the child who is the subject of this proceeding, BAP, without an evidentiary hearing. Because the district court abused its discretion by concluding that appellant failed to make a prima facie showing that respondent county had been unreasonable in failing to make the requested adoptive placement, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant challenges a district court’s order revoking her probation and executing a 36-month prison sentence. Because we conclude that the district court (1) did not err by failing to make the requisite findings and (2) did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation, we affirm.

In this appeal from the final judgment, appellant Adam John Haeska challenges his convictions of criminal sexual conduct and domestic assault. Haeska argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting improper relationship evidence. Haeska also argues the district court erred by entering convictions on verdicts stemming from the same course of conduct. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the relationship evidence, we affirm Haeska’s conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct while using coercion and one conviction for felony domestic assault. But we reverse and remand for the court to vacate the conviction for criminal sexual conduct while using force and to vacate the other conviction for felony domestic assault because those convictions arose from the same course of conduct as the two convictions that we affirm.

Appellant challenges his convictions for violation of an order for protection (OFP) and obstructing legal process, arguing that the district court failed to ensure a valid waiver of appellant’s constitutional right to counsel before allowing him to discharge his court- appointed attorney midtrial and proceed as a self-represented litigant. Appellant raises additional issues in a pro se supplemental brief. Although the district court did not strictly comply with statutory and rule-based requirements governing a waiver of counsel, the facts and circumstances of this particular case show that appellant validly waived his right to counsel. And because appellant’s pro se brief does not establish a basis for relief, we affirm.

Pawel Rzeczkowski and Carolina Borrero executed a postnuptial agreement in Colombia in 2011 and divorced in Minnesota in 2019. In this appeal from the judgment and decree after remand, Rzeczkowski argues that the postnuptial agreement is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable because it leaves Borrero with a disproportionate amount of the couple’s wealth. He also maintains that he is entitled to need-based attorney fees. We hold that the district court’s evidentially supported fact findings support its decision that the postnuptial agreement is not unconscionable. But we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to award Rzeczkowski any attorney fees incurred pursuing good-faith claims in district court and on appeal. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court for further findings on the issue of attorney fees.

Appellant challenges her stayed delinquency adjudication for third-degree assault, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the victim suffered substantial bodily harm and that the state failed to prove that appellant was not acting in self-defense. We affirm.

Appellant John Warren Harris challenges his convictions for domestic assault, sexual assault, stalking, and order for protection (OFP) violations, arguing that the set of assault charges, counts 5-6, should have been severed from counts 1-4, because the two sets were unrelated, and that the district court erred by including appellant’s Florida convictions in his criminal history score. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.