Opinions Archive

Appellant challenges the district court's order dismissing his petition to modify the permanent-child-custody order due to endangerment, arguing that the district court erred by (1) determining that appellant failed to show a change in circumstances, (2) not properly addressing appellant's petition to establish custody, (3) not conducting a best-interest analysis in denying modification of parental visitation, and (4) denying appellant's motion to remove the presiding judge for judicial bias. We affirm.

In this appeal from the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues: (1) the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily denying his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, (2) the postconviction court abused its discretion by concluding his remaining claims are procedurally barred, and (3) the interests of justice require that this court grant appellant a new trial. We affirm.

In this certiorari appeal, relator 3M Chemical Operations LLC (3M) challenges the terms of a water-discharge permit issued by respondent Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA). 3M argues that (1) the permit's condition regarding PFAS -testing "PFAS" refers to per- and poly-fluorinated alkyl substances, which are human-made chemicals that do not break down naturally and accumulate in the environment over time. requirements is in excess of MPCA's authority, unsupported by substantial evidence, and arbitrary and capricious; (2) the permit's condition regarding accreditation requirements for PFAS-testing methods are arbitrary and capricious; and (3) the permit's thermal-load condition regarding the effect of 3M's wastewater discharge on the temperature of the receiving water is an end-result requirement that is prohibited under a United States Supreme Court decision that was issued shortly before the issuance of the permit. Because we conclude that the PFAS-testing condition is, in one respect, not supported by substantial evidence and that the MPCA should have the opportunity to address the thermal-load condition in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, we reverse and remand for MPCA to address the PFAS-testing condition and the thermal-load condition.

At Donavon Boone's trial for first-degree burglary and domestic assault, the prosecutor told the jury that there were "multiple ways" it could find that the state proved that Boone committed domestic assault—either by his kicking in the door of the victim's apartment or by his then choking her. The district court did not instruct the jurors that they must unanimously agree as to which act Boone committed to find him guilty of this offense, and the jury found Boone guilty as charged. Boone unsuccessfully petitioned for postconviction relief partially on the ground that the district court plainly erred by failing sua sponte to issue a unanimity instruction. We affirm, because a unanimity instruction is not required when two acts satisfying the same element of an offense occur within the same behavioral incident.

Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his petition for probate of his deceased mother's 2021 will, arguing that the district court (1) abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance, (2) failed to provide him with proper notice of a court order, and (3) made clearly erroneous findings. We affirm.

In this insurance-coverage dispute, a policyholder seeks coverage for a dog-bite incident that the insurer denied as excluded under the policy. The district court agreed with the policyholder and granted summary judgment in her favor. On appeal, the insurance company maintains the district court erred because two exclusions to coverage apply: the "resident-relative" exclusion and the "history of biting" exclusion. We conclude that the policyholder was entitled to summary judgment on the "resident-relative" exclusion but not on the "history of biting" exclusion. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

In this certiorari appeal, relator Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA) challenges respondent City of Faribault's negative declaration concerning the necessity of an environmental impact statement for a data center project proposed by respondent Archer Datacenters SPE2, LLC. MCEA argues that the city violated the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), Minnesota Statutes sections 116D.01-.11 (2024 & Supp. 2025), in its review of the environmental assessment worksheet for the project, resulting in a decision that is arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and affected by errors of law. We conclude that the city's negative declaration is unsupported by substantial evidence, and we therefore reverse and remand.

Following a jury trial, appellant Richard Alan Quarles was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, third-degree criminal sexual conduct, second-degree assault, and domestic assault by strangulation. On direct appeal, Quarles challenges his convictions, arguing the district court: (1) abused its discretion when it allowed the state to admit audio recordings of certain 911 calls; (2) abused its discretion when it allowed the state to admit an audio recording from a cell phone; and (3) erred when it entered a conviction for third- degree criminal sexual conduct because it was a lesser-included offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Quarles also challenges his sentence on the bases that the district court improperly imposed multiple sentences and the warrant of commitment does not reflect the district court's orally pronounced sentence. Because we conclude the district court erred when it entered a conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct and the warrant of commitment does not reflect the district court's orally pronounced sentence, we reverse and remand. We otherwise affirm.

In this appeal from a post-dissolution order modifying a judgment and decree, appellant father argues that the district court clearly erred in its factual findings. Father also contends that the district court abused its discretion by (1) failing to decide two of father's motions; (2) deciding issues when it lacked jurisdiction to do so; (3) modifying child support; (4) ordering father to reimburse respondent mother for their children's expenses; and (5) vacating a parenting-time "right of first refusal" set out in the dissolution judgment and decree. Finally, father argues that the district court judge should not preside over further proceedings between these parties based on the appearance of bias. We affirm.

In this marital-dissolution dispute, appellant challenges the district court's denial of his motion to reopen the dissolution judgment and decree. Appellant argues that the district court (1) erred by determining that he was properly served, (2) erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the dissolution judgment, (3) erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by failing to address inequities in the dissolution judgment under Pooley v. Pooley, 979 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 2022), and (4) abused its discretion by awarding respondent conduct-based attorney fees. Because we conclude that service was proper and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion or by awarding respondent attorney fees, we affirm.