Opinions Archive

Appellant, pro se, challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the district court erred by imposing a lifetime term of conditional release instead of a ten-year term. We affirm.

In 2022, Edward Lee Jones was convicted of second-degree assault and possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. In 2024, Jones petitioned for postconviction relief and alleged that he was deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous evidentiary rulings. The postconviction court denied the petition. We affirm.

Appellant challenges his indeterminate civil commitment as a person who has a mental illness and is dangerous to the public. We affirm.

This is an appeal from an eviction judgment for respondent landlord based on nonpayment of rent by appellant tenant. In challenging that judgment, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion because (1) respondent’s counsel engaged in misconduct and (2) the eviction was retaliatory. Appellant also (3) asserts that respondent’s purported failure to address certain affidavits that appellant filed in the district court amounts to concessions and (4) makes several arguments challenging decisions by the district court after appellant filed the notice of appeal. We affirm.

Appellant challenges his convictions of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district court violated his rights to self-representation and counsel. Appellant raises additional issues in a supplemental pro se brief. We affirm.

Appellant challenges her conviction for fifth-degree controlled-substance possession and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that law enforcement did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion for the seizure and expanded stop, and lacked probable cause to search personal property within her vehicle. We affirm.

Appellant T.C.P. argues that respondent State of Minnesota presented insufficient evidence to convict him of three-degree criminal sexual conduct. We reverse

Appellant challenges the judgments of conviction for second-degree aggravated robbery, simple robbery, and theft from a person, asserting that there are grave doubts as to the aggravated- and simple-robbery convictions and that the simple-robbery and theft-from-a-person convictions are for lesser-included offenses and thus must be vacated. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Appellant Bryant Terrell Garth, II challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions of four counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-degree premeditated murder. He also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial for a violation of a sequestration order and by imposing four consecutive sentences totaling 888 months. Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction and because we discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Appellant parent B.L. (mother) challenges the district court’s order transferring permanent physical and legal custody of her minor child, R.T., to respondent foster parent 1 J.B. (foster parent). On the second day of trial on the contested petition of respondent 1 Mother had sole legal and sole physical custody of R.T. at the time of removal, and by the time of the custody trial, R.T.’s father had waived his trial rights. Washington County Child Protection (the county) to permanently transfer legal and physical custody of R.T. to foster parent, mother submitted a voluntary petition to permanently transfer legal and physical custody of R.T. to foster parent. In making its decision, the district court expressly considered mother’s voluntary petition along with the testimony received during the first day of trial and the files, records, and proceedings. On appeal, mother contends that the district court’s order “is invalid as a matter of law”; alternatively, mother argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Mother urges this court to “remand this matter to trial.” We conclude that any error in the detail of the district court’s findings is harmless, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the permanent transfer of legal and physical custody to foster parent, and that mother fails to establish her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. But we also conclude that the district court’s order appears to include conflicting or inconsistent terms that we cannot resolve on the existing record. Thus, we affirm in part and remand.