Opinions Archive

Appellant challenges his convictions of first-degree controlled-substance sale and first-degree controlled-substance possession on the ground that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because it does not establish that he knowingly possessed methamphetamine. Appellant also argues that his sentence must be reversed and remanded for resentencing under the modified sentencing grid of the Minnesota Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA). We affirm appellant’s convictions but reverse his sentence and remand for resentencing.

On appeal, we review a judicial appeal panel's order granting provisional discharge for clear error. We will not reverse the panel's provisional discharge unless the party opposing discharge proves by clear and convincing evidence that the provisional discharge should be denied.

Wurm Partnership, LLP (Wurm) challenges the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment to PSI Production Stamping, Inc. (PSI) and the district court’s award of $313,426.40 to PSI for Wurm’s unjust enrichment. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact and PSI is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Wurm’s counterclaims for unpaid rent, eviction for unpaid rent, and reformation, and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting PSI equitable relief, we affirm.

A condition of random drug testing within Minnesota Statutes section 256D.024, subdivision 1(a) (2016), for receipt of benefits under chapter 256D, applies to persons who become eligible for benefits during the five-year period following completion of a court-ordered sentence for a qualifying drug crime and does not extend beyond the five-year period. Reversed.

Appellant Ahmed Abduljabbar challenges his conviction of driving while impaired, arguing the admission of a breath-test result was plain error. We affirm.

At his pretrial hearing, appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree assault in exchange for the state’s promise that, at sentencing, he could move for a dispositional departure from the sentencing guidelines and, if that was not granted, the state would ask for a bottom-of- the-box sentence of 135 months in prison, provided he remain law-abiding. At his sentencing hearing, appellant did not move for a sentencing departure and acknowledged that he faced new criminal charges in a different county. The district court imposed a sentence of 135 months in prison. On appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred when it sentenced him without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he had violated release conditions based on the new criminal charges. Because appellant forfeited the issue he attempts to raise on appeal, we affirm.

The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant for legal malpractice. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to serve an expert- disclosure affidavit before the statutory deadline. The plaintiff then moved to enlarge the statutory period for serving the expert-disclosure affidavit. The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to enlarge and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s motion to enlarge and, accordingly, did not err by granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, we affirm.

On appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to modify parenting time, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to analyze all of the statutory best-interests-of-the-child factors and that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous. We affirm.

A Becker County jury found Anthony Ruben Lucero guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct based on evidence that he engaged in the sexual penetration of an intoxicated 15-year-old girl. Lucero seeks a new trial on the ground that two of the state’s witnesses testified that he previously had engaged in a similar type of sexual misconduct. We affirm.

Appellants challenge the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of their malpractice claims as barred by res judicata. Appellants argue that res judicata is not applicable for procedural dismissals and that the current action is based on new evidence. Because we determine that res judicata applies and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing appellants’ claims, we affirm.