Opinions Archive

1. The claims in the petition filed before the district court under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 fall within the scope of that statute because the claims allege errors involving respondents' duties concerning a specific election. 2. Minnesota Statutes section 412.02, subdivision 2a, authorizes a statutory city to call for a special election to fill a city council vacancy before the next regular city election based on a special-election ordinance enacted after a person was initially appointed to fill the vacancy. 3. A statutory city does not violate article VIII, section 5, of the Minnesota Constitution regarding the removal of inferior officers when it calls for a special election to fill a city council seat vacated by a sitting councilmember's resignation. Affirmed.

In a civil action based on speech that is not in or on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding, to prevail on a special motion for expedited relief under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), Minnesota Statutes sections 554.07 to 554.20 (2024), a moving party must establish pursuant to section 554.08(b)(3) that the cause of action is based on speech on a matter of public concern, as required by section 554.13(a), regardless of whether, per section 554.08(d)(2), the action relates to the communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews or ratings of businesses. Affirmed.

Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his motion for a downward dispositional departure. We affirm.

Appellant argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of refusal to submit to a chemical test of blood or urine as required by a search warrant. We affirm.

In this certiorari appeal, relators challenge the revocation of their adult-foster-care licenses. Relators argue that (1) respondent Minnesota Department of Human Services (the department) erroneously relied on its own definition of "primary residence" without promulgating the definition as a rule and (2) the department's decision was arbitrary and 2 We affirm. capricious.

In this appeal from an order indeterminately committing him as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), appellant argues that the district court erred in two ways: (1) the record does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellant is an SDP, and (2) alternatively, appellant proved by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program was available and appropriate. Because the record establishes that appellant (a) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct, (b) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction and, as a result, (c) is likely to engage in future harmful sexual conduct, we affirm the district court's determination that appellant is an SDP. And because appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program (a) is available and willing to accept him, (b) is consistent with his treatment needs, and (c) is consistent with the requirements of public safety, we affirm the district court's determination that appellant be indeterminately committed to a secure treatment facility as an SDP.

Appellant challenges his sentence for second-degree intentional murder, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the longest sentence available in the presumptive range under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm.

In this direct appeal from a conviction for third-degree possession of a controlled substance, appellant Sharmark Hussein Jama maintains that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the alternative, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a dispositional departure at sentencing. We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in both respects and therefore affirm.

A Mower County jury found Wade Joseph Novak guilty of impersonating a peace officer based on evidence that he used flashing lights on his vehicle to cause another vehicle to stop. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Therefore, we affirm.

Appellants challenge the district court's dismissal of their claims related to an alleged breach of contract, arguing that it erred by determining that the claims are barred by a contractual release. By notice of related appeal, respondent and cross-appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying its motion for sanctions. We affirm.