Opinions Archive

1. Appellant did not forfeit the issue of whether a specific-unanimity instruction was required. 2. When the State charges one count of criminal conduct but presents evidence of more than one distinct act, each of which on its own could prove the elements of the charged offense, a defendant is entitled to a specific-unanimity instruction, which advises the jury that it must unanimously agree as to the distinct act that proves the elements of the charged offense. 3. To determine whether a specific-unanimity instruction is required, a court must first look to the statute defining the offense to identify the elements of the offense and then determine whether the State has alleged more than one distinct act that could prove those elements. 4. The district court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s request for a specific-unanimity instruction because the State alleged two distinct acts of nonconsensual sexual penetration, either of which on its own could have proved the single charged offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. 5. The district court’s error in denying appellant’s request for a specific- unanimity instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it is reasonably likely that some jurors believed that appellant sexually penetrated the victim in the bedroom but not the living room, while other jurors believed that appellant sexually penetrated the victim in the living room but not the bedroom. Reversed and remanded.

An uninsured motor vehicle under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (no-fault act), Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2024), includes a motor vehicle for which no liability coverage is available because a tortfeasor is shielded by common-law official immunity. Reversed and remanded.

Respondent-insured brought an action against appellant-insurer seeking to recover uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. Following a damages trial, the jury returned a verdict for respondent. Appellant argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by denying its motion for a new trial. We affirm.

1. Because the contested-case provisions in the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 14.63-.69 (2024), do not apply to the commissioner of mediation services, and the Public Employment Labor Relations Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.01-.25 (2024) does not set forth a standard for appellate review, we apply the common-law standard for reviewing quasi-judicial decisions from the Bureau of Mediation Services. 2. To determine whether a position satisfies the “professional employee” definition under section 179A.03, subdivision 13(1) (2024), the “advanced knowledge” requirement in subdivision 13(1)(iv) requires the Bureau of Mediation Services to evaluate whether employees in that position have customarily engaged in a comprehensive course of study—distinct from a general postsecondary degree or on-the-job training—prior to beginning the position, and whether such advanced knowledge is required to perform the tasks of that position. Reversed and remanded.

In this breach-of-contract action, appellant challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent bank. Appellant contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) should have applied South Dakota law as required by the credit-card agreement, and (3) failed to hold third parties vicariously liable. We affirm.

In this probate-related dispute, appellants argue that, as nonparties to the probate and fraudulent-transfer matters arising from decedent's death, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they were never sued. We agree and reverse and remand with instructions to the district court to dismiss the action with prejudice. This matter could be viewed as a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction as well. Our analysis will address personal jurisdiction because the parties have cast this action as such.

Appellant challenges the district court's dismissal of her medical-malpractice action for failure to prosecute. Appellant also challenges multiple earlier underlying orders from the district court. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing appellant's complaint for failure to prosecute, we affirm.

Appellant Deionte Jaewon Parker challenges his convictions of second-degree intentional murder and unlawful firearm possession. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the district court abused its discretion by allowing respondent State of Minnesota to introduce evidence of prior incidents. Because sufficient evidence supports Parker's convictions and the district court acted within its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, we affirm.

Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that relator is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit his employment without a good reason caused by the company and because it was not medically necessary. Relator also contends that the ULJ failed to adequately develop the record on whether it was medically necessary for him to quit working when he did. We affirm.

Relator Shakitha Jones challenges the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits on the grounds that the unemployment-law judge (ULJ) erred by concluding that she was discharged for employment misconduct. Because the ULJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record, we affirm.