Opinions Archive

1. To perfect an appeal and confer jurisdiction on a district court in an action initiated under Minnesota Statutes section 462.361, subdivision 1 (2018), an aggrieved party appealing a zoning variance is only required to serve the municipality that decided the variance application, rather than the municipality and all necessary parties. 2. The district court erred by dismissing the action with prejudice rather than joining the non-municipality defendants to the action under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 19.01. Reversed and remanded.

On appeal from an action arising from a motor-vehicle collision, appellants challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment for respondents, arguing that the district court erred in (1) relying on, as a business record under Minn. R. Evid. 803(6), an unsworn statement taken by an insurance adjuster; (2) determining that the at-fault driver was not a permissive user of the rental vehicle; (3) determining that respondent insurer is not estopped from asserting the defenses of defective process and defective service of process; (4) determining that appellants failed to properly serve the summons and complaint on respondent foreign insurance company; and (5) determining that the complaint could not be amended to correct a typographical error after the statute of limitations had run. We affirm.

Appellant argues that his conviction for second-degree burglary must be reversed because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the home with the intent to commit a theft. We affirm.

Appellant Donald Eugene DeGroat Jr. challenges his conviction of first-degree controlled-substance possession, arguing (1) that the district court erred by not suppressing evidence obtained as a result of an invalid search warrant, (2) that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (3) the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, and (4) the district court erred by admitting certain testimony at trial. DeGroat also raises additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. Because we conclude that the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an invalid search warrant, we address only that issue and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence for first-degree assault, arguing that his guilty plea was invalid and that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a guidelines sentence. We affirm.

In this direct appeal from judgment of conviction for criminal sexual conduct, appellant challenges the district court’s admission of other-acts evidence and contends that the district court erred in adjudicating him guilty of both counts of criminal sexual conduct of which a jury found him guilty. In his pro se supplemental brief, appellant also argues that the district court erred because no mental health evaluation was completed prior to sentencing to support a downward departure and appellant’s counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to arrange a psychosexual evaluation. We reverse in part and remand with instructions to vacate the conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct. We affirm in all other respects.

After being released from prison and placed on supervised release, Christopher Christopherson sought and received treatment from a clinic owned and operated by Alpha Service Industries, Inc. (doing business as Alpha Human Services). Christopherson signed a consent form that authorized Alpha to release information concerning his treatment to his probation officer. Two years later, while still on supervised release, Christopherson informed Alpha that he wished to revoke his consent. Alpha later released information concerning Christopherson’s treatment to his probation officer. Christopherson sued Alpha, alleging a violation of the Minnesota Health Records Act. The district court granted Alpha’s motion for summary judgment. We conclude that Alpha did not violate the health- records act because the consent form that Christopherson signed expressly states that his consent may not be revoked until he has completed his term of supervised release. Therefore, we affirm.

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant Ali Joshua Jalil Robida argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a downward dispositional or durational sentencing departure because he is particularly amenable to treatment and the district court did not explain its reasons for denying the durational departure. Because the district court imposed a presumptive guidelines sentence only after carefully considering the testimony and all evidence including that which supports appellant’s departure motion, we affirm.

A Minnesota trooper arrested Oregon resident Patrick Martini for drunk driving, administered a breath test confirming Martini’s intoxication, and issued Martini a “Notice and Order of Revocation” of his Minnesota driving privileges. The notice stated that the revocation would begin seven days later, but the trooper mistakenly told Martini he was immediately prohibited from driving. The district court rejected Martini’s petition to rescind the revocation. In this appeal we too reject Martini’s due-process theory and affirm the district court because Martini was not misled about the consequences of refusing a chemical test, he had actual notice of the practical revocation date, and the loss of an insignificant amount of hardship relief does not result in a due-process violation.

Appellant Beatrice Kamathi Kanake challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to withdraw from a property settlement agreement—reached during a settlement conference as part of an ongoing dissolution proceeding—and argues that the court failed to find that the agreement was just and equitable. She also suggests that the subsequent judgment and decree is not supported by the record. Because we are satisfied that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion, we affirm.