Opinions Archive

1. In determining whether to order forfeiture of a bail bond, the trial court must exercise its discretion and consider, among other factors, the proportionality of any prejudice to the state compared to the amount of the bail bond to be forfeited. 2. When the trial court’s decision to forfeit a bond is against logic and facts on the record, a reviewing court will find an abuse of discretion. Reversed and remanded.

1. Under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 56.03, subdivision 5(b), a person who entered an admission to a petition for termination of parental rights may file a motion to withdraw their admission at any time upon a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. 2. When a person files a motion to withdraw their admission to a petition for termination of parental rights under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 56.03, subdivision 5(b), the district court must determine whether the motion makes a prima facie showing that a manifest injustice has occurred and that withdrawal is necessary to correct the injustice. If the district court determines that the motion makes such a showing, then the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing. Reversed and remanded.

Whether a civil action is based on speech “on a matter of public concern” and thus within the scope of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07-.20 (2024), is determined, consistent with common-law interpretation of the phrase in the defamation context, on a case-by-case basis given the totality of circumstances, taking into consideration the content, form, and context of the speech, as well as any other pertinent factors. Affirmed.

1. The state’s involvement in the investigation or cleanup of a released hazardous substance does not preclude a claim under the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act (MERLA), Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.01-.20 (2024). 2. As it appears in the definition of “release” under Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(b)(4), the term “residue” does not include “rinsate” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 18B.01, subd. 25 (2024). 3. Whether damages awarded under Minn. Stat. § 115B.04 are “reasonable and necessary” is a factual determination for the district court. 4. A party may be awarded damages for the diminution of value of their property under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05. Affirmed.

This is a direct appeal from the final judgment of convictions of second-degree solicitation of prostitution, second-degree promotion of prostitution, second-degree sex trafficking, three counts of fifth-degree controlled-substance possession, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant Morries Lester Hall argues that the district court erred by (1) not permitting him to introduce evidence of his good character, (2) allowing the state to impeach him with five prior felony convictions and by admitting the warrants of commitment for those convictions, and (3) entering convictions for six of the seven counts for which he was found guilty, though not sentenced. We affirm the district court's decision to exclude Hall's good-character evidence and to allow the state to impeach him with his prior offenses. However, because the warrant of commitment improperly indicates convictions for counts related to prostitution that arose from the same act, we reverse in part and remand to vacate those convictions.

In this medical-malpractice case, appellant Ken Bellicot —in his capacity as the trustee for his deceased wife Sallie Bellicot's next of kin—challenges the district court's decision to grant respondents' motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). Because there is sufficient evidence on the issue of causation to present a fact issue that requires resolution by a jury, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

In this direct appeal from judgment of conviction for third-degree driving while impaired (DWI), and following a stay and remand for postconviction proceedings, appellant argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and, in the alternative, that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Appellant raises three issues; whether his plea was accurate, whether it was intelligent, and whether his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that appellant's plea was valid and that appellant fails to assert grounds establishing that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. We also conclude that the files and record conclusively show that appellant is not entitled to relief, so the district court did not err by denying appellant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. Thus, we affirm.

In this direct appeal from a final judgment convicting appellant of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues that the district court prejudicially abused its discretion by admitting testimony about four different prior bad acts as Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). Because we conclude that the district court did not act within its discretion by allowing the state to introduce the challenged evidence and that there is a reasonable possibility that this evidentiary error significantly affected the verdict, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Edward Bello was employed by the University of Minnesota until he resigned his position. An unemployment law judge (ULJ) determined that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he did not quit for a good reason caused by his employer. We affirm.

Appellant Emmanuel Troy Davis challenges the postconviction court's decision to deny his petition for postconviction relief. Davis argues the postconviction court abused its discretion when it determined the district court acted properly when it accepted and imposed Davis's agreed-upon sentence, without independently calculating the appropriate presumptive guidelines range under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Because we do not discern that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Davis to the agreed-upon 240 months in prison, we affirm the postconviction court's decision to deny Davis's petition for postconviction relief.