Opinions Archive

1. In determining whether to order forfeiture of a bail bond, the trial court must exercise its discretion and consider, among other factors, the proportionality of any prejudice to the state compared to the amount of the bail bond to be forfeited. 2. When the trial court’s decision to forfeit a bond is against logic and facts on the record, a reviewing court will find an abuse of discretion. Reversed and remanded.

1. Because a plaintiff’s complaint need not anticipate and rebut an affirmative defense to survive a motion to dismiss based on that defense, a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense may be granted only if the allegations in the complaint, construed in the plaintiff’s favor, establish an unrebuttable defense. 2. Given our decision that the complaint was improperly dismissed based on the asserted affirmative defense, respondents Josh Krsnak and JT Manager, LLC, are no longer the “prevailing party” and are not entitled to contractual costs and attorney fees at this time. Reversed and remanded.

1. For purposes of a claim of unjust enrichment, a person or entity is enriched upon receipt of a benefit. 2. A city acting in its legislative capacity in establishing stormwater utility fees is entitled to judicial deference. 3. To withstand summary judgment on an unjust-enrichment claim that challenges municipal stormwater utility fees, a plaintiff must produce evidence that (a) a reasonable fact-finder could conclude clearly and convincingly rebuts the presumption of just and reasonable rate-design decisions and (b) establishes a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a municipality unjustly retained fees. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Appellant, trustee for the next-of-kin of a deceased patient of respondent, a medical- care provider, challenges the denial of appellant’s motion for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in excluding some of appellant’s expert-witnesses’ testimony and in granting respondent’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). We affirm.

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for threats of violence and second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, appellant Billy Jean Sledge challenges his convictions on two grounds. First, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he did not act in self-defense. Second, he argues that the district court committed reversible plain error in instructing the jury on the threats-of-violence offense. We determine that the evidence is sufficient to disprove Sledge’s self-defense claim and that the jury instructions, while plainly erroneous, did not affect Sledge’s substantial rights. We therefore affirm.

In this pretrial appeal, the state challenges the district court’s order suppressing evidence obtained after a sheriff’s deputy stopped respondent’s vehicle. Because we conclude that the deputy had reasonable suspicion justifying an expansion of the traffic stop, we reverse and remand.

In this certiorari appeal following our previous opinion reversing and remanding respondent city’s negative declaration on the need for an environmental-impact statement (EIS) regarding respondent university’s plan to build a multipurpose arena on its campus, relator challenges the city’s second negative EIS declaration for the project. Relator argues that the city failed to remedy the defects in the environmental-assessment worksheet (EAW) that we identified in our first decision and that the city otherwise erred in several ways on remand. We affirm.

In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for second-degree intentional murder for the benefit of a gang, appellant Donta Jaboat Brown argues that (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting a prior recorded statement of a witness under the residual exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the district court abused its discretion by admitting cumulative and prejudicial gang-related evidence; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting hearsay, appealing to racial stereotypes, injecting a personal opinion into the case to endorse the credibility of a witness, and improperly making arguments in the opening statement; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived Brown of a fair trial. Because we discern no error, we affirm.

A jury awarded Ty Bernard $250,000 in emotional-distress damages after finding that former employer Superset Tile & Stone LLC unlawfully discriminated against him because of his disability, but the district court remitted the award to $75,000. Bernard appeals, arguing that the district court should not have disturbed the jury’s verdict. Superset cross appeals, arguing that the district court should have reduced the award even further or granted it a new trial. Because the district court acted within its discretion by remitting the damages and Superset’s arguments differ materially on appeal from those it made to the district court, we affirm in part. But we reverse in part and remand for the district court to allow Bernard the option to accept either the remitted award or a new trial on damages.

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for unlawful firearm possession and fifth-degree drug possession, appellant Myon Demarlo Burrell argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence against him because the police lacked (1) reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of his initial traffic stop to conduct an impaired-driving investigation and (2) probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle. In making both arguments, Burrell contends that several of the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. We affirm.