Opinions Archive

1. A referendum on a Saint Paul ordinance that establishes organized waste collection services does not conflict with the requirements in Minn. Stat. §§ 115A.94–.941 (2018), that municipalities ensure that residents have waste collection services including through appropriate local controls, because ordinances that are not subject to the referendum fulfill those requirements and the Legislature intended that municipalities have broad authority in the process for establishing organized waste collection. 2. A referendum on an ordinance that establishes organized waste collection services in the City does not impair the City’s contract obligations under the Contract Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Affirmed.

1. Discounts negotiated by managed-care organizations under Minnesota’s Prepaid Medical Assistance Plan are “payments made pursuant to the United States Social Security Act” and therefore are not deducted from the jury’s damages award under the collateral-source statute, Minnesota Statutes section 548.251, subdivision 1(2) (2018). 2. The Legislature intended to displace the common-law collateral-source rule for medical insurance payments and thus the common law cannot be used to reduce the jury’s damages award. Affirmed.

A law-enforcement officer may seize an item pursuant to a search warrant if the item is described in the search warrant, if there is a strong relationship between the seized item and the things described in the search warrant, or if the seized item clearly and definitely relates to the suspected criminal conduct that gave rise to the issuance of the search warrant.

Appellant Elijah Ahmad Milsap appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to correct sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, asserting that his sentence was not authorized by law. Because Milsap’s sentence is authorized by statute and is within the presumptive range of sentences provided by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, we affirm.

After pleading guilty to one count of criminal sexual conduct pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Terrance Trevelle Hill received a stayed sentence and fifteen years of probation. After Hill violated his probation conditions, the district court revoked Hill’s probation. Hill now challenges his sentence and that revocation. Because Hill’s challenges to his sentence are not properly before this court, we decline to address Hill’s arguments pertaining to it. But because the district court’s findings are insufficient to support the revocation of Hill’s probation, we reverse and remand.

In this certiorari appeal, relator Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA) challenges decisions by respondent Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), denying MCEA’s request for a contested-case hearing on a national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) feedlot permit and request for an environmental impact statement (EIS) regarding respondent Daley Farms’ proposed expansion of its 1 dairy-farm concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO). The MCEA argues that because Daley Farms’ manure management plan (MMP) and best management practices (BMPs) will not effectively mitigate potential environmental effects, Daley Farms’ expansion project will pollute the water supply in 2 the sensitive karst area of southeastern Minnesota. Specifically, the MCEA argues that (1) the MPCA’s decision to deny an EIS for Daley Farms’ expansion was based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, and arbitrary and capricious; (2) the MPCA’s decision to issue a modified NPDES permit was unsupported by substantial evidence; 1 An animal feeding operation (AFO) is “a lot or facility (other than an aquatic animal production facility)” where “animals (other than aquatic animals) have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained for 45 days or more in any 12–month period” and “[c]rops, vegetation, forage growth or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (b)(1) (2019). An AFO is defined as either a large or a medium CAFO. Id., (b)(2) (2019). A dairy operation is a large CAFO if it stables or confines more than “700 mature dairy cows.” Id., (b)(4)(i) (2019). 2 Karst is “[a]n area of irregular limestone in which erosion has produced fissures, sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 957 (5th ed. 2011). 2 (3) the MPCA’s denial of a contested-case hearing was unsupported by substantial evidence; and (4) the MPCA’s decision to issue the NPDES permit before issuing a commissioner report, as set out in Minn. R. 7001.0125, subp. 2 (2017), was made upon unlawful procedure. Because the MPCA’s determination that an EIS was not needed was arbitrary and capricious, we reverse and remand to the MPCA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. And because a determination of whether an EIS is needed must precede a decision to approve a permit modification, we also reverse the NPDES permit modification approval and remand to the MPCA. We reject other objections raised by the MCEA, however, and also conclude the MPCA’s denial of a contested-case hearing is supported by substantial evidence, and the MPCA’s failure to issue a commissioner’s report was not procedural error.

Marcus Jones pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree possession of cocaine with intent to sell after Saint Paul police found cocaine in the back seat of his car in May 2016 and Minneapolis police found cocaine in the apartment where he lived two days later. The district court sentenced Jones on both counts. Jones appeals, arguing that one of his convictions must be vacated because the offenses were both part of the same course of conduct. He relatedly contends that the district court exaggerated the criminality of his conduct by Hernandizing his sentences. And he argues that the district court erroneously failed to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence. Because Jones’s convictions resulted from different behavioral incidents and because the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request for a durational or dispositional sentencing departure, we affirm.

Appellant, pro se, challenges the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to withdraw his stipulation to commitment to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and entitled to an evidentiary hearing and to withdrawal under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 6. Because appellant’s motion to withdraw was untimely, he has not shown that his counsel was ineffective, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 6, does not apply to stipulation withdrawal, we affirm.

Appellant challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights to her child. She argues that the district court erred in concluding that she failed to rebut the statutory presumption that she is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship and abused its discretion in determining that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.

We affirm the termination of appellant’s parental rights because the record supports the district court’s findings and determinations that she failed to satisfy the duties of the parent-child relationship and that respondent county’s reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement.