Opinions Archive

A district court plainly errs by allowing a witness to testify at trial outside the presence of a defendant without holding a hearing and making findings pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4(c) (2024), that the defendant’s presence “would psychologically traumatize the witness so as to render the witness unavailable to testify.” Affirmed.

In this appeal from the district court's order denying her petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues that the court abused its discretion in determining that it had acted within its discretion in its earlier denial of appellant's presentence motion to withdraw her Alford plea to the charge of third-degree burglary. Appellant maintains that she advanced fair-and-just reasons for withdrawal and that the state asserted no prejudice. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's postconviction petition, we affirm.

1. An entity that seeks to receive payment on any pecuniary obligation for others, including a rental-vehicle damage claim, is engaged in the collection of “any . . . other indebtedness” and thus is a “collection agency” under Minn. Stat. § 332.31, subd. 3 (2024), regardless of whether such indebtedness is liquidated. 2. An entity that agrees to undertake efforts to collect a debt originally owned by another and remit to the original debtholder some or all amounts collected on that indebtedness is engaged in collection “for others” and thus is a “collection agency” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 332.31, subd. 3. 3. An entity that contracts with a Minnesota business to undertake efforts to collect a debt for the benefit of another or engages in debt collection originating from a transaction occurring in Minnesota is subject to regulation under Minn. Stat. §§ 332.31-.44 (2024), Minnesota’s collection agency statutes. Affirmed.

On appeal from his convictions of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing respondent to introduce expert testimony on "grooming" behavior, and refusing to redact a statement made by the victim in a recorded interview that was played for the jury related to appellant's attempt to kill the victim's mother. Appellant also contends that the cumulative effect of the evidentiary errors deprived him of a fair trial. Appellant further argues that the district court erred in convicting him on all offenses of which he was found guilty because all of the offenses were based on the same acts. Finally, appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he appears to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm appellant's convictions on counts I through III, but reverse and remand for the district court to vacate appellant's conviction on count IV.

In this appeal following a court trial, appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that she is the owner of a vehicle sold to her by respondent and that there was no breach of the agreement between appellant and respondent related to the purchase of the vehicle. We affirm.

Robert Villanueva lingered inside a convenience store's retail area and its restroom for hours before store staff finally questioned whether he was using drugs and ordered him to leave. Villanueva sued the store, alleging intrusion upon seclusion (a cleaning employee attempted to enter a restroom that Villanueva occupied), defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and retaliation. The district court dismissed all claims on summary judgment, concluding that the undisputed facts supported none of them. Because the undisputed facts establish that the store is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.

In this appeal from the district court's order certifying appellant for adult prosecution, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining whether retaining the proceeding in juvenile court serves public safety. Appellant specifically challenges the district court's consideration of the public-safety factors set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 260B.125, subdivision 4 (2024). Because we conclude that the district court properly considered the challenged public-safety factors and acted within its discretion in ordering adult certification, we affirm.

Respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant Robert Daniel Mesenburg's driver's license based upon a finding that he refused to submit to a breath test after his arrest for driving while impaired. Mesenburg petitioned the district court to rescind the revocation of his license. The district court denied the petition. We affirm.

Scott Schillak demanded a speedy trial to contest a speeding citation that he received after a police officer ticketed him for driving 18 miles over the posted speed limit. Schillak appeals from his conviction, arguing first that the district court violated his speedy-trial right, second that he was improperly refused discovery contingent on his paying an administrative fee, and third that the evidence was insufficient to support the speeding conviction because the district court admitted the officer's testimony about the LIDAR reading without sufficient foundation. Because the district court did not violate Schillak's right to a speedy trial, properly applied the discovery rules to require payment of the nominal administrative fee, and did not erroneously admit evidence of the LIDAR reading, we affirm.

Appellant Larry Kenneth Alexander argues that the district court erred in continuing the parties' summary-judgment hearing, granting respondents GSIC II Southview, LLC, and Greystar Management Services, L.P.'s (collectively, the apartment complex) motion for summary judgment, and dismissing his claims against respondent Tyson's Towing and Transport, LLC. We affirm.