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Advisory Opinion 95-052

December 7, 1995; School District 777 (Benson)

12/7/1995 10:14:43 AM

This is an opinion of the Commissioner of Administration issued pursuant to section 13.072 of Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 13 - the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. It is based on the facts and information available to the Commissioner as described below.


Facts and Procedural History:

For purposes of simplification, the information presented by the citizen who requested this opinion and the response from the government entity with which the citizen disagrees are presented in summary form. Copies of the complete submissions are on file at the offices of PIPA and are available for public access.

On October 18, 1995, PIPA received a letter dated October 13, 1995, from T's mother. In her letter, T's mother requested an advisory opinion regarding a possible inappropriate dissemination of private data by Independent School District 777, Benson, hereinafter District 777.

In response to the request of T's mother, PIPA, on behalf of the Commissioner, wrote to Les Potas, Superintendent of District 777. The purposes of this letter, dated October 20, 1995, were to inform Dr. Potas of T's mother's request, to ask him or District 777's attorney to provide information or support for District 777's position, and to inform him of the date by which the Commissioner was required to issue this opinion. On November 29, 1995, PIPA received a response, dated November 29, 1995, from Kevin Rupp and Nancy Blumstein, attorneys representing District 777. (In subsequent correspondence, T's mother and Dr. Potas, were informed that the Commissioner would be taking additional time, as allowed by statute, to issue this opinion.)

A summary of the detailed facts surrounding this situation is as follows. In her letter, T's mother described the data she believes to be private that were disseminated by a school psychologist to a school secretary, It was brought to my attention on September 29, 1995 that dissemination of private data about [T] was disclosed by the school psychologist to a secretary...that takes care of another age group not pertaining to any area concerning [T]. Information disclosed pertained to [a flare-up of a specific medical condition which is T's] due to my judgement on a medication change. Also an incident between [T's]...teacher, myself, my husband and [T] in regards to [the flare-up of a specific medical condition which is T's] and a communication not [sic] book that is a log for [T's medical condition].

Also according to T's mother, several additional comments were made to the secretary about her (T's mother's) behavior, such as I was over reacting to allot [sic] of my daughters [sic] concerns and I was calling the school to [sic] often.

In their response to T's mother's opinion request, Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp asserted that the issue of this opinion, as stated by the Commissioner, is different than the issue raised by T's mother.

Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp also argued that the Commissioner lacks authority to issue this opinion, In posing her question and in providing the School District the opportunity to respond to the parent's factual allegations, the Commissioner has assumed that she has the power to act as the arbiter of fact in this matter. She has also assumed that she has the power to render an opinion on the application of the federal Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C. section 1232g). Neither of these assumptions are correct.

Finally, Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp argued, based on Keezer v. Spickard, 493 N.W.2d 614 (Minn.App. 1992), The only information imparted by the School Psychologist to the secretary during this conversation consisted of her unrecorded mental impressions and apprehensions about the student's parent and home situation or other information about the teacher's interaction with the parent that was recorded only in the mind of the psychologist or teacher. Under the rule set out above, this information does not constitute government data. Therefore, no violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act may be established on these facts.



Issue:

In her request for an opinion, T's mother asked the Commissioner to address the following issue:

Was the dissemination of data about T, by a school psychologist to a school secretary, consistent with the requirements of Minnesota Statutes Chapter 13, Minnesota Rules Chapter 1205, and 20 United States Code 1232g (the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974)?



Discussion:

Before addressing the issue raised by T's mother, the Commissioner must respond to the first three assertions made by Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp. First is the argument that the Commissioner's statement of the issue in this opinion is inaccurate:
...while your [PIPA's request to School District 777 for a response] letter asked the School District to respond to the question of whether a dissemination of data regarding the student had violated the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act and FERPA, the letter initiating the request for an advisory opinion indicated that the parent's allegations actually involved the supposed dissemination of information (not necessarily data) by a school psychologist regarding the parent's actions or behavior (rather than the student's) to another party....the parent's letter expressly states that the information she believes to have been disclosed by the School District arose out of a school psychologist's questions about the parent to a secretary in the School District.

Given the information provided the Commissioner by T's mother, the Commissioner respectfully disagrees. In her opinion request, T's mother wrote, Information disclosed pertained to [a flare-up of a specific medical condition which is T's] my judgement on a medication change. Also an incident between [T's]...teacher, myself, my husband and [T] in regards to [the flare-up of a special medical condition which is T's] and a communication not [sic] book that is a log for [T's medical condition]. In these comments, T's mother states clearly that data or information about T was disclosed, e.g. the fact that T's medical condition had flared-up, the fact that T's medication had been changed, and the fact that an incident had occurred between T's mother, T's teacher, and T's mother's husband. While the Commissioner agrees that some of the data apparently disclosed by District 777 appear to be about T's mother, much of the data are clearlyalso about T. However, it should be noted, pursuant to Section 13.32, subdivision 2 (b), that data concerning parents are also educational data and therefore, are classified as private.

Second is the assertion by Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp that the Commissioner lacks the authority to render opinions on the application of FERPA, The Minnesota legislature has not and, in fact, could not, grant the Commissioner the authority to render advisory opinions on the application of FERPA. There are a variety of reasons why the Commissioner may find it necessary to discuss the requirements of FERPA in an opinion. First, some of FERPA's provisions have been incorporated into Chapter 13. Second, the advisory opinion enabling language, Section 13.072, authorizes the Commissioner to give a written opinion regarding the person's rights as a subject of government data or right to have access to government data. Nothing in this language prohibits the Commissioner from commenting on federal law which affects the rights of the person.

Third is the assertion by Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp that nothing in Section 13.072 gives the Commissioner the right to determine whether a violation of Minnesota or federal law has occurred or to make findings of fact. This argument is now quite familiar to the Commissioner as Ms. Blumstein and some of her colleagues have included it in their responses to several other opinion requests. In Advisory Opinion 95-029 the Commissioner quoted from Advisory Opinion 93-004:

Ms. Blumstein's [attorney for an educational agency] chief objection seems to rest on the concern that the Commissioner is being asked whether the actions of an entity subject to the MGDPA constitute a violation of the MGDPA. Many of the questions that can be asked of the Commissioner under this new authority will implicitly or explicitly lead to a conclusion, based on the facts relied upon by the Commissioner in issuing an opinion, that a violation of the MGDPA may have occurred. The Commissioner is of the opinion that refusing to issue opinions in situations like that would lead inevitably to a situation of issuing no opinions whatsoever because virtually all opinions could be interpreted as a finding that an agency violated the MGDPA.

It is the Commissioner's opinion that the legislature conferred sufficient authority on her to issue these types of opinions. Her opinions are by their nature conditional on the facts and information presented to her by the government entity and the data subject. To the extent that a Commissioner's opinion becomes at issue as part of a lawsuit, no court is bound to adopt all or part of a Commissioner's opinion. Under the terms of the authority conferred by the legislature, courts are only asked to give deference to the Commissioner's opinions, they are not directed to surrender their fact finding authority to the Commissioner or to automatically accept that if the Commissioner determined on the facts provided to her that there may have been a violation of the MGDPA that an actual violation did occur. To the extent that a court finds the Commissioner's opinions helpful because of the special expertise of the Department of Administration in data practices matters it is free to use that expertise. To the extent that a court finds that the commissioner's opinion rests on incomplete or incorrect facts, the court will obviously be free to find its own facts.


The Commissioner's position on the aforementioned issue raised by Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp has not changed since Ms. Blumstein raised the same issue in connection with Advisory Opinion 93-004 and her colleague, Mr. Foy, raised the same issue in connection with Advisory Opinion 95-029.

T's mother requested this opinion because she is concerned that School District 777 inappropriately disseminated data about T. It should first be noted that, pursuant to Section 13.32, subdivision 1 (a), data on individuals maintained by a public educational agency or institution which relate to a student are termed educational data. Pursuant to Section 13.32, subdivision 3, educational data are private data on individuals and can be disclosed in only very limited circumstances. Also, as previously mentioned, Section 13.32, subdivision 2 (b), defines data concerning parents as educational data. Therefore, regardless of whether the data are about T and/or T's mother, the data are private.

One exception to the strict statutory requirements regarding disclosure of private data was created by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Keezer v. Spickard. In this case, the court wrote:

If 'government data' includes the unrecorded mental impressions of government employees, [Chapter 13] requires responsible authorities to describe procedures for gaining access to these impressions. The statute cannot be reasonably interpreted to include such a requirement....To give effect to [Chapter 13], we conclude that information is not government data until the information is recorded somewhere other than the human brain....Under this definition of 'government data', an individual has no cause of action under [Chapter 13] for the unauthorized release of private data about him unless he shows the information released was recorded somewhere other than in the mind of a government employee.

As applied to the situation at hand, if the data about T (and/or T's mother), disclosed by the school psychologist to the school secretary, were not recorded somewhere other than in the mind of a government employee, those data are not government data and are not subject to the requirements of Chapter 13.

In their response, Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp stated that District 777 conducted a thorough investigation into T's mother's complaint and determined that the data communicated by the school psychologist to the school secretary had not been recorded, The only information communicated by the psychologist to the secretary consisted of the psychologist's unrecorded thoughts and apprehensions, her general unrecorded observations about the parent or other unrecorded information. Further, Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp stated:

The only information imparted by the School Psychologist to the secretary during this conversation consisted of her unrecorded mental impressions and apprehensions about the student's parent that was recorded only in the mind of the psychologist or teacher.

Under the rule set out above, this information does not constitute government data. Therefore, no violation of the Minnesota Data Practices Act may be established on these facts.


Even thought there does appear to be a dispute regarding whether the data in question are data about T or about T's mother (or about both T and T's mother), the facts as presented by Ms. Blumstein and Mr. Rupp (that no data were ever recorded regarding the incident described by T's mother), coupled with the reality that nothing in T's mother's letter indicates otherwise, lead the Commissioner to conclude that the data in question, based on Keezer v. Spickard, are not government data. Therefore, it appears that no violation of Chapter 13, Minnesota Rules Chapter 1205, or FERPA has occurred.

However, since the conclusion reached in this opinion relies upon a court decision of which T's mother may or may not be aware, it is important to note that had her opinion request contained additional information regarding whether the data were or were not recorded, the result of this opinion might have been different.


Opinion:


Based on the correspondence in this matter, my opinion on the issue raised by T's mother is as follows:

Based on the information provided by District 777, it appears that because the data in question are unrecorded mental impressions of government employees, the data are not government data, and therefore, are not subject to the requirements of Chapter 13 (see Keezer v. Spickard, 493, N.W.2d 614 (Minn.App. 1992)). Accordingly, the dissemination of data by District 777 was not in violation of the requirements of Chapter 13.

Signed:

Elaine S. Hansen
Commissioner

Dated: December 7, 1995



Personnel data

Commissioner of Administration

Mental impressions (See: Keezer v. Spickard, 493 N.W.2d 614)

Mental impressions (Keezer v. Spickard, 493 N.W.2d 614)

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