Facts and Procedural History:

For purposes of simplification, the information presented by the person who requested this opinion and the response from the government entity with which the person disagrees are presented in summary form. Copies of the complete submissions are on file at the offices of IPA and, with the exception of any data that are not public, are available for public access.

On October 30, 2001, IPA received a letter from John P. Borger, on behalf of his client the Star Tribune. In this letter, Mr. Borger asked the Commissioner to issue an advisory opinion regarding his client's right to gain access to certain data maintained by the Blue Earth County Medical Examiner.

In response to Mr. Borger's request, IPA, on behalf of the Commissioner, wrote to D.D. Gremel, Blue Earth County Medical Examiner. The purposes of this letter, dated November 6, 2001, were to inform him of Mr. Borger's request and to ask him to provide information or support for the County's position. On November 13, 2001, IPA received a response from Dr. Gremel. On November 14, 2001, IPA received a response from Ann E. Decker, attorney for Dr. Gremel in his capacity as a pathologist with privileges at Immanuel Joseph's Hospital in Mankato, Minnesota. A summary of the facts of this matter follows.

This request involves issues surrounding the release of information in connection with the death on August 1, 2001, of Minnesota Vikings football player Korey Stringer. Mr. Borger wrote: [t]his was the first heat-related death in National Football League history, and [Stringer's] death attracted national attention. Dr. Dennis Gremel is the medical examiner for Blue Earth County. Dr. Gremel also is a pathologist at Immanuel St. Joseph's Hospital in Mankato, a private hospital. He performed the autopsy on Korey Stringer, although the death certificate signed on August 13, 2001, was signed by Dr. Wm. David Knowles, who coordinates care for the Vikings.

According to Mr. Borger, shortly after Mr. Stringer's death, a Star Tribune reporter contacted the Blue Earth County Attorney's office seeking information on any investigation of the death, and spoke with assistant county attorney Doug Sinclair. No information was forthcoming, so a Star Tribune editor made a written request to Mr. Sinclair, asking for public data related to the death of Korey Stringer under section 13.832 [sic].

The Star Tribune was directed by Dr. Gremel's office to Kevin Burns, the director of communications for Immanuel St. Joseph's Hospital, who refused to provide any data, and who stated that the data in the death certificate would not be released to the public until it was filed at the County.

Subsequently, the Star Tribune's repeated requests were referred from the medical examiner's office, to the hospital, to the county attorney, and back to the medical examiner. At some point, Mr. Borger writes, Mr. Burns stated that there was no data to be released, because Dr. Gremel was not acting in his capacity as medical examiner, but rather as a private doctor. Dr. Gremel confirmed that position in a telephone call with the Star Tribune. The death certificate was signed on August 13, 2001, and filed on August 20, 2001.

Mr. Borger stated:

Although the Requested Data eventually was provided, we believe that it was not provided in a timely fashion, and that the proper official (the medical examiner) did not release the Requested Data at all. Dr. Gremel's contention that he did not perform the autopsy as a public official is particularly troubling. In many locations outside the metropolitan areas of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, county medical examiners serve part-time and maintain private practices in addition to their public duties. If Dr. Gremel is correct in his assertion that he did not have to provide the Requested Data because he performed the autopsy in his capacity as a private physician, there is a potential for widespread manipulation of the Data Practices Act to deprive the public of data which the Act provides shall be public.

In connection with his discussion of the applicability of Minnesota Statutes, section 390.11, (which requires a coroner to investigate certain deaths, i.e., violent deaths, deaths under unusual or mysterious circumstances, deaths of persons whose bodies are to be cremated, and deaths of certain inmates), Mr. Borger stated that the circumstances of Mr. Stringer's death were sufficiently mysterious that Dr. Gremel, in his capacity as medical examiner, should have conducted an investigation.

In his response to the Commissioner, Dr. Gremel related that a team of doctors treated Mr. Stringer, and that [a] disease process was well established by this team of physicians. Dr. Gremel wrote:

After death, the physicians requested an autopsy from the family to assure the physicians that they did not miss any underlying process or opportunity to avoid the outcome in this case. . . . . This autopsy was performed as a medical autopsy, and not as a medical examiner autopsy. . . . .

The next question is obvious. Why wasn't this considered to be a medical examiner case? . . . . The death of Mr. Stringer was presented to us in the laboratory as an autopsy requested by the attending physicians with a valid consent form signed by the family. There was no evidence of criminal activity. There was no unknown public health issue of concern, and the idea to assign the case as a medical examiner was not considered. The diagnoses were well established. The therapeutic interventions appeared appropriated [sic] with no evidence of therapy misadventure.

In her comments to the Commissioner, Ms. Decker wrote:

A fundamental error in the Star Tribune's analysis is that the autopsy information at issue was data maintained by the Blue Earth County Medical Examiner. It was not. The autopsy information is private, privileged and confidential health information which cannot be released absent authorization from the patient or authorized representative. The Minnesota Data Practices Act is simply inapplicable in this setting.

In her discussion of the operation of section 390.11, Ms. Decker stated:

Inherent in the statute is the judgement resting in the attending physician and certainly the coroner or medical examiner to determine which deaths fit the type described by statute . . . . In addition, the statute allows, and in fact directs, the exercises [sic] of clinical judgement regarding when a death is, for example, unusual or mysterious. While a death may appear mysterious to a layperson, physicians or coroners/medical examiners may, and often do, apply their professional judgement and clinical knowledge to determine that a death is a result of clinical circumstances, and not 'violent' or 'unusual or mysterious.'