MOHAMUD A. MOHAMUD (deceased), by SAMIRA FARAH, Petitioner/Appellant, v. BASHKA EXPRESS LLC and ALI IBRAHIM (uninsured), Employers/Respondents, and CAP. EXPRESS INC. and GREAT AM. INS. CO. OF N.Y., Employer-Insurer/Respondents, and SPECIAL COMP. FUND.

The petitioner appeals the compensation judge’s finding that she does not meet the definition of putative spouse set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.055, and is therefore not entitled to dependency benefits pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.111.  The petitioner also appeals from the compensation judge’s award of penalties, arguing that the penalty percentage assessed should be higher, and from the compensation judge’s denial of sanctions.  We affirm.

The employee, Mohamud Ahmed Mohamud, immigrated to the United States in 2015.  On May 19, 2021, while working as an over-the-road truck driver for Bashka Express/Vista Freight (Bashka), the employee was killed in a collision.  Bashka, owned by Ali Ibrahim, was uninsured for workers’ compensation benefits at the time of the employee’s death.

Two months prior to his death, the employee married Samira Farah, the petitioner.  The petitioner immigrated to the United States in 2000.  The two met in 2019 and were engaged on December 9, 2020.  They began sharing aspects of their daily lives, including a checking account and an apartment.  On March 10, 2021, the two were photographed together wearing formal wedding attire and rings on their left fingers.  Two days later, on March 12, 2021, the couple was married in a religious wedding ceremony.  In accordance with custom, the petitioner was not present at the ceremony.  An Imam signed an Affidavit of Relationship/Marriage, acknowledging the marriage.  There is no evidence that a marriage license was obtained or that a marriage certificate was filed with the State of Minnesota.  The petitioner testified that she and the employee had been planning an American style wedding reception to take place on July 2, 2021.  On December 10, 2021, nearly seven months after the employee’s death, the petitioner gave birth to a child.  Later paternity testing confirmed the employee was the biological father of the child.

The petitioner filed a claim petition seeking dependency benefits on behalf of herself and their child.  Bashka and Mr. Ibrahim denied liability, alleging that the employee was an independent contractor who was ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits.  Joined as a party was Capital Express, Inc. (Capital), with whom Bashka had worked as a contractor under a Distribution Service Agreement.  Relying on the position taken by Bashka and Mr. Ibrahim regarding the employee’s status as an independent contractor, Capital also denied liability.  The Special Compensation Fund denied liability to the petitioner for lack of a marriage certificate.

The petitioner underwent a discovery deposition, the transcript of which was admitted into evidence at the hearing below.  She graduated from high school in Arizona, and took college classes in Arizona and Minnesota but did not obtain a degree or certificate.  She had been working as an assistant bank manager earning $25.00 per hour.  She testified that she had been financially dependent on the employee prior to his death, and that his wages were deposited into a separate bank account to which she did not have access.  After the employee’s death, the petitioner worked two jobs to support herself and her child.  (T. 103.)

At the deposition, the petitioner was asked if she took steps to make her March 12, 2021, marriage legal.  Her response was, “we didn’t get a chance.  He passed away two and a half months later, while we were planning our American wedding.”  (Ex. FFF at 15.)  She testified at hearing that, in order to be listed as a survivor on the death certificate, the coroner required a Minnesota-issued marriage certificate.  She sent the Affidavit of Relationship/Marriage, believing the documents were the same.  It was her understanding that to get married in Minnesota, “you turn your [religious] marriage license [in] to the state,” but did not know the process for legally marrying in Minnesota.  (T. 116.)  She had assumed that she was married because “you get married under God.”  (T. 100.)

The petitioner first learned that her marriage to the employee may not have been legally valid about a year after his death.  (T. 104.)  She had never been married to anyone other than the employee and has not since remarried.

The claim petition seeking dependency benefits was heard by a compensation judge on June 12, 2025, nearly four years after its filing.  Just prior to the hearing, Bashka conceded an employment relationship and Capital agreed to pay dependency benefits to the employee’s minor child.  The petitioner’s claim for dependency benefits remained in dispute.  Relevant to this appeal, the issues presented to the compensation judge for adjudication included whether the petitioner was eligible as a putative spouse to receive dependency benefits under Minn. Stat. § 176.111, and whether penalties and/or sanctions were warranted against the employers.

By Amended Findings and Order served and filed September 25, 2025, the compensation judge found that the petitioner was not a putative spouse of the employee and denied her claim for dependency benefits.  The compensation judge concluded that Capital’s liability denial was contingent on the feasibility of Bashka’s asserted independent contractor defense.  He went on to award penalties against Bashka, payable by Capital, in the amount of ten percent for its maintenance of a frivolous defense resulting in an unreasonable delay of payment of dependency benefits to the employee’s minor child for the period of February 8, 2023, to May 21, 2025, and against Capital in the amount of five percent for the period of March 8, 2024, to June 11, 2025.^[1]  He declined to award claimed discovery-based sanctions.  The petitioner appeals.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  When the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must defer to the compensation judge. Lagasse v. Horton, 982 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Minn. 2022).  Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975); see also Smith v. Carver Cnty., 931 N.W.2d 390, 79 W.C.D. 495 (Minn. 2019).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo.  Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993); see also Busch v. Advanced Maint., 659 N.W.2d 772, 778-79 (Minn. 2003).

The petitioner appeals from the compensation judge’s finding that she is not the employee’s putative spouse and from the denial of her claim for dependency benefits.  She also appeals from the compensation judge’s award of penalties, arguing that the penalty percentage assessed should be higher, and from the compensation judge’s denial of sanctions.

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), family members who are wholly or partially supported by a deceased employee at the time of the employee’s death are eligible to receive dependency benefits pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.111.  Eligible family members include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, sibling, and mother- or father-in-law.  Minn. Stat. § 176.111, subds. 1-4.  A spouse is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent.  Id. subd. 1(a).

It is undisputed that the employee and the petitioner were not legally married under Minnesota law.  The petitioner argues that although she was not legally married and was not the employee’s spouse, she was a “putative spouse,” which is defined as:

In his memorandum, the compensation judge cited the petitioner’s deposition testimony in which she was asked whether she and the employee had taken steps to make their marriage legal.  The petitioner had answered, “we didn’t get the chance,” as the employee had passed away while they were planning their “American wedding.”  (Ex. FFF at 15.)  The compensation judge considered this statement to have been an admission that the petitioner had known her marriage to the employee was not legal.  He was not persuaded by “[h]er attempt to explain away this admission” with testimony he deemed selective, evasive, and not credible.  (Mem. at 7.)  He explained that the petitioner had lived in Minnesota for more than two decades and was employed as an assistant bank manager, which demonstrated that she is “sophisticated and intelligent.”  Id.  He also noted that she had been aware of a friend having mailed a marriage certificate to the State of Minnesota.  The compensation judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that she and the employee were regarded by the community as a married couple at the time of his death, concluding that the relevant test was whether the petitioner knew she was not legally married when the employee passed away.

We are troubled by the compensation judge’s analysis of the putative spouse statute.  Most notably, the compensation judge’s decision does not cite or discuss the explicit language of Minn. Stat. § 518.055 or its three elements: (1) the parties cohabit, (2) the parties are not legally married, and (3) the person seeking putative spouse status has a good faith belief that they were married.^[3]  Of particular concern, the compensation judge did not consider what belief the petitioner had with respect to the legal status of her marriage at the time of the ceremony, as opposed to the time of her deposition, or whether that belief was held in good faith at the time of the employee’s death.  Instead, the compensation judge stated that the relevant test was, “whether she knew she was not legally married when the employee passed away.”  (Mem. at 7, emphasis in original.)  Knowledge is not required under a plain reading of the putative spouse definition.  It would appear that the compensation judge expected the petitioner to have known that she was not legally married to the employee, whether at the time of the religious ceremony or at the time of the employee’s death, and when she attempted to explain that she did not have such knowledge, he did not believe her and denied her claim.

Nevertheless, the burden to establish putative spouse status before the compensation judge was on the petitioner seeking dependency benefits.  Yet, there was little to no testimony elicited regarding what she knew, believed, or relied upon regarding her marital status, either at the time of the March 2021 wedding ceremony or the May 2021 death of the employee.  As such, we are limited by the compensation judge’s credibility determination in his memorandum,^[4] and by the evidence in the record below.^[5]

The evidence in the record shows that the petitioner and the employee met in 2019 and were engaged to be married in late 2020.  They opened a joint bank account and began living together.  They were photographed as husband and wife, wearing wedding attire and rings on their left hands.  On March 12, 2021, the couple was married according to their religious and cultural customs, and an Affidavit of Relationship/Marriage was signed.  The couple was expecting a child.  They were planning to host an American-style wedding reception in the summer of 2021.  The couple held themselves out to their community as husband and wife.

The petitioner testified that she first learned that her marriage to the employee was not legally valid when she presented for her deposition about a year after the employee’s death.  (T. 104.)  She had assumed that she was married because she had been “married under God” on March 12, 2021.  (T. 100.)  It was her understanding that to be legally married in Minnesota, “you turn your [religious] marriage license [in] to the state,” which was a formality that could be done at a later time. ^[6]  (T. 116.)

Upon this court’s careful review of the evidence presented in support of her claim, the petitioner’s testimony is insufficient to support a finding that she had a good faith belief that she and the employee were legally married at the time of his death.  Even if this court may disagree with the compensation judge’s analysis in reaching his finding, that finding must be affirmed “unless [it is] clearly erroneous in the sense that [it is] manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).  A finding is manifestly contrary to the evidence where the evidence “clearly requires reasonable minds to adopt a contrary conclusion.”  Lagasse v. Horton, 982 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Minn. 2022) (citing Hengemuhle, 358 N.W.2d at 60-61).  We cannot conclude that the compensation judge’s finding that the petitioner is not a spouse eligible for dependency benefits is manifestly contrary to the evidence.  Accordingly, we must affirm this finding.^[7]

The petitioner appeals from the compensation judge’s award of penalties against Bashka and Capital for their maintenance of a frivolous defense resulting in an unreasonable delay of payment of dependency benefits to the employee’s minor child, arguing that the percentage assessed should have been higher.

Under Minn. Stat. § 176.225, subd. 1, a compensation judge shall award compensation in an amount up to 30 percent of the total compensation where a claim was frivolously denied.  This section defines “frivolously” as “without a good faith investigation of the facts or on a basis that is clearly contrary to fact or law.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.225, subd. 1.  Whether an award of penalties is appropriate is a question of fact.  Zwieg v. Pope Douglas Solid Waste, 704 N.W.2d 752, 65 W.C.D. 563 (Minn. 2005).  The amount of penalties imposed is generally within the sound discretion of the compensation judge.  See, e.g., Maxfield v. Stremel Mfg. Co., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Jan. 6, 1999); Crimmins v. NACM N. Central Corp., 45 W.C.D. 435, 442 (W.C.C.A. 1991), summarily aff’d (Minn. Nov. 26, 1991); Erickson v. Texaco Refining, 45 W.C.D. 181, 190 (W.C.C.A. 1991).  This court reviews the compensation judge’s award for an abuse of discretion.  See Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 23 N.W.3d 582 (Minn. 2025).  An abuse of discretion requires a determination that the compensation judge made “an erroneous legal conclusion or a clearly erroneous factual conclusion.”  Ansello v. Wis. Cent., Ltd., 900 N.W.2d 167, 173, 77 W.C.D. 721, 729 (Minn. 2017) (citing Paulownia Plantations de Panama Corp. v. Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Minn. 2009)).

The compensation judge awarded penalties against Bashka, payable by Capital, in the amount of ten percent for Bashka’s maintenance of a frivolous defense resulting in an unreasonable delay of payment of benefits for the period of February 8, 2023, through May 21, 2025, and against Capital in the amount of five percent for the period of March 8, 2024, through June 11, 2025.  In his memorandum, the compensation judge detailed his analysis of the independent contractor defense asserted by Bashka, and Capital’s reliance on Bashka’s defense.

On appeal, the petitioner argues that the penalty percentage assessed should have been higher than the ten and five percent awarded by the compensation judge.  In her brief, the appellant alleges that Bashka and Capital should be further sanctioned for their lack of cooperation, obfuscation, withholding of information, non-compliance with discovery orders, and failure to conduct a good faith investigation, all of which led to prejudice against the employee’s dependent minor child.  It is the appellant’s position that Bashka and Capital should be penalized to the fullest extent under Minn. Stat. § 176.225, subd. 1, as the penalty amount imposed by the compensation judge does not “serve to assure the quick and efficient delivery of benefits under the [Act] as intended by the legislature.”^[8]  (App. Brief at 34.)

Dependency benefits were unjustifiably denied to a very young child for more than two years.  The appellant’s argument that the awarded ten and five percent penalties are too low is, in this context, not without merit.  The evidence shows, per the unappealed findings, that whether the employee was employed by Bashka or was an independent contractor was initially a good faith defense to the claim.  That good faith defense, however, proved to be no longer valid by February 8, 2023, as found by the compensation judge, when the employment contract was produced.  Despite this, both Bashka and Capital continued to maintain that the employee was an independent contractor for more than two years.

This court has held that a penalty amount should be commensurate with the harm done.  Elzie v. Univ. of Minn., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Nov. 18, 2025) (quoting Cassem v. Crenlo, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 102, 108, 44 W.C.D. 484, 496 (Minn. 1991)).  A review of the record shows that little to no testimony was elicited from the petitioner with regard to harm caused by the four-year delay between the commencement of the claim and the eventual admission of liability.  Without more, we cannot say that the compensation judge abused his discretion in determining the amount of the awarded penalties.  Further, whether this court would have decided the issue differently is not the standard of this court’s review.  To reverse the compensation judge’s penalty award would require a determination that the compensation judge abused his discretion and made an erroneous legal conclusion or clearly erroneous factual conclusion.  We cannot conclude he did so and must affirm.  While we are sympathetic to the loss suffered by the petitioner and her child given the death of the employee, we are limited to the record before us and decline to award additional penalties.

The compensation judge’s decision is affirmed in its entirety.

I reluctantly concur with the majority’s affirmance of the compensation judge’s denial of the petitioner’s claim for dependency benefits.  I am compelled to write separately to address the troubling injustices in the application of the Act’s current dependency statute in this case.

First, while the credibility determination in this case cements the compensation judge’s view of the petitioner’s story, another compensation judge may have ruled in her favor.   The petitioner testified that she believed that she was married to the employee.  She and the employee took steps which demonstrate that belief.  They opened a joint bank account, began living together, held themselves out in the community as married, and had a child together, all of which indicate a good faith belief that she was married to the employee.  During the legal process, she was questioned regarding the intimate details of her private life.  The testimony elicited was interpreted as not credible, but could also read as a defensive response to a perceived attack on her respectability given her cultural background.  Further, according to custom, the petitioner did not attend the wedding ceremony.  To expect the petitioner to have knowledge of the legal documentation that was required, completed, or filed with the State of Minnesota regarding the ceremony ignores her limited involvement in that event.   This case highlights the importance of treating all parties with dignity, respect, and cultural awareness within the workers’ compensation system and litigation process.

Second, this case calls attention to the inadequacy of the current dependency statute.  The current dependency statute lists persons who may be eligible to receive benefits, including those so attenuated as a father-in-law or a grandmother.  Minn. Stat. § 176.111, subd. 3.  A spouse and a child are presumed to be dependent.  Id. subd. 1.  Meanwhile, a surviving parent of a deceased employee’s child, who lived with and was dependent upon the employee, is not eligible.  That a parent such as the petitioner has no claim to benefits under the current dependency statute is antithetic to the purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  The dependency statute should be legislatively corrected and modernized to avoid a similar injustice for surviving family members or others who are financially dependent upon a deceased worker in future cases, and provide a means by which an individual can claim and prove actual dependency to demonstrate eligibility for benefits.

Recently, the legislature included an extensive list of relationships in defining “family member” under the Minnesota Paid Leave Law, which went into effect this year.  This law defines “family member,” with respect to an applicant for leave, as a spouse or domestic partner, a child, a parent or legal guardian, a sibling, a grandchild, a grandparent or spouse’s grandparent, a son-in-law or daughter-in-law, and “an individual who has a personal relationship with the applicant that creates an expectation and reliance that the applicant care for the individual without compensation, whether or not the applicant and the individual reside together.”  Minn. Stat. § 268B.01, subd. 23(a).  Were the Act similarly inclusive in determining eligibility for dependency benefits, the petitioner and other individuals who were wholly or partially dependent on a deceased employee would not bear the detrimental economic consequences resulting from a work-related death.