KRISTINE EASTLUND, Employee/Appellant, v. ANOTHER MAN’S TREASURE and TRAVELERS INDEM. CO. OF CONN., Employer-Insurer/Respondents, and FAIRVIEW HEALTH SERVS. - ALL ENTITIES, and UCARE, Intervenors.

The appellant contends that the compensation judge erred by finding that she was not an employee of the employer on the date of injury and that her injury did not occur in the course of her employment.  We affirm.

Kristine Eastlund, the appellant, began working at Another Man’s Treasure, the employer, owned and managed by Mr. Jody Powers, in August 2023.  The job was part time and her job duties included opening the store, running the cash register, texting with the store owner about buying and selling items brought into the store, and closing the store.  At the time she was hired, she had no physical restrictions related to her low back.

The appellant applied for and accepted a different job in early December 2023, which was scheduled to start in January 2024.  After a text exchange with Mr. Powers involving a shift she was unable to work, the appellant texted her resignation to him on December 7, 2023.  She turned in the keys to the store the following day.  Following her resignation, she informed a co-worker, Heidi Rehbein, that she had terminated her employment.  Ms. Rehbein did not have authority to hire or fire employees, but she told the appellant that she would talk to Mr. Powers about the appellant working for him again.

On December 24, 2023, Ms. Rehbein called the appellant and asked for help moving an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) in the store that was “preventing customers from being able to move around the store.”  (T. 42.)  The appellant lived close to the store and agreed to help move the ATV, and in doing so, she grabbed the front end of the ATV to push it to the side, heard her back pop, and fell to the floor.  Ms. Rehbein called an ambulance, and the appellant was transported to a hospital for treatment.  She was diagnosed with a moderate L1 superior endplate compression fracture.  As a result of her injury, she could not start the new job she had secured earlier that month.  She has continued to have restrictions on her activities due to the back injury and has conducted a job search.

The appellant filed a claim petition seeking payment of wage loss benefits, medical expenses, a vocational rehabilitation consultation, medical mileage, and intervention claims.  The employer and its insurer denied primary liability for the injury.  After a hearing on July 16, 2025, the compensation judge denied the appellant’s claims, finding that she was not an employee of the employer on the date of injury and, therefore, her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.  This appeal followed.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  When the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must defer to the compensation judge.  Lagasse v. Horton, 982 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Minn. 2022).  Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  N. States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975); see also Smith v. Carver Cnty., 931 N.W.2d 390, 79 W.C.D. 495 (Minn. 2019).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo.  Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993); see also Busch v. Advanced Maint., 659 N.W.2d 772, 778-79 (Minn. 2003).

The appellant argues that the compensation judge erred by finding that she was not an employee of the employer on the date of injury, and by finding that her injury did not occur in the course of employment because the injury happened as she performed a service in furtherance of the employer’s interests.  We disagree and affirm.

An employee is defined under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) as “any person who performs services for another for hire.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 9.  An employer, as defined by Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 10, is “any person who employs another to perform a service for hire.”  A claim for compensation under the Act “may be sustained only where an injury arises out of service performed pursuant to a contract for hire, express or implied, and not as a volunteer worker.”  Holm v. H & S Asphalt Co., 283 Minn. 330, 331, 167 N.W.2d 743, 744, 24 W.C.D. 888, 889 (1969); see also Alcozer v. N. Country Food Bank, 61 W.C.D. 759 (W.C.C.A. 2000), aff’d on other grounds 635 N.W.2d 695, 61 W.C.D. 772 (Minn. 2001).  In this case, the appellant had been employed by the employer, but the compensation judge concluded in an unappealed finding that it was undisputed that she had resigned via a text message sent to Mr. Powers on December 7, 2023, and returned her keys to the store on December 8, 2023.^[1]  From that point on, the appellant was no longer an employee because she was no longer performing services for the employer for hire.  Despite the compensation judge’s unappealed finding and the language in the text messages, the appellant argues that because Ms. Rehbein told her that she would discuss having the appellant return to work with Mr. Powers and she had performed a service for the employer, she was an employee on the date of injury.  We are not persuaded.

The employment relationship is the essential basis of recovery under Minnesota workers’ compensation law.  Krause v. Trustees of Hamline Univ. of Minn., 243 Minn. 416, 68 N.W.2d 124, 18 W.C.D. 219 (1955) (citing Jackson v. Cathcart & Maxfield, Inc., 201 Minn. 526, 277 N.W. 22, 10 W.C.D. 131 (1938)).  The “relation” of the employer and the employee “is purely contractual.”  Arterburn v. Cnty. of Redwood, 154 Minn. 338, 340, 191 N.W. 924, 925, 1 W.C.D. 243, 245 (1923).  Ultimately, the determination of employment status is a legal issue, and the facts upon which that determination is based may include findings by the compensation judge.  Hunter v. Crawford Door Sales, 501 N.W.2d 623, 624, 48 W.C.D. 637, 639 (Minn. 1993).  Citing Zoller v. Elliott Realty, 312 Minn. 595, 252 N.W.2d 857, 29 W.C.D. 457 (1977), the appellant argues that her resignation was not final because the discussions between herself and Ms. Rehbein, as well as between Ms. Rehbein and Mr. Powers, created an ongoing employment relationship.  We disagree.  In Zoller, the employee, a real estate agent, had also resigned his position, but had made an agreement with the employer that after his resignation he would finalize details and closings for purchase agreements made before he resigned.  After completing a closing on a house, the agent was injured as he left the house.  Given the agreement with the employer that the agent could complete this work, he remained an employee while doing the work.  In this case, there was no such agreement.  There is no evidence that Mr. Powers had any contact with the appellant about returning to work at the store after she resigned and turned in her keys.  Also, as the compensation judge noted in his memorandum, the appellant did not consider herself employed by Another Man’s Treasure at the time she was injured.  (Mem. at 5.)  There was no ongoing employment relationship between the appellant and the employer at the time of the injury.

Given that the appellant had resigned her position, the employer would have needed to offer the appellant a job after her December 7, 2023, resignation for her to be employed under the Act.  The compensation judge stated in his memorandum that there was no evidence that the appellant expected to return to work for the employer or that she had been offered a job there again following her resignation.  (Mem. at 5.)  The only communication between Mr. Powers and the appellant following the December 7, 2023, resignation text was a text from the appellant on December 31, 2023, asking about an item for sale in the store.  The response did not include an offer of re-employment.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in 1923, “No one can become the employe[e] of another without the consent of the other.”  Arterburn, 154 Minn. at 340, 191 N.W. at 925, 1 W.C.D. at 244.  In that case, because there was no evidence that the injured claimant, who had been hired by another employee as a driver, was known to anyone working for the employer who had authority to hire employees, the claimant was found to not be an employee of the employer.  While the appellant and Ms. Rehbein testified in this case that Ms. Rehbein was going to talk to Mr. Powers about the appellant’s return to employment at the store, there is no evidence that Mr. Powers consented to this return or that Mr. Powers authorized Ms. Rehbein to make an offer of re-employment.  A discussion between past coworkers about potential re-employment does not constitute an offer of employment or a contract for hire.^[2]

There was also no expectation that the appellant would be compensated for her efforts to assist Ms. Rehbein on the date of injury.  She testified on cross-examination that Ms. Rehbein said, “I can give you a few bucks for coming over,” but agreed that she had previously testified at her deposition, “[Ms. Rehbein] needed help, and I went over and helped her.  I didn’t expect pay.  She offered it.”  (T. 73-74.)  Ms. Rehbein testified that when she called the appellant to ask for assistance with moving the ATV, there was no mention of payment.

Because the appellant had resigned from her position and there was no ongoing employment relationship between the appellant and the employer, no new offer of employment, no new contract for hire, and no payment for the services rendered on the date of injury, there is no evidence of any employment relationship at the time of the injury.

The appellant also argues that even if she had resigned, her injury occurred in the course of employment because she had performed a service that furthered the interests of the employer at the time of injury.  Citing Lindsay v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch. Dist. (SSD1), 26 N.W.3d 624 (Minn. 2025),^[3] the appellant argues that her actions on the date of injury were “reasonably incidental to employment” because the act of moving the ATV was undertaken in good faith to advance the employer’s interests.  The appellant’s focus on whether she was advancing the interests of the employer at the time of the injury is misplaced.  In Lindsay, there was no dispute as to whether the claimant was an employee on the date of injury.  The issue in that case involved an injury that occurred after the employee’s normal work hours, not a dispute regarding her employment status.  Other cases cited by the appellant also involve the issue of whether the injury occurred in the course of employment, not whether the claimant was an employee at the time of injury.^[4]  Instead, the focus was on whether the employees’ injuries, occurring off duty or outside of usual work hours, were sufficiently incidental to employment. 

The appellant also distinguishes the circumstances of her injury from that in Karstad v. Myles Lorentz, Inc., 75 W.C.D. 207 (W.C.C.A. 2015), where the employee had been laid off for the season and hoped to return to work the following spring.  His injury occurred during the seasonal layoff while he was removing his personal items from the company vehicle, which was not done at the employer’s direction, he was not paid for his time to remove his items from the truck, and the employer did not exercise any control over the employee’s conduct in retrieving his personal items.  This court affirmed the findings that the injury was not sufficiently incidental to the employment and that the injury did not occur within the course of employment.  The appellant asserts in this case that because she was in negotiations to remain employed, not laid off, and that she performed a service for the employer, she was in the course of employment.  We disagree.  As noted above, the appellant had in fact resigned her position and the employer had not directed her to perform the service, therefore, her injury did not occur in the course of employment.

Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s findings that the appellant was not an employee of the employer on the date of injury and that her injury did not occur in the course of employment.  We affirm.