CHARLIE ANDERSON, Employee/Respondent, v. COUNTRY SUN FARM & GREENHOUSES and AUTO OWNERS INS. CO., Employer-Insurer/Appellants, and UNITEDHEALTHCARE SERVS., FAIRVIEW HEALTH SERVS. – ALL ENTITIES, and SUMMIT ORTHOPEDICS, LTD., Intervenors.

The employer and insurer appeal the compensation judge’s finding that at the time of injury, the employee was in an employment relationship with the employer and not casual employment as defined by Minn. Stat. § 176.041, subd. 1.  They also appeal from the judge’s finding that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.  We affirm the compensation judge’s findings and order.

Country Sun Farm & Greenhouses, the employer, operates as a retail business, farm, and greenhouses, growing plants from January through April and selling flowers in the spring, pumpkins during the fall, and Christmas trees and holiday items in the winter months.  It is a family-run business that also hosts seasonal events, such as hayrides and a corn maze.  Owned by Richard and Eileen Bergmann, the company employs multiple family members, including their son, Chad Bergmann (Bergmann), as full-time employees.  The employer’s property is adjacent to Bergmann’s private home.

Charlie Anderson (Anderson)^[1] was introduced to the Bergmann family in 2021, while he was dating Bergmann’s daughter.  He would often help various family members with personal projects and also helped out in the business with and without pay.  Anderson was under the impression Chad Bergmann was one of the owners of the business.  On March 14, 2022, Bergmann texted Anderson to offer him work at the greenhouses, which is part of the employer’s retail business.  Bergmann offered Anderson $12 an hour working after school hours to which Anderson agreed.^[2]  Anderson worked at the greenhouses after school but did not always clock in to work.  The employer kept no personnel or payroll records regarding Anderson.  He continued to work sporadically for the employer through mid-June 2022.  The employer did not employ part-time workers in July.

On July 21, 2022, Anderson reached out to Bergmann via text asking if he needed any help.  Bergmann told Anderson they would clean up firewood in the employer’s parking lot.^[3]

The following day, on July 22, 2022,^[4] Anderson, a coworker who worked for the employer, and Bergmann, stacked hay and asphalt on Bergmann’s home property.  Anderson understood this work to be personal for Bergmann and not related to the employer or its business.  After finishing that project, the three left Bergmann’s property and traveled to the parking lot on the employer’s property.  Several months before, Wright Tree Service had cut down a tree on the employer’s property on behalf of Xcel Energy.  Richard Bergmann offered the logs to Bergmann for personal use, and Bergmann then directed Wright to place the logs in the employer’s lower parking lot.  On July 22, the three began to split and remove the logs that were left in the employer’s parking lot.  When momentarily distracted by a chicken running across the lot, Anderson’s hand was caught and crushed by the splitter, breaking three fingers and requiring immediate surgery.  Anderson was unable to work from July 23 to October 2, 2022.

Anderson returned to work for the employer on October 3, 2022, was paid $12 an hour in cash, and performed assigned tasks for the employer until the end of the fall season on October 31, 2022.  He planned to return for the Christmas tree season, but did not because the employer had sold all available trees early.

Seeking medical and wage loss benefits, Anderson filed a claim petition for the July 22, 2022, injury on November 28, 2023.  The employer denied that Anderson was an employee on that date, and argued he was engaged in “casual employment” when he was injured.  They also argued that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment.  The matter was heard before a compensation judge on April 23, 2025.  The judge found that Anderson was in the employ of the employer on July 22, 2022, and it was not “casual employment.”  She further found that Anderson sustained a personal injury to his right hand arising out of and in the course of his employment with the employer on July 22, 2022.  She ordered payment of medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits from July 23 to October 2, 2022.  The employer and insurer appeal.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  When the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must defer to the compensation judge. Lagasse v. Horton, 982 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Minn. 2022).  Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975); see also Smith v. Carver Cnty., 931 N.W.2d 390, 79 W.C.D. 495 (Minn. 2019).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo.  Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993); see also Busch v. Advanced Maint., 659 N.W.2d 772, 778-79 (Minn. 2003).

On appeal, the employer and insurer argue that substantial evidence demonstrates that the employee was not engaged in employment for the employer at the time of his July 22, 2022, injury and that his injuries did not arise out of and in the course of employment with the alleged employer.  We disagree.

The employer and insurer assert that Bergmann was not an owner of the employer and did not work in a management capacity for the employer.  Anderson, they claim, worked on a limited, part-time basis and no other part-time worker worked for the employer in July 2022.  While acknowledging that the logs were on the employer’s property, they argue removing the logs was not at the direction of the employer.  They point to the five-factor test^[5] in Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1980), to establish whether an employment relationship existed and argue that the test does not support the compensation judge’s finding.  The employer and insurer further argue that Anderson’s employment was excluded by the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) because it was casual and not within the usual trade, business, profession, occupation of the employer.  Minn. Stat. § 176,041, subd. 11. We disagree.

We review the existence of an employment relationship as a question of mixed fact and law which has evolved over the decades.  In Farnam v. Linden Hills Congregational Church, 276 Minn. 84, 87-88, 149 N.W.2d 689, 692, 24 W.C.D. 135, 140 (1967), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the existence of an employment relationship between two parties is a question of fact and that, if reasonable inference may be drawn either way, the facts found by the commission must stand.”  We have held that the determination of employment status is ultimately a legal one.  Schultz v. Andy & Steve’s Lawn & Landscape, No. WC20-6361 (W.C.C.A. Jan. 5, 2021)(citing Hunter v. Crawford Door Sales, 501 N.W.2d 623, 624, 48 W.C.D. 637, 639 (Minn. 1993).  Where the evidence is free from conflict as to the controlling facts, the question of whether a person is an employee is a question of law.  Oelrich v. Schlagels, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 430, 433, 41 W.C.D. 84, 87 (Minn. 1988).  Here, where it does not appear that there is a conflict as to the controlling facts, the issue is a legal one, which we review de novo.  Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. at 608.

Under the WCA, an employment is excluded from the Act if it is both casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer.  Minn. Stat. § 176.041, subd. 1(11).  Minnesota Stat. § 176.041 does not define “casual,” however the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that casual employment “indicates something which comes without regularity and is occasional and incidental.  It is usually temporary and of short duration . . . with the intention and understanding on the part of both employer and employee that it shall not be continuous.”  Witthus v. Harvey L. Noyes, No. WC22-6456 (W.C.C.A. Sept. 30, 2022)(citing Billmayer v. Sanford, 177 Minn. 465, 467, 225 N.W. 426, 427, 5 W.C.D. 242, 243-44 (1929).  Both elements are viewed as separate and distinct, and both must be met for there to be an exclusion from the act.  Amundsen v. Poppe, 227 Minn. 124, 34 N.W.2d 337, 15 W.C.D. 351 (1948).

Here, the employee’s work removing logs from the parking lot could be described as casual as it was in short duration and not meant to be continuous.  However, we are persuaded that the second part of the exclusion, that the employment was “not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer” is not met and therefore the exclusion does not apply.  In O’Rourke v. Percy Vittum Co., 166 Minn. 251, 207 N.W. 636 (1926), the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether an employee performing a service which was not normally part of his work duties was excluded under the WCA.  The court determined that “an employer may enlarge or extend the scope of the employment, and an employee who, at the direction of his employer or of a superior to whose orders he is subject performs services outside the duties of his usual employment, and performs them in consequence of the existence of the relation of employer and employee and as incidental to the employment, is within the protection of the act while performing such services.”  O’Rourke, 166 Minn. at 257, 207 N.W. at 638.

In Farnam, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the casual employment exclusion in Minn. Stat. § 176.041, subd. 1.  In that case, two teenagers undertook tree trimming in their south Minneapolis neighborhood charging $1.50 an hour.  Their third job took place at the local church which needed some tree trimming.  The church reverend and trustees settled on paying both a total of $2 an hour and agreed on a date.  The teenagers had the necessary equipment and while up in the tree, one blacked out and fell 20 to 30 feet to the ground and as a result became quadriplegic.  The court determined that the right of the trustees to control the work by virtue of their authority to terminate the services of the teenagers was the most important factor in determining an employment relationship and upheld the award of workers’ compensation benefits.  Farnam v. Linden Hills Congregational Church, 276 Minn. at 86-87, 149 N.W.2d at 691-92, 24 W.C.D. at 138-40.  After Farnam, the court maintained that in determining whether an employment relationship exists, the most important factor “is the right of the employer to control the performance” of the employee’s work duties.  Newland, 295 N.W.2d at 618; see Hunter, 501 N.W.2d at 624, 48 W.C.D. at 639; see also Hammes v. Suk, 291 Minn. 233, 235, 190 N.W.2d 478, 481, 26 W.C.D. 43, 46 (1971). 

Here, the job of splitting logs was not the retail job the employee previously worked for the employer, yet it was reasonable for the judge to conclude that the job benefited the employer and furthered the employer’s business.  Moreover, it was also reasonable for the judge to conclude that it was a job in which Bergmann, the employee’s superior, controlled the means and manner of performance.  Anderson was hired via text message by Bergmann and worked for the employer on a part-time basis from March to June 2022.  Bergmann, in addition to other family members, would often pay Anderson for his work on behalf of the employer.  Anderson testified that he understood that he worked for Bergmann in a personal capacity when on Bergmann’s home property, but that he worked for the employer in an employment capacity when working on the employer’s property.  The logs sat for several months in the employer’s parking lot.  Bergmann testified that the logs needed to be removed from the employer’s property.  Anderson understood that because these logs were on the employer’s property they had to be removed from the employer’s parking lot so it could be used by customers in the coming season.  As such, the log splitting was work for the employer.  The final destination of the logs was the home of Bergmann, but that was irrelevant to the task assigned to Anderson.  He was performing the task of splitting the logs on the employer’s property in furtherance of the employer’s interests under the direction and control of the person who had hired him to work for the employer.  When an employee performs services undertaken in good faith to advance the interests of the employer-employee relationship and is injured incidental to such services, the employee is within the protection of the WCA.  See O’Rourke, 166 Minn. at 257, 207 N.W. at 638.  

The employer and insurer also argue that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment because the log splitting was performed as a personal benefit for Bergmann.  In order to be compensable, the injury must arise out of and in the course of employment.  Gibberd v. Control Data Corp., 424 N.W.2d 776, 780, 40 W.C.D. 1040, 1047 (Minn. 1988).  “Arising out of” refers to the causal connection between the employment and the injury.  For the employee to have the requisite causal connection between the injury and employment, he “must have faced a hazard, such as an external hazard, a special hazard, an unsafe condition, or a neutral condition with circumstances originating on the premises as part of the working environment that increased the employee’s risk of injury.”  Olson v. Total Specialty Contracting, Inc., No. WC23-6510 (W.C.C.A. Nov. 9, 2023), summarily aff’d (Minn. July 8, 2024); see also Tomah v. Good Samaritan Soc’y, No. WC21-6436 (W.C.C.A. Mar. 31, 2022 ) (citing Dykoff v. Xcel Energy, 840 N.W.2d 821, 73 W.C.D. 865 (Minn. 2013); Roller-Dick v. CentraCare Health Sys., 916 N.W.2d 373, 78 W.C.D. 509 (Minn. 2018)).

“In the course of” refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury.  An act outside an employee’s regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer’s interests, whether or not the employee’s own assigned work is thereby furthered, is within the course of employment.  Swenson v. Zacher, 264 Minn. 203, 211, 118 N.W.2d 786, 789, 22 W.C.D. 342, 347-48 (1962) (quoting 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 27).

Here, the compensation judge reasoned that Anderson’s duties with the employer were limited to the employer’s premises and related primarily to the greenhouses and working with the public, including moving plants and flowers, cleaning, watering plants, cashiering, and assisting with attractions.  While log splitting was not one of the employee’s regular duties, his work requirements varied, and he testified that he would do whatever tasks the employer requested.  When the employee was engaged in tasks for the employer, he was subject to the increased risk associated with those activities.  The judge determined that as Anderson’s injury occurred while he was splitting logs for the employer, his injury arose out of his employment. 

The judge also determined that the employee met the “in the course of” requirement.  Though some evidence supports that any work on July 22, 2022, the date of injury, was outside the employee and employer’s regular schedule and that the log splitting was outside of the employee’s regular duties, the judge concluded that the preponderance of the evidence showed that Anderson was engaged in a work activity on the employer’s premises at the instruction of the employer within his employment with the employer.  

Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s finding that the injury sustained by Anderson on July 22, 2022, arose out of and in the course of his employment with the employer.  We affirm.