PARKER STEVENS, Employee/Respondent, v. CITY OF FAIRMONT and LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES INS. TR., Self-Insured Employer/Appellant.

The self-insured employer appeals from the compensation judge’s award of an excess fee.  We vacate and remand.

The employee, a police officer for the City of Fairmont, was injured in a work-related motor vehicle accident on May 26, 2023.  He suffered back pain and whiplash injuries.  Primary liability was admitted, however, payment for the employee’s chiropractic treatment was denied on the basis that the treatment was not authorized.

An administrative conference on the employee’s medical request was held on December 31, 2024, to resolve the issue of payment for chiropractic treatment rendered between July 24 and December 4, 2024.  A specialist for the Department of Labor and Industry issued an order on January 8, 2025, finding that the work injury was a substantial contributing factor to the employee’s need for the disputed chiropractic treatment and that the disputed treatment was reasonable and necessary.  The self-insured employer was ordered to pay the $5,498.00 chiropractic bill, subject to the fee schedule, and to reimburse the employee $47.77 for medical mileage.^[1]

The attorney for the employee filed a Statement of Attorney Fees and Costs on May 15, 2025, seeking $1,099.60 in contingent attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a)(1), and $14,386.90 in excess fees based upon time spent on the medical dispute.  The self-insured employer filed an untimely objection to the Statement of Attorney Fees and Costs.^[2]  An Order Determining Attorney’s Fees was issued on May 29, 2025, and provided:

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  When the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must defer to the compensation judge. Lagasse v. Horton, 982 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Minn. 2022).  Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975); see also Smith v. Carver Cnty., 931 N.W.2d 390, 79 W.C.D. 495 (Minn. 2019).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo.  Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993); see also Busch v. Advanced Maint., 659 N.W.2d 772, 778-79 (Minn. 2003).

The self-insured employer asserts that the compensation judge’s Order Determining Attorney’s Fees is erroneous as a matter of law since the compensation judge awarded an excess fee without finding that the contingency fee was inadequate and without an analysis of the Irwin^[3] factors.  We agree.

As a threshold issue, attorney fees may be awarded only if there exists a genuine dispute.  Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(c); Lagasse v. Horton, 982 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 2022).  The compensation judge found, and the parties agree, that there was a genuine dispute over chiropractic treatment and that the employee’s attorney was successful in obtaining that medical benefit for the employee.^[4]

In matters where an attorney obtains medical benefits for an employee, Minnesota Statutes, section 176.081 provides for a contingent fee of 20 percent of the ascertainable value of the medical benefit awarded.  The statutory contingent fee is presumed to be adequate.  Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a)(1).  Here, there is no explicit finding by the compensation judge that the contingent fee was inadequate.  Such a finding cannot be implied in this case as the compensation judge did not provide any analysis or explanation for the awarded excess fees.

Where there is a genuine dispute and the contingent fee is determined to be inadequate, a compensation judge may award excess attorney fees.  To award excess attorney fees, a compensation judge must consider the factors set forth in Irwin by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Those factors include: 1) the amount involved, 2) the time and expense necessary to prepare for trial, 3) the responsibility assumed by counsel, 4) the experience of counsel, 5) the difficulties of the issues, 6) the nature of the proof involved, and 7) the results obtained.^[5]

In this case, the self-insured employer did not timely object to the Statement of Attorney Fees and Costs filed by the employee.  However, a lack of objection does not entitle a party to automatic approval of the requested excess fees.  Jurgensen v. Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc., 22 N.W.3d 568 (Minn. 2025).^[6]  Fees claimed in excess of the statutory contingent fee must be reviewed by the compensation judge.  While the compensation judge cited to Irwin and Roraff^[7] in the Order Determining Attorney’s Fees, she did not provide any specific findings or further analysis of the required Irwin factors.  A compensation judge should “state with clarity and completeness the facts essential to the ultimate decision so that a reviewing court can determine from the record whether these facts support the judge’s decision” and “should not leave to the reviewing court the obligation to seek or spell out the facts supporting the judge’s decision or to choose between conflicting testimony and inferences.”  Barbknecht v. Americ Disc, Inc., of Minn., No. WC04-274 (W.C.C.A. Mar. 3, 2005) (quoting Mendez-Merino v. Farmstead Foods, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Aug. 7, 2001)).  Without explicit findings or analysis regarding the adequacy of the contingent fee or of the Irwin factors, this court cannot determine the basis for the excess fee award.

We are unable to ascertain whether the excess fee in this case was approved because there was no objection or because the compensation judge found the contingent fee to be inadequate and analyzed the claim for fees utilizing the Irwin factors.  The lack of documentation deprives this court of the ability to review the award of fees and is contrary to Irwin and Jurgensen.  As such, we vacate the compensation judge’s Order Determining Attorney’s Fees, and remand the matter to the compensation judge for a determination of whether the contingent fee is adequate and for consideration of each of the seven Irwin factors individually, as directed by the supreme court in Jurgensen.^[8]  Because the self-insured employer did not object to the fee statement in a timely manner, on remand, the judge may make her findings based on the existing record.