The employee appeals the compensation judge’s denial of the employee’s claims that she had sustained CRPS and was permanently and totally disabled as a result of her 2014 work injury.  We affirm.

On February 9, 2014, Lillian S. Jensen, the employee, was injured as a result of a trip and fall while working as a laborer for Donnelly Custom Manufacturing Company, the employer, which was insured for workers’ compensation liability by TRIFAC Workers’ Compensation Fund.  The employer and insurer initially admitted primary liability for a right hand sprain and a forehead contusion, and paid various workers’ compensation benefits.

The employee initially treated with Dr. David Odland at Douglas County Hospital on the day of the injury.  Regarding her right hand injury, an x-ray was negative for fracture and the diagnosis was a right thumb sprain.  The employee received occupational therapy from March through May of 2014.  The employee treated with Dr. Thomas Dudley at Heartland Orthopedics for persistent right hand pain in April and May of 2014.  Dr. Dudley ordered an MRI and noted there was no soft tissue edema.  He concluded that the employee did not have signs of CRPS but recommended referral to a hand specialist.

On July 22, 2014, the employee was evaluated by Dr. Andrew Staiger, a hand specialist at St. Cloud Orthopedics.  Dr. Staiger examined the employee’s right upper extremity and noted no swelling or instability.  He observed slight discoloration of the skin, and suspecting CRPS, referred the employee to a pain clinic.  His impression of the employee’s right hand condition was post right hand injury/sprain with probable development of CRPS.  Dr. Staiger completed a workability form with restrictions of no torque, crimping, or heavy grasping and no lifting over 10 pounds with the right hand.  Daniel Truax, P.A., at the Center for Pain Management, saw the employee on August 27, 2014.  He noted slight discoloration of the employee’s right hand and slight allodynia in her right hand, and stated that she has some signs of CRPS, but also signs of a C6 radiculopathy, and recommended a cervical spine MRI.  The MRI scan did not indicate any findings that would account for the employee’s right hand symptoms.  A right stellate ganglion block was recommended.

In September and October 2014, the employee was seen by Betsy Ann Noga, N.P. at Alexandria Clinic regarding left hand overuse symptoms.  The employee had been working with right hand restrictions and was taken off work on October 7, 2014.

On November 14, 2014, the employee filed a claim petition seeking benefits related to injuries to her head, both hands, wrists, and arms, as well as a consequential right upper extremity CRPS condition.  On December 4, 2014, the employee underwent an independent medical examination with Dr. Joel Gedan.  The employee described her right hand injury as occurring when her hand hit a coworker’s ankle as she fell, and her right thumb was bent backwards and reported persistent right hand pain.  Dr. Gedan examined the employee and found that the employee had normal skin color with no diffuse reddish, bluish, or mottled discoloration, normal symmetric skin temperature in both hands, no edema in either hand, no abnormal sweating or trophic changes in the skin, no nail or hair changes, no signs of allodynia or hyperesthesia, and a normal upper extremity neurological examination.  Dr. Gedan opined that the employee had no objective findings consistent with CRPS and no permanent partial disability (PPD) rating.

The employee returned to the Center for Pain Management for a follow up visit on February 24, 2015.  She reported right hand and arm pain and symptoms of right hand discoloration and increased coolness were noted.  An EMG was ordered and was reported as normal on March 12, 2015.  A right stellate ganglion block was ordered, which did not provide pain relief, but the employee noticed that her right hand was warmer.  P.A. Truax opined that the employee’s 2014 work injury was the cause of her symptoms and need for treatment.

A hearing was held before Compensation Judge Bradley J. Behr on July 16, 2015.  In Findings and Order dated October 6, 2015, the judge made several findings, including that the employee had not proven she sustained CRPS as a substantial result of her right hand injury, but that she had restrictions regarding the use of her right hand as a substantial result of her work injury and was likely to benefit from rehabilitation assistance.  Neither party appealed this decision.

In December 2015, the employee sought treatment for right arm pain and chronic low back pain with Dr. Sena Kihtir at United Pain Center.  On examination, Dr. Kihtir described a mottled appearance of the right hand and forearm, some pitting of the right thumbnail, decreased right hand and forearm hair, decreased range of motion, and swelling at the right wrist.  Dr. Kihtir diagnosed the employee with CRPS that was directly related to her 2014 work injury.  The employee was treated with a right stellate ganglion block and occupational therapy, which did not provide relief.  Dr. Kihtir opined that the employee was permanently and totally disabled (PTD) secondary to her CRPS condition and her persistent right leg weakness in January 2017.

Dr. Gedan evaluated the employee on March 6, 2017, and noted that his findings on examination were very similar to those found during his December 2014 examination, and that he did not observe any objective signs of CRPS.  He concluded that the employee did not have CRPS, did not develop CRPS after July 2015, and had no right upper extremity symptoms related to the 2014 injury.  He disagreed with Dr. Kihtir’s opinion that the employee was PTD.

On May 22, 2017, the employee was evaluated by Dr. Todd Hess at United Pain Center.  Dr. Hess observed discoloration around the employee’s right thumb and first finger, allodynia from right wrist to elbow, cold and warm temperature, swelling up to the right elbow, pain into the right shoulder, decreased range of motion, and decreased grip strength.  He diagnosed right arm CRPS stemming from the February 9, 2014, work injury.  In July 2017, the employee was awarded social security disability benefits related to multiple conditions, including CRPS.  On September 19, 2017, Dr. Hess rated the employee at 44.45 percent PPD under multiple rules for her CRPS condition.  Dr. Kihtir saw the employee again on July 14, 2017, and recorded that the employee’s right arm had a deeper blotchy discoloration with sensitivity throughout the forearm and hand, weakness of the hand grip with decreased range of motion, general coldness, and allodynia, consistent with CRPS.

Dr. Gedan evaluated the employee for the third time on January 24, 2018, and again opined that the employee did not have CRPS, noting that his findings on examination were virtually identical to his findings on the previous two examinations.  He also reviewed the employee’s PPD ratings from Dr. Hess and disputed each rating, concluding that the employee had a zero percent PPD rating.

In February 2018, Dr. Kihtir opined that the employee’s condition was permanent and that she would not be able to return to work.  The employee was also evaluated by Dr. David Carlson at the employer and insurer’s request on August 16, 2018.  In a report dated September 5, 2018, Dr. Carlson opined that the employee had sustained a temporary contusion and sprain of her right thumb on February 9, 2014, that had resolved within eight weeks.  He also concluded that the employee had not sustained any PPD and was not PTD.

The employee claimed that she was permanently and totally disabled based on a low back injury incurred at the time of the 2014 work injury and based on her right hand CRPS condition.  A hearing was held on November 27, 2018, before Compensation Judge William J. Marshall.  In Findings and Order served and filed February 1, 2019, the judge found the employee did not sustain a low back injury in the February 2014 fall and that the issue of CRPS had been tried and decided in the 2015 decision.  He also stated that the employee’s doctors had not indicated that the employee’s CRPS condition had developed after the 2015 hearing and that the employee had testified that her symptoms remained the same as before that hearing.  Based on these findings and the principles of res judicata, the judge denied the employee’s CRPS claim.  The judge also stated that there was no indication that the employee had any symptoms or treatment for her hand sprain beyond 2015 and concluded that the employee’s right hand sprain had resolved.

The employee appealed, claiming that the compensation judge erred by finding res judicata barred her CRPS claim based on Judge Behr’s 2015 finding that she had failed to prove that she has developed CRPS as a result of her February 2014 right hand injury.  In Jensen v. Donnelly Custom Mfg. Co., No. WC19-6266 (W.C.C.A. Sept. 10, 2019), summarily aff’d (Minn. Mar. 25, 2020), this court held that res judicata did not bar the employee from claiming benefits for a time period after the 2015 decision by Judge Behr, but that collateral estoppel could apply.  The court noted that the compensation judge had not addressed whether collateral estoppel would bar the employee’s claim as argued by the employer and insurer.  The court vacated the judge’s denial of the employee’s claim for CRPS and remanded the matter to the compensation judge for determination of whether the employee’s condition had changed or worsened or whether new material facts had emerged such that collateral estoppel would not bar the employee’s claim.  The employer and insurer appealed this court’s decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which summarily affirmed the decision.  The matter was remanded to the Office of Administrative Hearings as directed by this court’s decision.

By order dated June 24, 2020, Judge Marshall stated that no additional evidence or testimony would be considered on remand and ordered submission of written arguments.  In Findings and Order served and filed October 16, 2020, the judge found that the employee’s consequential CRPS claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, that the employee did not have CRPS as a substantial result of the 2014 work injury, and that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled as a substantial result of the 2014 work injury.  The employee appeals.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo.  Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).

The compensation judge held a conference to discuss the issues and process regarding the remand on June 11, 2020.  In an order dated June 24, 2020, the judge listed the issues to be considered as whether the employee’s claim for CRPS was barred by collateral estoppel, whether the employee was entitled to PPD benefits related to CRPS, whether the employee was entitled to PTD benefits, and potential payment to intervenors.  The judge determined that no additional evidence or testimony, other than what was presented at the 2018 hearing, was warranted and would not be considered.  The employee argues that the judge erred by not holding a hearing on remand to allow additional testimony and submission of additional exhibits addressing the employee’s condition after the 2018 hearing.  The employee claims that this court’s directives to the judge on remand, to consider whether the employee’s condition had changed or whether new facts had emerged regarding the employee’s condition, would necessarily include evidence of the employee’s condition after the 2018 hearing.

Where a case is remanded for reconsideration, the decision of whether to hold another hearing to accept additional testimony and argument is within the discretion of the compensation judge.  Hufnagel v. Deer River Health Care Ctr., 79 W.C.D. 693, 699 (W.C.C.A. 2019); see also Matykiewicz v. Gen. Tire, 69 W.C.D. 272 (W.C.C.A. 2009) (additional argument allowed at compensation judge’s discretion).  In this court’s previous decision in this matter, we noted that the compensation judge had not considered whether the employee’s condition had changed or worsened, or whether new material facts had emerged, since the 2015 hearing.  The period at issue at the 2018 hearing ran from the date of the hearing in 2015 through the date of the hearing in 2018.  There is no indication that the parties agreed to expand the issues to include evidence arising after the date of the hearing in November 2018.  The compensation judge did not abuse his discretion by declining to conduct another evidentiary hearing on remand to consider such evidence.

The employee argues that the compensation judge’s finding that her right hand sprain had resolved as of the date of the 2015 hearing is contrary to Judge Behr’s unappealed finding in 2015 that she had restrictions regarding the use of her right hand as a result of her work injury and was likely to benefit from rehabilitation assistance.  The employee asserts that Judge Marshall disregarded and effectively modified Judge Behr’s finding by stating that the sprain had resolved as of the date of the 2015 hearing.  We agree that Judge Behr’s unappealed finding was effective through the date of the 2015 hearing, but again note that the period at issue at the 2018 hearing ran from the date of the hearing in 2015 through the date of the hearing in 2018.  While the employee treated for right hand symptoms after 2015, these were suspected CRPS symptoms, not sprain symptoms.  In making the finding that the employee’s right hand sprain had resolved, the compensation judge considered that the employee had no significant treatment for her right hand sprain/strain since 2015.  Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s finding that the employee’s right hand sprain had resolved, and we affirm.

The employee asserts that her claim for CRPS is not barred by collateral estoppel.  The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies to matters that were necessarily determined in a previous judgment based on the same or a different cause of action.  Mach v. Wells Concrete Prods. Co., 866 N.W.2d 921, 927, 75 W.C.D. 279, 286 (Minn. 2015) (citing Hauser v. Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1978)).  The determination of whether collateral estoppel is applicable is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review.  Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004); Care Inst., Inc.-Roseville v. Cty. of Ramsey, 612 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Minn. 2000). 

Collateral estoppel is applicable when: “‘(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.’”  Nelson v. Am. Fam. Ins. Group, 651 N.W.2d 499, 511 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Willems v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 333 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Minn. 1983)).  The doctrine does not apply to bar a claim for a condition that has changed.  Mach, 866 N.W. 2d at 928, 75 W.C.D. at 288.  As the party asserting collateral estoppel, the employer and insurer have the burden of proving the defense of collateral estoppel.  See Lange v. City of Byron, 255 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 1977).  Collateral estoppel should not work as an injustice against a party.  Nelson, 651 N.W.2d at 511.

The compensation judge determined that the issue at the 2015 and 2018 hearings was the same, that being whether the employee had developed CRPS as a result of her work injury.  The judge then considered whether the employee’s condition had changed.  The judge adopted Dr. Gedan’s opinion that the employee’s condition had not changed and that the employee did not have CRPS, and found that her diagnosis, symptoms, and treatment had not changed between the 2015 and 2018 hearings.  The judge concluded that collateral estoppel would apply to bar the employee’s claim for CRPS in 2018, and also found that the employee did not have CRPS, did not have any PPD rating related to CRPS, and was not PTD based on Dr. Gedan’s opinion.

Dr. Gedan conducted three examinations of the employee over four years and found that the employee had exhibited no objective signs of CRPS during any of the examinations.  He described the employee’s right hand in detail, reporting no skin discoloration, normal symmetric skin temperature in both hands, no edema in either hand, no abnormal sweating or trophic changes in the skin, no nail or hair changes, no signs of allodynia or hyperesthesia, and a normal upper extremity neurological examination.  He acknowledged that other providers had diagnosed CRPS but noted that many of the common signs of CRPS were not reported in their records.  He also opined that findings of discoloration by other providers did not include any consideration of the employee’s psoriasis condition.  Dr. Gedan emphasized that a diagnosis of CRPS is usually obvious and that he had not observed any objective signs of CRPS during his three examinations of the employee.  He also disputed each PPD rating given by Dr. Hess, concluding that the employee had zero percent PPD for that condition.  A compensation judge’s choice among conflicting expert opinions is generally upheld unless the opinion chosen lacked adequate factual foundation.  Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337, 342-43, 37 W.C.D. 364, 372-73 (Minn. 1985).

Substantial evidence, including the well-founded opinion of Dr. Gedan, supports the compensation judge’s finding that the employee did not have CRPS and the judge’s denial of the employee’s CRPS claim as barred by collateral estoppel, and of the related claims of PPD and PTD.  Accordingly, we affirm.