CAUSATION – SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. Substantial evidence, including the medical records and expert medical opinion, supports the compensation judge’s determination that the employee did not suffer a psychological injury arising from a physical work injury.
Compensation Judge: Sandra J. Grove
Attorneys: Pro Se Appellant. Edward Q. Cassidy and Ashley R. Thronson, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A. Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the Respondents.
Affirmed.
DAVID A. STOFFERAHN, Judge
The employee has appealed the compensation judge’s decision denying his claims. We affirm.
In September 2016, Myron Williams began working at Central Bi-Products, a rendering plant in Long Prairie, Minnesota, operated by Farmers Union Industries, LLC. The plant processes animal carcasses into grease used in various products. On the dates of both of his injuries, Mr. Williams was operating an expeller, a machine that filtered hot grease.
On May 1, 2018, the employee was using a long-handled scraper to clean an auger. The scraper blade snapped off and flew backwards, striking the employee just below his mouth on the right side, puncturing the skin and causing bleeding. A supervisor took Mr. Williams to the emergency room at CentraCare Long Prairie. Three stitches were applied to a circular puncture one centimeter in diameter and antibiotics were prescribed. The employee returned to the emergency room two days later, an infection was found in the wound, and a different antibiotic was prescribed. Mr. Williams went to the clinic at CentraCare on May 7, 2018, with complaints of sharp pain at the wound site and light-headedness. He was released to work at that time with restrictions allowing him to sit down when he felt light-headed.
The employee returned to the clinic on May 12, 2018, and reported right-sided headaches, right-sided neck pain, and upper back pain. Cervical x-rays and a head CT scan taken at that time showed some loss of normal cervical lordosis but no evidence of concussion. The employee was referred to physical therapy. The employee saw a PA-C at CentraCare on July 17, 2018. He stated there had been an 80 percent improvement in his headaches, but he was anxious about being back at work because he feared being hurt again. A psychological consult was recommended.
At the request of the employer and insurer, Mr. Williams was evaluated by Dr. Joseph Burgarino, a neurologist, on August 3, 2018. Dr. Burgarino reviewed the employee’s medical records, the employee’s deposition transcript, and examined the employee. Dr. Burgarino diagnosed the employee’s work injury on May 1, 2018, as a laceration and contusion that had resolved by June 6, 2018. In Dr. Burgarino’s opinion, there were no other consequences from the injury. Based on this report, the employer and insurer denied payment of further treatment for the work injury.
Mr. Williams had another injury on the job on September 27, 2018. A new employee opened a wrong valve and hot grease poured on the employee. He sustained second degree burns on his scalp, right shoulder, and left eyelid. He was seen at the CentraCare emergency room the same day where he was given pain medication, antibiotic cream, and eye drops. The employee was advised that he should be off work until his burns healed. The burns healed by mid-October, but Mr. Williams did not return to work at the employer thereafter.
In October 2018, the employee consulted with mental health providers at CentraCare and requested restrictions to keep him off work because of his fear of reinjury and possible post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) arising out of his injuries. The employee was referred to Dr. Timothy Rysavy, a clinical neuropsychologist, on January 8, 2019. Dr. Rysavy concluded the employee’s symptoms were consistent with PTSD and severe depression.
Mr. Williams was then referred to a psychiatrist, Dr. Eric Johnson. In a letter dated February 6, 2019, Dr. Johnson restricted the employee from all work, diagnosed PTSD, anxiety, and depression, and opined that these diagnoses were directly related to the work injuries. The employee also began treating with a psychologist.
At the request of the employer and insurer, the employee was evaluated by a psychiatrist, Dr. Thomas Gratzer, on March 22, 2019. Dr. Gratzer issued a report dated April 4, 2019, and provided a deposition on May 1, 2019. Dr. Gratzer’s opinions, as expressed in his reports and deposition, were that the employee did not develop any psychiatric condition as the result of his physical injuries. According to Dr. Gratzer, the employee did not meet the criteria in the DSM-5 for a diagnosis of PTSD, the employee’s treatment for his mental condition was appropriate but was due to pre-existing conditions and not the work injuries, and the employee was not temporarily totally disabled as a result of the May 1, 2018, and September 27, 2018, work injuries.
The employer and insurer filed a petition to discontinue benefits which was heard by a compensation judge on May 28, 2019. The employee was represented by an attorney at the hearing.
The compensation judge issued her Findings and Order on June 17, 2019. The judge made factual findings in which she set out the medical treatment the employee received since the time of his initial injury, the conclusions and opinions of the employee’s treating doctors and providers, and the opinions of Drs. Burgarino and Gratzer. The compensation judge found the opinions of Drs. Burgarino and Gratzer to be persuasive. She concluded that the employee had not developed any psychological impairment as the result of his physical injuries and the employee no longer had work restrictions from the injuries of May 1 and September 27, 2018. The petition to discontinue the employee’s workers’ compensation benefits was granted.
The employee, now acting pro se, has appealed.
In his brief, the pro se employee explains how he was hurt on the job on May 1 and September 27, 2018. He states his belief that his problems, both physical and psychological, since that time have been the result of those injuries. The employer and insurer have never denied that Mr. Williams was hurt on the job on those dates, but the employer and insurer did dispute the employee’s claims about the extent of those injuries. The question for the compensation judge to answer was whether the psychological conditions diagnosed in this case were the result of those work injuries.
This is a question which requires a medical opinion; and to answer that question, the compensation judge needed to review and consider the information and opinions found in the employee’s medical records. The employee states in his brief that the judge had said at the hearing that the judge and lawyers would not be using his medical records. We have reviewed the transcript of the hearing carefully and we believe there must have been a misunderstanding by the employee about how those records would be considered. The lawyers made it clear to the compensation judge that this case would be decided on the medical records they gave to the judge.
In a case such as this, it is the obligation of the compensation judge to carefully consider all the evidence presented at the hearing and to weigh the conflicting medical opinions. In this case, the judge identified in her decision the evidence she considered, including the testimony of the employee. (Findings 1 through 25.) She stated her conclusions from that evidence. (Findings 26 through 32.) In her memorandum, she explained why she made the decision that she did.
When this court considers an appeal such as this, we do not retry the case. Our function is to decide whether the compensation judge’s decision is based on substantial evidence when we consider all the evidence. Our supreme court has said that substantial evidence means evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984). We have also held that a medical opinion based on adequate information can serve as substantial evidence that a compensation judge may rely on in deciding a case. Carda v. State of Minn./Dep’t of Human Servs., 79 W.C.D. 649 (W.C.C.A. 2019).
After due consideration, we conclude there was no error on the part of the compensation judge and her decision was based on substantial evidence. The decision is affirmed.