TESSA M. WASHEK, Employee/Respondent, v. NEW DIMENSIONS HOME HEALTHCARE and SFM, Employer-Insurer/Appellants.

The employer and insurer appeal the compensation judge’s award of reimbursement for the base cost of an accessible van for rehabilitation and employment purposes. We affirm.

On December 18, 2002, Tessa M. Washek, a 22-year-old employee of New Dimension Home Healthcare, sustained catastrophic injuries while working for the employer when her vehicle was struck by a semi-truck. The employee’s injuries included a closed head injury resulting in cognitive difficulties, internal injuries, and a spinal cord injury that rendered her paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair. The employee testified that she developed dyslexia, anxiety, and forgetfulness after the accident. The employee underwent extensive medical treatment and continues to need ongoing treatment for her condition. The employee has 94.6496 percent permanent partial disability and is permanently and totally disabled as a result of her personal injury.

The employer and its insurer admitted liability and have paid wage loss benefits, permanent partial disability, rehabilitation expenses, medical expenses, and residence remodeling expenses. The parties have also been involved in extensive litigation over various issues. In 2011, the parties litigated whether a recommended lift system was medically reasonable and necessary for the employee. The employee claimed that the lift system would yield reasonable and necessary medical benefits by helping to prevent skin breakdowns and by lessening repetitive trauma to the employee’s arms, and would also enable the employee to continue living independently. The employer and insurer paid for the cost of the lift apparatus itself, but asserted that the cost of installation constituted remodeling under Minn. Stat. § 176.137, which capped structural remodeling of an employee’s residence at $60,000.00 at that time. Having already paid about $58,000.00 in structural remodeling expenses, they argued that their liability was limited to the balance remaining under the statute. This court agreed and reversed the compensation judge, holding that the cost of remodeling was capped by the statute. The court also concluded that the necessity of structural remodeling to allow for installation of a medical device did not convert the remodeling expense into a medical expense compensable under Minn. Stat. § 176.135.^[1] The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.^[2]

In 2015, the parties litigated the compensability of the base cost of a 2003 Dodge Caravan accessible van purchased on May 3, 2004, and of the base cost of a 2014 Toyota Sienna accessible van which was a replacement vehicle purchased in October 2014 with funds from a family relative. The employee claimed reimbursement for the vehicles as either medical expenses or rehabilitation expenses. The employer and insurer paid for the conversion costs which enabled the employee to operate the vehicles, but denied the claims for the base costs of the vehicles.

In Findings and Order served and filed July 24, 2015, a compensation judge denied the base costs of both vehicles as medical expenses under the statute. The judge also denied the cost of the 2003 vehicle as a rehabilitation expense after finding that the vehicle did not enable the employee to seek or engage in employment on a sustained basis. The judge further denied reimbursement for the cost of the 2014 vehicle as a rehabilitation expense on the basis that it was premature to determine whether the vehicle was likely to assist the employee in returning to employment compatible with her education, skills, and disability.

The employee appealed only the denial of reimbursement for the base cost of the 2003 vehicle as a rehabilitation expense.^[3] This court affirmed the judge’s denial of the base cost of the 2003 vehicle on grounds that there was no evidence in the record that the recommendation for an accessible vehicle was part of a rehabilitation plan to return the employee to work at that time. The employee was not working at the time the 2003 vehicle was purchased and was not physically capable of returning to her pre-injury position. While the employee attempted to return to work for about five months in 2012, for most of the ten years she owned the 2003 vehicle she was incapable of working and was not looking for work. The court held that substantial evidence in the record supported the compensation judge’s finding that the 2003 vehicle did not enable the employee to seek or engage in employment on a sustained basis and concluded that the compensation judge did not err by denying the employee’s claim for reimbursement of the base cost of that vehicle.^[4]

In March 2016, the employee’s rehabilitation plan was amended to include having an employment specialist develop job leads when the employee was medically able. This plan was continued in May 2016, when it was noted that the employee would resume a job search after she recovered from a recent surgery. Returning to work has always been the employee’s number one goal. She explained that she was too young not to work and that she wanted to be able to be out in the community, not just sitting at home. She emphasized that having a job was important to her and that she wanted to be like everyone else.^[5]

A job placement plan and agreement (JPPA) dated June 23, 2016, indicated that job development and placement services for the employee would begin with restrictions of twelve hours of work per week, four hours per day for non-consecutive days. On July 11, 2016, the employee had an in-person interview at a Shopko store and was offered a position. She began working eight hours per week after an orientation on July 22, 2016. The employee lives in Battle Lake, Minnesota, and drives about 28 miles to work at the Shopko in Perham, Minnesota. There is no public handicapped accessible transportation available in the area.

On April 10, 2017, the employee filed a claim petition for payment of the base cost of the 2014 Toyota Sienna. The employer and insurer denied the claim as not being compensable under Minnesota’s workers’ compensation laws. After a hearing on November 27, 2017, the compensation judge found that the vehicle “has enabled the employee to seek and engage in employment on a sustained basis.”^[6] In an unappealed finding, the judge also found that there was “no handicapped accessible transportation available from her home to her job.”^[7] The judge awarded reimbursement of the base cost of the vehicle to the employee. The employer and insurer appeal.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3). Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984). Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed. Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240. Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo. Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).

On appeal, appellants raise two issues for determination. First, as question of law, whether the base cost of an accessible vehicle is a reimbursable expense under the Workers’ Compensation Act in any circumstances. Second, if so, is there substantial evidence in the record to support the compensation judge’s award of the base cost of Ms. Washek’s 2014 Toyota Sienna accessible vehicle.

The employee claims the 2014 vehicle was a necessary part of her vocational rehabilitation services and therefore the employer and insurer are liable to pay for it. The employer and insurer contend the compensation judge committed an error of law by broadly interpreting the statute regarding rehabilitation services in Minn. Stat. § 176.102 and ignored the clear language of the statute. For the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded by the employer and insurer’s arguments and we affirm.

The fundamental principle of vocational rehabilitation is to assist injured employees to return to their former job or, when precluded from returning to their pre-injury job, to get a job in a modified or new position.^[8] Vocational rehabilitation services include a rehabilitation plan which is designed to aid the injured employee in a job search or in the development, acquisition, or updating of skills that will enable the employee to secure or maintain employment.^[9] Consideration of the employee's physical limitations,^[10] qualifications,^[11] age,^[12] education,^[13] previous work history,^[14] interest,^[15] transferable skills,^[16] and labor market conditions within a reasonable distance from home^[17] is given in developing a rehabilitation plan.^[18] A job placement plan and agreement (JPPA) will list specific tasks for the employee to follow in order to obtain the job-related goals of the plan.

Under Minn. Stat. ch. 176 and the accompanying rules, the employer and insurer have the sole responsibility for paying the cost of necessary rehabilitation services provided.^[19] Minn. Stat. § 176.102, subd. 9(a) sets forth the rehabilitation costs and expenses for which an employer and insurer are liable, which include the cost of “all rehabilitation services and supplies necessary for implementation of the plan.”^[20] Further, unlike the statutory limit on remodeling costs contained in Minn. Stat. § 176.137, subds. 2 and 5, the “pecuniary liability” of an employer for rehabilitation costs is not capped for each personal injury. Instead, the test is whether the cost of all rehabilitation services and supplies are reasonable, necessary, and causally related to the work injury.

The central issue of this case is whether an employee who has been rendered paraplegic by a work injury such that a modified accessible vehicle is necessary for her to seek, secure, and maintain employment, may be awarded the full cost of that vehicle as a rehabilitation expense. This court has held that such a vehicle may be compensable as a rehabilitation expense in a similar case, Wong v. Won Ton Foods,^[21] and in the earlier decision in this matter, Washek v. New Dimensions Home Health.^[22] In Wong, the employee, who was quadriplegic as the result of a work injury, had a strong desire to return to work. This court affirmed the award of the cost of an accessible vehicle as a rehabilitation expense because the vehicle would rehabilitate the employee and enable the employee “to function independently and to seek and engage in employment compatible with his education, employment skills and disability.”^[23] The court further concluded that the compensation judge reasonably found that the employee would benefit from vocational rehabilitation services and that “a handicap-equipped van would be useful in restoring the employee to a job related to his former employment or in another work area.”^[24] The Minnesota Supreme Court summarily affirmed this decision.

The employer and insurer argue that Wong conflicts with the supreme court’s holding in Langa v. Fleischmann-Kurth Malting Co.,^[25] and must be overruled. In Langa, the court held that the cost of child care incurred before an employee was in rehabilitation was not reimbursable as a medical expense under Minn. Stat. § 176.135 since it was not provided for in the statute. The employer and insurer contend that the base cost of an accessible vehicle is likewise not a compensable vocational expense under the Workers’ Compensation Act, arguing that the statute makes no mention of a vehicle as a compensable cost and inferring that the legislature did not intend for a vehicle to be compensable without express legislative authorization. By allowing reimbursement for a vehicle as a rehabilitation expense, the employer and insurer argue that this court has exceeded its authority. We are not persuaded by this argument. The statute authorizes payment for all rehabilitation supplies necessary for implementation of the employee’s rehabilitation plan. We note that many types of reasonable and necessary rehabilitation supplies are not directly listed in the statute but would be reimbursable. Therefore, we decline to overrule the Wong decision.

In the previous Washek decision, we cited the Wong case as precedent and affirmed the compensation judge’s denial of the base cost of the 2003 vehicle as a compensable expense under the circumstances presented at that time. The judge distinguished the determinative facts, that the employee was not able to work or look for work for most of the time she used that vehicle, from the facts in Wong where the employee had demonstrated the physical capability of returning to his pre-injury vocation or other employment. Because evidence in the record supported the judge’s finding that the vehicle did not enable the employee to seek or engage in employment compatible with a vocational rehabilitation plan, unlike Wong, we affirmed. We also concluded that in appropriate circumstances, the full cost of a vehicle may be awarded to a disabled employee under the Workers’ Compensation Act.^[26]

Our view of the applicable law has not changed. The base cost of an accessible vehicle is compensable as a vocational rehabilitation expense. Similar to our previous decision in Washek, the next issue presented on appeal is whether the judge’s finding that the 2014 vehicle has enabled the employee to seek and engage in employment on a sustained basis has substantial support in the record. We conclude that the finding is supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, we affirm.

The compensation judge applied the law to the facts and determined the evidence in the record supported the award of reimbursement of the base cost of the 2014 vehicle, and noted that

We are not aware of any other case involving an award of the full cost of an accessible vehicle as a rehabilitation expense to an employee since the Wong case was decided in 1993. This case and Wong both address a highly unusual situation involving a severely injured employee with paralysis who is in vocational rehabilitation, is physically able to work, is highly motivated to work, and needs an accessible vehicle in order to attain vocational goals. Given the unique facts of this case, we conclude the base cost of the 2014 vehicle is a compensable cost that is reasonable and necessary to implement the employee’s rehabilitation plan and to enable the employee to engage in sustained employment. Therefore, under the substantial evidence standard and in accordance with Hengemuhle and Wong, we affirm.