ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF. Substantial evidence in the record supports the compensation judge’s determination that the employee’s hurrying was not a causative factor in her fall, that her fall was unexplained, and that her injury did not arise out of her employment.
Compensation Judge: Sandra J. Grove
Attorneys: Mark J. Fellman, St. Paul, Minnesota, for the Appellant. Andrew Lynn and Elizabeth Giebel, Lynn, Scharfenberg & Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the Respondents.
Affirmed.
SEAN M. QUINN, Judge
The employee appeals a finding that her injury did not arise out of her employment. Because the compensation judge’s decision is well supported by the record and because her analysis comports with the law, we affirm.
The employee is a nursing assistant for the employer, a residential care center for elderly individuals. She testified that as a nursing assistant, she “always walks fast” while working. (T. 22, 25.) When not at work, she walks at a more relaxed pace. (T. 23.)
On August 2, 2017, the employee had just finished her shift, did the last of her charting, and washed her hands. She then turned, intending to walk down the hallway, grab her purse, and punch out for the day. The hallway floor was carpeted, non-slippery, flat, dry, and debris-free. After walking a few steps down the hall, the employee fell, suffering serious injury resulting in significant medical expense and over three months of lost time from work. The employee testified that although she was walking at her usual fast pace, she did not know why she fell. (T. 26, 29, 30.)
The employer and insurer denied primary liability and the issue of whether the employee’s injury arose out of her employment was presented to the compensation judge. Concluding the injury did not arise out of employment pursuant to Dykhoff,[1] the compensation judge denied the employee’s claim. The employee appeals.
On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3). Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984). Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed. Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240. Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).
A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo. Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).
The employee appeals from the compensation judge’s determination that her August 2, 2017, injury did not arise out of her employment. The judge determined the employee’s injury was not compensable under Dykhoff. The compensation judge concluded that while the employee was walking fast, the evidence was insufficient to prove that walking fast was a cause of the fall.
For an injury to be compensable, it must arise out of and in the course of employment. Minn. Stat. § 176.021. “The very words ‘arising out of’ connote a causal connection, whereas ‘in the course of’ refers to the time, place, and circumstance of the incident causing the injury.” Gibberd v. Control Data Corp., 424 N.W.2d 776, 780, 40 W.C.D. 1040, 1047 (Minn. 1988) (citations omitted). There is no dispute in this case that the employee’s injury occurred in the course of her employment. The only relevant issue is whether the employee’s injury arose out of her employment.[2]
The employee argued at hearing, and urges here on appeal, that at the time of her fall, she was walking fast on her way to punch out, and this hurrying, by itself, presents an increased risk of injury. She cites this court’s analysis and conclusion in Kubis v. Cmty. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, No. WC15-5842 (W.C.C.A. Feb. 5, 2016), rev’d on other grounds, 897 N.W.2d 254, 77 W.C.D. 543 (Minn. 2017), for the proposition that hurrying can provide the requisite causal connection between an injury and employment. She also relies upon this court’s decisions in Williams v. ISD 2396, No. WC15-5820 (W.C.C.A. Feb. 17, 2016) and Erven v. Magnetation, LLC, 76 W.C.D. 433 (W.C.C.A. 2016) to further support this argument. She alleges she had the subjective belief that she needed to walk fast at work, due to the nature of her duties as a nurse. She further alleges that at the moment of her fall, she was still walking fast. Because her testimony on these points was found credible by the compensation judge, the employee argues the compensation judge erred in denying her claim.
In Kubis, Williams, and Erven, hurrying was not the only factor that led this court to conclude there to be an increased risk of injury, but was part of overall circumstances presented as particular facts in each case. The question of whether hurrying, by itself, can constitute an increased risk of injury need not be decided in this case. The employee testified she did not know why she fell and did not connect hurrying to her fall. The compensation judge concluded there was insufficient evidence to prove a causal connection between hurrying and the fall, thus making the fall unexplained. Because substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s conclusion, we affirm.[3]
Under Minnesota workers’ compensation law, injuries resulting from unexplained falls are not compensable. Dykhoff, 840 N.W.2d at 828, 73 W.C.D. at 874. The employee in this case did not encounter an external hazard, a special hazard, or an unsafe condition. Rather, she encountered a non-slippery, flat, dry, debris-free floor – a neutral condition. For an injury occurring from a neutral condition to be compensable, there must be a hazard originating on the premises as part of the working environment. Roller-Dick, 916 N.W.2d at 377, 78 W.C.D. at ___. Although her hurrying was argued to be the hazard, the compensation judge found the employee’s hurrying did not cause the fall. As such, the hurrying was not a hazard that increased her risk of injury. In the absence of circumstances encountered creating an increased risk of injury, the employee’s fall is unexplained and her injury is not compensable. Because the employee’s fall is unexplained, we affirm the compensation judge’s denial of her claim.
[1] Dykhoff v. Xcel Energy, 840 N.W.2d 821, 73 W.C.D. 865 (Minn. 2013).
[2] An additional argument raised by the employee is that the compensation judge erred in admitting into evidence, over objection, the deposition of a co-worker. As the co-worker did not witness the fall, her testimony was only relevant to the time of day the fall occurred. Although the co-worker’s deposition was initially taken due to her expected unavailability, and although the co-worker was ultimately available to attend the trial, the compensation judge did not err in exercising her discretion in admitting the deposition. See Nagel v. Hennepin Cty., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Apr. 6, 2004) (a compensation judge is not bound by the rules of evidence and has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of evidence). Regardless, nothing in the co-worker’s testimony was material to the key issue of whether the injury arose out of employment.
[3] We note the compensation judge also concluded the employee failed to present sufficient evidence that connected her work duties to her walking fast. There is no requirement under the law, however, that the employee’s activity leading to the injury be so specifically work-related. Roller-Dick v. CentraCare Health Sys., 916 N.W.2d 373, 380 n.5, 78 W.C.D. ___, ___ (Minn. 2018) (citing Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 421-22, 35 N.W.2d 719, 728, 15 W.C.D. 395, 406 (1949)).