ERNESTO HERRADORA-BRIONES, Employee/Appellant, v. BUILDING RESOURCES CORP. and AMTRUST GROUP, Employer-Insurer/Respondents and NORAN NEUROLOGICAL CLINIC, MINNETONKA IMAGING MRI, INTERSOURCE SERVS. LLC, RIVERA CHIROPRACTIC CTR. LLC, and RESULTS THERAPY LLC, Intervenors.

The pro se employee appeals the compensation judge’s denial of his claims, arguing that substantial evidence in the record does not support the denial and alleging a flawed evidentiary ruling. We affirm.

The employee, Ernesto Herradora-Briones, was employed by Building Resources Corporation as a member of a janitorial crew at a school building. His job duties were physical in nature and, as the employer conceded, he was a hard-working employee. (T. 307.)

The employee alleges that on June 23, 2015, he suffered an injury to his left shoulder, neck, and mid and low back while moving a piece of furniture he estimated weighed more than 100 pounds. He did not report an injury to his employer, nor did he say anything to his co-workers with whom he was moving furniture. He testified that he thought he would be fired if he reported an injury. He expected his pain would improve over time. That day, he sought treatment at St. Mary’s Health Clinic in St. Paul. There, he complained of having had back pain for the past month. The June 23, 2015, office note states that the employee did not have an injury. The doctor assessed the employee with a lumbar strain, told him he was okay to continue work as a janitor, and prescribed naproxen. (Ex. 2.)

The employee continued to work after June 23, 2015, including moving and lifting heavy items such as bookshelves, sofas, tables, and refrigerators. He was not under restrictions from a doctor and he testified that he did not self-restrict his activities. He testified that his symptoms continued to worsen.

On September 9, 2015, the employee was evaluated by Dr. David Monson, D.C., at Rivera Chiropractic Clinic. He reported pain in his right knee, neck, and back, and a June 23, 2015, injury at work as a result of carrying heavy items. He was kept off work through September 21, 2015. In addition to the specific injury claim on June 23, 2015, the employee also alleged Gillette-type injuries to his left shoulder, left upper extremity, neck, and mid and low back culminating on September 9 and 12, 2015, as a result of lifting and moving heavy items at work during the summer of 2015. The employee treated at Rivera Chiropractic Clinic multiple times a week through September and into October and was given sedentary activity restrictions. He treated approximately once per week in November and no improvement was noted. MRI scans were recommended, and he was released from care in December 2015 with a referral to a neurologist. (Ex. J-1.)

The employee underwent MRI scans of the cervical and lumbar spine on December 16, 2015. The cervical scan was interpreted as normal aside from findings of loss of lordotic curve potentially due to muscular spasm. The lumbar scan showed herniations at L4-5 and L5-S1 with bilateral neural foraminal narrowing at those levels. (Ex. 17.)

On February 18, 2016, the employee was seen for evaluation at Noran Neurological Clinic by Dr. Ana Groeschel. The employee complained of neck, mid-back, low back, bilateral shoulder, and knee pain, with numbness and tingling into the left arm as a result of moving a couch at work on June 23, 2015. She recommended EMG studies to address reported numbness, as well as an MRI scan of the left shoulder and thoracic spine. The EMG results showed findings consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome of the left wrist. The MRI of the left shoulder showed a labral tear and cyst with associated tendinopathy. The MRI of the thoracic spine showed findings of small disc herniations at T8-9, T6-7, and T5-6 without spinal stenosis. Upon review of these findings, Dr. Groeschel recommended continued chiropractic treatment, physical therapy, use of muscle relaxants, and referred the employee to Summit Orthopedics for the left shoulder and wrist. (Ex. 19.)

Prior to his employment with the employer and his alleged work injuries, the employee was involved in motor vehicle accidents in 2002 and 2009. When deposed in this case by the employer and insurer, the employee denied involvement in motor vehicle accidents prior to his alleged work injury.^[1] As a result of the 2002 motor vehicle accident, the employee treated for complaints of neck and low back pain and presented with S1 radiculopathy into the right leg, and L4, L5, and S1 radiculopathy into the left leg. (Exs. 19 and 7.) As a result of the 2009 motor vehicle accident, the employee reported exacerbation of neck and back pain that he had previously been experiencing, as well as headaches and pain in his shoulders. (Ex. 5.) He underwent a CT scan of the lumbar spine and an MRI of the cervical spine. The lumbar spine scan showed a central disc bulge extending into the epidural space without central or neural foraminal narrowing at L5-S1, and the cervical scan showed a loss of lordic curve. (Ex. 6.) The employee underwent ongoing treatment for neck and low back pain sustained as a result of the motor vehicle accident. He also treated for pain in both shoulders and symptoms of tingling and numbness in his upper extremities prior to the alleged June 23, 2015, work injury. (Exs. 2 and 5.)

In September 2016, the employee was involved in another motor vehicle accident, which resulted in an injury to his back.

Dr. Monson of Rivera Chiropractic Center prepared a narrative report dated December 28, 2016. Therein, he opined that the employee had suffered a permanent injury to his cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine as a result of both the June 23, 2015, injury and the non-work-related 2016 motor vehicle accident. He apportioned 60% to the June 23, 2015, injury. The only injury he related solely to the June 23, 2015, injury was to the knee, for which the employee ultimately did not claim workers’ compensation benefits. (Ex. C.)

In a narrative report dated March 21, 2017, Dr. Groeschel diagnosed the employee with a number of conditions she related to the three claimed 2015 dates of injury, including sprains of the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine, right knee pain, left shoulder labral tear and tendinosis, and mononeuropathy in the wrist. She provided work restrictions and permanent partial disability ratings, including 3.5% for the cervical spine, 2.5% for the thoracic spine, 10% for the lumbar spine, 3% for carpal tunnel syndrome, and deferred to a specialist for ratings for the knee and shoulder. While Dr. Groeschel opined that the three claimed dates of injury were substantial contributing factors to the employee’s diagnoses, her report refers to a “collision,” which is not consistent with the reported mechanism of the alleged work injuries. (Ex. B.)

The employee was also evaluated by Dr. Robert Wengler, who issued a report dated April 26, 2017. The only injury Dr. Wengler related to the employee’s claimed work injuries was that to the left shoulder. He opined that the employee does not have significant problems with his spine. He rated the employee’s shoulder condition at 2% and suggested activity restrictions related to that condition. (Ex. D.)

The employer and insurer requested that the employee be examined by Dr. Mark Friedland. The examination took place on February 3, 2016. Dr. Friedland issued a report that day, as well as a supplemental report dated August 23, 2016. Based upon his interview and examination of the employee and his review of medical records, Dr. Friedland opined that the employee did not sustain a work-related injury on June 23, 2015, September 9, 2015, or September 12, 2015. He concluded that the findings on MRI in 2015 were nearly identical to the findings on MRI in 2009 following the employee’s motor vehicle accident. He similarly concluded that the employee’s current symptomology is nearly identical to the symptomology noted in the employee’s treatment records from 2009 to 2014. Dr. Friedland also noted the medical implausibility of the employee having sustained a work injury in June 2015 but continuing to perform ongoing unrestricted heavy work activities and without medical treatment for months thereafter. (Ex. 11.)

The employee asserted entitlement to wage loss benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, medical benefits, and vocational rehabilitation benefits as a result of his claimed work-related injuries with the employer. A number of medical providers and an interpreter service intervened. The employer and insurer denied primary liability for all claimed dates of injury, and asserted a notice defense for the June 23, 2015, date of injury. The matter was heard by a compensation judge over the course of a two-day hearing with counsel appearing on behalf of both parties. Voluminous records were admitted into evidence, and the testimony of the employee and a representative of the employer was taken. The record was closed upon submission of written closing arguments and the uncontested admission of an additional exhibit.

On October 20, 2017, the compensation judge issued her Findings and Order. Therein, all claims asserted by the employee and intervenors were denied, and the notice defense asserted by the employer and insurer was rejected. The compensation judge found that the employee failed to meet his burden of proof to establish work-related injuries as claimed because his testimony regarding past motor vehicle accidents was not credible, he continued to work without reporting an injury or altering his job duties for months following the claimed injury, no co-employee testimony was offered to verify that an injury had occurred, and he did not report an injury during his initial medical visits. In denying the employee’s claims, the compensation judge considered the opinions of Dr. Friedland to be well-founded and more persuasive than the medical opinions offered by the employee in support of his claims. The employee appeals the denial, proceeding pro se.^[2]

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3). Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984). Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed. Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240. Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo. Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).

The pro se employee appeals the compensation judge’s denial of his claims. He alleges substantial evidence in the record does not support the compensation judge’s findings, and that the compensation judge erred in closing the record without allowing additional discovery following the hearing.

The compensation judge was tasked with making a number of determinations in this matter. The threshold question was whether the employee suffered a work-related injury as claimed. The compensation judge concluded that the employee did not meet his burden of proof to establish that a work injury occurred or that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subds. 1 and 1a. This conclusion was based primarily on a finding that the employee was not credible, and on the acceptance of the opinions of Dr. Friedland over those of the employee’s treating physicians.

The assessment of witness credibility is the responsibility and unique function of the compensation judge as the trier of fact. Even v. Kraft, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 831, 834, 42 W.C.D. 220, 225 (Minn. 1989) (citing Brennan v. Joseph G. Brennan, M.D., P.A., 425 N.W.2d 837, 839-40 (Minn. 1988)). As the reviewing court, it is not this court’s function to evaluate the credibility and probative value of witness testimony. Vanderbeek v. City of St. Paul, 72 W.C.D. 789 (W.C.C.A. 2012). This court cannot draw its own inferences if the inferences made by the compensation judge are reasonable. See Redgate v. Sroga’s Standard Serv., 421 N.W.2d 729, 734, 40 W.C.D. 948, 957 (Minn. 1988).

The compensation judge found the employee’s testimony was not sufficiently credible or persuasive to meet his burden of proof to establish that he suffered a work injury on June 23, 2015. (Finding 11.) Specifically, she found he lacked credibility with regard to his denial of prior motor vehicle accidents (Finding 3), the history provided to his treating doctor on the date of the alleged work injury (Finding 6), and the delay in his provision of notice to the employer (Finding 10). Because the compensation judge was in the best position to assess the credibility of the employee and his testimony and the inferences she drew were reasonable, we conclude that substantial evidence supports her finding that the employee was not credible.

The employee argues that the witness for the employer did not testify credibly. Indeed, while the compensation judge did not make a specific finding with regard to the credibility of the employer’s witness, the judge’s description of the witness’s testimony suggests that the compensation judge did not believe her to be credible. However, the compensation judge’s denial of the employee’s claims was not based upon reliance on this witness’s testimony. Further, any determination made with regard to the credibility of the employer’s witness does not affect the compensation judge’s finding that the employee himself was not credible.

More importantly, the compensation judge’s denial of the employee’s claim was also based upon her acceptance of the opinions of Dr. Friedland over those of the employee’s treating physicians. It was Dr. Friedland’s opinion, based upon his examination of the employee and his review of the employee’s medical records and history, that the employee did not sustain a specific injury on June 23, 2015, or a Gillette-type injury on September 9 or 12, 2015. Because Dr. Friedland had reviewed records related to the employee’s prior medical and chiropractic care, including those related to the employee’s prior motor vehicle accidents, the compensation judge considered Dr. Friedland’s opinions to be better founded than those of the employee’s physicians, including Dr. Groeschel, Dr. Monson, and Dr. Wengler.

This court will uphold a compensation judge’s choice between conflicting expert medical opinions so long as the accepted opinions are adequately founded. Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337, 342-43 (Minn. 1985). Dr. Friedland examined the employee and reviewed extensive medical records and history, and we have repeatedly held that this level of information constitutes adequate foundation for purposes of providing a medical opinion. See Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W.2d 185, 188, 30 W.C.D. 426, 430 (Minn. 1978); Willy v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 77 W.C.D. 349, 354 (W.C.C.A. 2016), summarily aff’d (Minn. May 10, 2017). The compensation judge’s reliance on the opinions of Dr. Friedland was appropriate and her denial of the employee’s claim is supported by substantial evidence, and we therefore affirm.

The employee argues that the employer and insurer have improperly withheld documentary evidence and faults the compensation judge for not holding the record open for additional discovery following the hearing. Upon review of the transcript, it appears that the existence of a previously undisclosed ‘night supervisor report’ was identified through the testimony of the employer representative. The parties agreed at the conclusion of the two-day hearing that the report referred to by the witness would be produced post-hearing and submitted to the compensation judge with written closing arguments.

Five days after the ‘night supervisor report’ was produced, counsel for the employee requested a special term conference before closure of the record, citing his belief that additional documents existed and could be discoverable. Counsel for the employer and insurer objected, asserting that all relevant documents had been produced and provided to the court. The compensation judge did not allow for additional discovery and no special term conference was held. Rather, the record was closed with the submission and admission into evidence the ‘night supervisor report,’ as well as written closing arguments from both parties. In his appeal to this court, the employee expresses his belief that there are other documents the employer and insurer did not disclose relative to his claim and that the judge erred in not allowing further discovery. The employer and insurer maintain that all documents relative to the employee’s claimed injuries have been disclosed as required under the law, and that the compensation judge was well within her discretion in closing the record without allowing for additional discovery.

Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the compensation judge and this court will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion. Cici v. Methodist Hosp., 63 W.C.D. 421, 426 (W.C.C.A. 2003). Compensation judges are given considerable latitude in conducting hearings in workers’ compensation matters. See Minn. Stat. § 176.411, subd. 1; Otterness v. Anderson Windows, 77 W.C.D. 975, 985 (W.C.C.A. 2017). Here, the compensation judge kept the record open for the submission of an additional exhibit and written closing arguments. The judge declined to leave the record open for an additional period of time to allow for further discovery. The employee did not identify specific evidence he believed had not been disclosed and the employer and insurer asserted all discoverable evidence had been provided. Only upon a showing of good cause may a compensation judge allow an extension of time for the submission of evidence after the hearing date, and that extension is limited to a period of 30 days pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.341, subd. 5. Without the identification of specific evidence the employee sought, and in light of the statutory limitations under Minn. Stat. § 176.341, subd. 5, the compensation judge did not abuse her discretion in rejecting the employee’s request to conduct additional discovery following the hearing in this matter.

Ultimately, the compensation judge concluded that the employee did not meet his burden to prove that he sustained a work-related injury or that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. Based upon our review of the record, we acknowledge the employee’s frustration in his dealings with his former employer and the limitations he encountered related to language barriers and his reliance on interpreters throughout the process. We also acknowledge the employer’s witness was seemingly found by the compensation judge to have her own “credibility issues,” and the record amply supports those concerns. However, the scope of this court’s review is limited to whether substantial evidence in the record supports the compensation judge’s findings and whether she abused her discretion with regard to evidentiary rulings. Because substantial evidence in the record supports the compensation judge’s decision and because no abuse of discretion was committed, we affirm.