WILLIAM DODGSON, Employee/Appellant, v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC WORKS, SELF-INSURED, Employer/Respondent, and MEDICA HEALTH PLANS – OPTUM, Intervenor.

The employee appeals from the discontinuance of his wage loss benefits. We affirm.

On July 20, 2017, while working for the City of Minneapolis water and sewer department, the employee, William Dodgson, suffered an injury to his left index finger, resulting in the amputation of the finger. The employee first treated with Dr. Mark Urban and later with Dr. David Falconer, a hand specialist. During the first three months, his medical care included partial bone removal, wound care, therapy, splinting, and narcotic pain medication. He had swelling of the hand, jagged bone regrowth, and the fingernail grew back in a “hook nail” pattern, causing excruciating pain and sensitivity.

The employee’s doctors restricted the use of the left hand and disallowed driving or operating heavy machinery while taking pain medication. The employee personally owned a manual vehicle which he could not operate given these restrictions. To get to various medical appointments, the employee depended on his wife or father-in-law, though neither were able to provide reliable day-to-day transportation for the employee to get to and from work.

In the first few months following the injury, the employee was assigned two light-duty temporary jobs by the employer. The employer offered the employee a third light-duty job, which the employee refused because the job was outside of his physical restrictions. Near the end of October 2017, the employer offered another temporary light-duty job to the employee, which involved admitting and escorting visitors of a secured building.^[1] The employee rejected this job offer on the basis that he had no transportation as he was precluded from driving and he could not rely on his wife and/or father-in-law. When it was suggested the employee use public transportation, he refused, citing to the cost. Evidence in the record reflects the cost to take a bus ranged from $2.50 to $5.00 per day. The employee also objected to using a bus because of the distance he would have to walk from his home to a bus stop, and from the bus stop to his place of employment, each about two to three blocks. The employee’s physician instructed him to avoid working in temperatures below 65 degrees Fahrenheit and prescribed charcoal-lined gloves to wear in colder temperatures.

The employee’s refusal of the job offer and the employer’s subsequent discontinuance of benefits was considered at an administrative conference. Another administrative conference was held to consider the employee’s request that the employer provide transportation. The employer prevailed at both conferences. The employee appealed both decisions and the issues were consolidated. The employee withdrew his appeal of the denial of transportation prior to the hearing.

The issue of whether the employee unreasonably refused an offer of gainful employment that was consistent with the rehabilitation plan came on for hearing before a compensation judge on March 6, 2018. The judge heard testimony from the QRC that the job offered was within the employee’s physical restrictions imposed by Dr. Falconer. The judge also considered the rehabilitation plan prepared by the QRC, which listed the vocational goal of returning the employee to work with the employer.^[2] The judge also heard testimony from the employee regarding the transportation issue. The employee testified that transportation such as a taxi or other private transportation was cost prohibitive, and that with respect to use of a bus, he believed the employer should pay for it. The employee also testified to difficulty with his injured finger being exposed to colder temperatures, even with charcoal-lined gloves.

The compensation judge issued a Findings and Order, determining that the employee was offered a job consistent with the rehabilitation plan and that his refusal to accept the offered job was not reasonable. As such, wage loss benefits were discontinued. The compensation judge acknowledged the employee was precluded from driving. Between the low cost of a bus, the charcoal-lined gloves, and the potential for family members to occasionally drive him to and from work, the compensation judge concluded the employee’s refusal to take advantage of these other transportation methods was unreasonable. The employee appeals.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3). Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984). Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed. Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240. Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo. Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).

The employee appeals from the compensation judge’s decision discontinuing his wage loss benefits upon finding the employee was offered work consistent with the rehabilitation plan and that he unreasonably refused that offer. The employee also argues that the compensation judge’s mention of an unappealed administrative decision in her findings deprived him of his right to a de novo hearing.

The compensation judge found the employee was not eligible to receive temporary total disability benefits because he unreasonably refused an offer of employment that was consistent with the rehabilitation plan. Under Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 1(i), temporary total disability benefits “shall cease if the employee refuses an offer of work that is consistent with a plan of rehabilitation filed with a commissioner which meets the requirements of section 176.102, subdivision 4.”

The employee argues the compensation judge’s conclusion that the job offer was consistent with the rehabilitation plan was clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. He acknowledges the rehabilitation plan on file stated the goal was for the employee to return to work with the same employer, but points to the QRC’s initial evaluation and report to show that the QRC did not actually consider this to be the ultimate goal of the employee’s rehabilitation. While other documents may indicate the QRC did not anticipate the employer providing long-term employment for the employee, no alteration was made to the rehabilitation plan as of the time of the job offer. The QRC testified the job offer was consistent with the employee’s work restrictions “except for transportation issues.” Yet, there is nothing in the rehabilitation plan regarding transportation that is consistent with this testimony. The statute instructs consideration of the “plan of rehabilitation filed with a commissioner” and the employee does not provide authority for this court to consider material or information outside of that plan. Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 1(i). The job offered to the employee was one for return to work with the same employer, and was thus consistent with the filed rehabilitation plan. Both parties are bound by a strict adherence to the plain language of the statute and the terms of the rehabilitation plan. See Gilbertson v. Williams Dingmann, LLC, 894 N.W.2d 148, 77 W.C.D. 313 (Minn. 2017) (holding an offer to return to work with the same employer was not consistent with the rehabilitation plan listing return to work with a different employer as the vocational goal). The compensation judge’s conclusion that the job offer was consistent with the rehabilitation plan is affirmed.

The employee alternatively argues that his refusal of the job offer was reasonable. An employee’s refusal of a job offer may be considered reasonable under the circumstances if it would “dramatically alter a reasonable and responsible pattern of living.” Punt v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 44 W.C.D. 372, 374 (W.C.C.A. 1990) (citing Riley v. Chuck Meuer’s Rest., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Mar. 14, 1990)). This court has upheld the reasonableness of rejections of offers of employment for reasons related to an employee’s established work schedule, or family or personal obligations. See, e.g., Begin v. Thermo Serv. Co., 36 W.C.D. 404 (W.C.C.A. 1984) (refusal of day shift job offer reasonable because employee attended college class during the day); Scheidt v. Metro. Transit Council, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Nov. 2, 2001) (refusal of night shift job offer reasonable where employee did not regularly work night shift and testified night shift strained marriage); Meongen v. Owens Corning Fiberglass, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Jun. 13, 1991) (refusal of day shift job offer reasonable because acceptance would require alteration of child care arrangements).

The employee is correct in identifying transportation to and from work as a relevant factor in considering the reasonableness of a rejection of a job offer, citing Hodgin v. Xcel Energy, No. WC09-4993 (W.C.C.A. Apr. 5, 2010). In Hodgin, the employee was medically unable to drive to the employer’s premises. The evidence presented to the compensation judge was not clear as to whether public transportation was a feasible option for the employee, so this court affirmed the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee’s rejection of a job offer was reasonable. Here, unlike in Hodgin, evidence regarding public transportation was presented. The compensation judge concluded that the employee unreasonably refused to make other arrangements to get to work, whether that was by public transportation or the occasional reliance on his wife or father-in-law. Substantial evidence in the record supports her conclusions, and we affirm.

Finally, the employee cites as error two findings made by the compensation judge, specifically, a finding that the employee had filed a rehabilitation request seeking transportation (Finding 12), and a finding that the transportation issue was considered at an administrative conference and the employee did not prevail (Finding 16). The employee argues that because he withdrew his appeal from the denial of his rehabilitation request, the compensation judge’s reference to this issue in her findings indicates she relied upon and was influenced by the underlying decision, and he was deprived of his right to a de novo hearing. We disagree. Upon review of the findings in their entirety and the record before us, there is no indication that the outcome of the administrative conference “tainted” the compensation judge’s decision, as the employee alleges. Rather, it appears that the findings identified by the employee are mere recitations of a procedural aspect of the litigation leading up to the hearing and in no way deprived the employee of his right to a de novo hearing on the issue presented, that being, whether he reasonably refused a job offer consistent with the rehabilitation plan.

The decision of the compensation judge is affirmed in all respects.