DEBBIE G. LEGATT, Employee/Respondent, v. VIKING COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO., SELF-INSURED/BERKLEY RISK ADM’RS CO., Employer/Appellants, and BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MINN. & BLUE PLUS, WOODLANDS CHIROPRACTIC, and ST. CLOUD MED. GROUP, P.A., Intervenors.

The employer and insurer have appealed from the compensation judge’s determination that the employee’s injury of November 20, 2014, arose out of her employment. The employer and insurer have also appealed the compensation judge’s finding that the employee’s low back and right hip medical expenses were related to the work injury. We affirm.

The employer, Viking Coca-Cola Bottling Company, bottles and distributes a variety of Coca-Cola products. The employee, Debra Legatt, began working there in 1992. In November 2014 she was employed as an operations manager and had been employed in that capacity for 10 years. One of her daily duties was to leave the office building where she generally worked and go to the warehouse to take inventory on some of the products stored there. On November 20, 2014, as Ms. Legatt was walking in the warehouse, taking the daily inventory, she twisted her right ankle.

The employee went to St. Cloud Medical Group the day after her injury with complaints of right foot pain and swelling. She was diagnosed as having an ankle sprain, was referred to physical therapy, was restricted to a sitting job, and was given an air cast. When she returned after a week, she was advised to keep wearing the air cast and to elevate her right foot when possible. In early December, the employee returned to St. Cloud Medical Group noting right hip and low back pain. She also sought chiropractic care for these complaints. At a visit to St. Cloud Medical Group on January 16, 2015, it was stated that the right ankle had healed “quite well.” Thereafter, the employee treated with her chiropractor for low back pain. In his report of January 28, 2016, the employee’s treating chiropractor, Dr. Michael Balfanz, expressed his opinion that the employee’s injury on November 20, 2014, and the altered gait resulting from that injury “contributed to the progression of her acute low back pain.”

At the request of the employer and its insurer, the employee was evaluated by Dr. David Fey on September 3, 2015. In his report of September 16, 2015, Dr. Fey concluded that the employee’s right ankle injury had resolved within four weeks of her injury on November 20, 2014. As to the low back complaints, Dr.Fey’s opinion was that those symptoms were due to pre-existing degenerative arthritis.

The employer and insurer denied liability for the employee’s November 20, 2014, injury, alleging that the injury did not arise out of employment. The employee filed a claim petition which was heard by Compensation Judge Catherine Dallner on May 16, 2016. The employee sought payment of medical expenses incurred for treatment of her right ankle and low back. In her Findings and Order of July 22, 2016, the compensation judge determined that the employee’s injury on November 20, 2014, arose out of her employment. The compensation judge found the right ankle injury was temporary and had resolved by January 16, 2015. The compensation judge also found that the employee’s low back symptoms were the result of an aggravation from the ankle injury and were temporary, resolving by March 30, 2015. The claims of the employee and intervenors for medical expenses were awarded.

The employer and insurer have appealed.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3). Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984). Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed. Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240. Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo. Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).

The employer and insurer argue that the compensation judge erred in finding that the employee’s injury arose out of employment. The appellants also contend that even if the injury arose out of employment, substantial evidence does not support the compensation judge’s finding that the low back and right hip problems were consequences of the right ankle injury.

The employer and insurer argue that the compensation judge erred in finding that the employee’s injury arose out of employment. Citing to Dykhoff v Xcel Energy, 840 N.W.2d 821, 73 W.C.D. 865 (Minn. 2013), the appellants contend that for this injury to arise out of employment, the employee must establish that the warehouse floor was hazardous or increased her exposure to injury beyond what she would have encountered in her everyday non-work life. Appellants allege that the employee’s evidence failed to meet those criteria and, further, that the facts in this case “are substantially identical” to the facts in Dykhoff. Accordingly, they argue that the employee’s injury could not be found to arise out of employment. We disagree.

In Dykhoff the employee testified that she fell in a hallway on her employer’s premises because the floor was slippery. The compensation judge found the floor was not slippery and denied her claim. This court reversed, applying the balancing test from our decision in Bohlin v. St. Louis County, 61 W.C.D. 69 (W.C.C.A. 2000), summarily aff’d, (Minn. 2001), and subsequent cases. The supreme court then reversed, rejecting the Bohlin balancing test and reinstating the compensation judge’s factual determination. Citing to more than seventy years of case law, the supreme court reiterated that for an injury to arise out of employment the employee must show an increased risk of injury.

“[T]he phrase ‘arising out of’ means that there must be some connection between the injury and the employment.” Dykhoff, 840 N.W.2d at 826, 73 W.C.D. at 871 (quoting Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1992)). This causal connection “is supplied if the employment exposes the employee to a hazard which originates on the premises as a part of the working environment, or peculiarly exposes the employee to an external hazard whereby he is subjected to a different and greater risk than if he had been pursuing his ordinary personal affairs.” Dykhoff, 840 N.W.2d at 826, 73 W.C.D. at 871 (quoting Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 55-56, 81 N.W.2d 272, 275 (1957) (emphasis added)).^[1]

The issue for the compensation judge in this case was whether the employee’s injury resulted from a hazard which originated on the premises. The compensation judge concluded that the employee was indeed exposed to a hazard that originated on the employer’s premises, specifically the warehouse floor in the condition encountered by the employee. After considering all of the evidence, including the employee’s testimony and photographs of the warehouse floor, the compensation judge found “the side of [the employee’s] right shoe caught in a damaged or crumbling crevice in the concrete floor, twisting her right ankle.” (Finding 8.)

In light of the factual finding with respect to the manner in which the injury occurred and the application of the causation test set forth in Dykhoff, we conclude, as did the compensation judge, that the employee’s injury of November 20, 2014, arose out of her employment.

The compensation judge found that the employee’s low back and right hip problems for which she had received medical and chiropractic care were consequences of her right ankle sprain and the altered gait from that sprain. Appellants argue this conclusion is simply “not medically credible.” This statement may be the opinion of counsel, but there is no evidence to support it. The independent medical examiner attributed the low back symptoms to a pre-existing condition which became symptomatic within two weeks of the ankle injury. The compensation judge was not required to accept the opinion of the IME and could accept the opinion of the employee’s chiropractor on this issue. The appellants attack the chiropractor’s opinion because of his “financial interest” but, again, there is no evidence of any financial advantage to the chiropractor in having his bill paid by the workers’ compensation insurer instead by some other source.

The compensation judge carefully considered this question and set out the basis for her decision in her memorandum.

The compensation judge’s decision is affirmed.