LACHLAN P. FOLSTROM, Employee/Respondent, v. NORTHGATE LIQUORS and AMTRUST GROUP, Employer-Insurer/Appellants, and MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., ST. PAUL RADIOLOGY/MIDWEST PHYSICIANS, O’HARA & HUNTER CONSULTING, INC., MEDICA HEALTH PLANS, CTR. FOR DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING, and ABBOTT NW. HOSP., Intervenors.

The employer and insurer appeal the judge’s finding that the employee injured his low back and right hip while moving beer kegs at work, arguing that the employee’s demonstrated lack of credibility warrants a reversal of the judge’s findings. Because substantial evidence supports the judge’s finding, we affirm. As a matter of law, the employer and insurer also appeal the judge’s exclusion of evidence of a criminal conviction. In a de novo review of the evidentiary issue, we hold that the compensation judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting said evidence.

Northgate Liquors hired Lachlan Folstrom as a cashier and stocker in April 2015. Before he was hired, his medical history included diabetes mellitus for 25 years and a neck fusion 18 years prior. He had suffered from intermittent back pain, but other than a 1991 office visit, he sought no treatment. Three months before his hire at Northgate Liquors, the employee was involved in a flip-over motor vehicle accident. He was under no physical restrictions and suffered no physical disability which prevented him from working for the employer.

On January 14, 2016, the employee was in the employer’s cooler stocking and moving beer kegs as part of his job. The largest kegs weighed approximately 160 pounds. As he bent down to move a keg, he felt a pop and a burning sensation in the middle of his low back. He testified that because he had no insurance, he called Allina Coon Rapids Clinic and requested pain medication. A few days later, he was seen with complaints of bilateral low back pain, numbness in his legs and toes, and an inability to stand or sit. He was taken off work. The employer and its workers’ compensation carrier, Amtrust Group, admitted liability and paid benefits.

The employee began a five-month course of physical therapy at Courage Kenny on January 21, 2016. A week later, on January 28, 2016, the employee reported pain that spread into his right hip and groin upon flexion movement. Pain was noticed upon prolonged sitting. He also developed buttock pain in February 2016. The low back pain remained unchanged. An MRI of February 5, 2016, showed degenerative disc disease and some spondylosis at the L5-S1 level on the left.

The employee sought care with David Kraker, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon who initially diagnosed the employee’s condition as lumbar spinal stenosis in February 2016. The initial chart note reflected that the employee had a history of diabetes mellitus. In April 2016, after performing a range of motion test of the hip joint, Dr. Kraker also diagnosed the employee with sprain of the right hip. An MRI scan was ordered in May 2016, which confirmed bilateral trochanteric bursitis, right greater than left. There was also attenuation of the acetabular labrum felt to be related to chronic wear. There was no definite tear. Dr. Kraker concluded that the employee’s low back was not the main pain generator. He referred the employee to David Palmer, M.D. at Twin Cities Orthopedics to evaluate the hip and buttock pain that was constant and worsening.

Dr. Palmer saw the employee on September 19, 2016, noting that the employee hurt his hip lifting kegs of beer at work. Dr. Palmer diagnosed the condition as a femoral acetabular impingement of the right hip. He recommended a right hip arthroscopy with CAM resection.

The employer and insurer retained Mark E. Friedland, M.D. to examine the employee and issue a report. Dr. Friedland concluded in his report of October 17, 2016, that the employee’s hip pain was not related to his work injury of January 14, 2016. Rather, Dr. Friedland attributed the hip pain to chronic obesity (BMI calculated at 40.6) and deconditioning, as well as the motor vehicle accident in January 2015. He explained that the hip issues were not diagnosed until several months after the injury and it was only when Dr. Kraker could not explain the employee’s symptoms based on spinal pathology that he began questioning the possibility of hip pathology. He also explained that the injections to the hip did not appear to relieve the employee’s pain. Dr. Friedland diagnosed the employee’s condition as lumbosacral strain/sprain which had fully resolved and required no restrictions. He concluded that the employee had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) as of June 28, 2016.

Based on Dr. Friedland’s conclusions, the employer and insurer filed a Notice of Intention to Discontinue Benefits (NOID) and a Rehabilitation Request seeking termination vocational rehabilitation benefits. The employee filed an Objection to Discontinuance. Both the NOID and the Rehabilitation Request were consolidated and heard on February 3, 2017, before Compensation Judge Grant Hartman. Judge Hartman outlined the issues to include the nature and extent of the employee’s injuries, entitlement to wage loss, MMI, and whether vocational rehabilitation benefits should be terminated.

At the hearing, the employer and insurer sought admission of evidence concerning a prior criminal conviction. The employee objected to its admission, the compensation judge sustained the objection, and the evidence was not admitted. An offer of proof was made alleging that the proposed evidence related to the employee’s credibility.

In a Findings and Order filed April 17, 2017, and Amended Findings and Order filed April 25, 2017, Judge Hartman found that the January 14, 2016, low back injury was not a temporary aggravation. He found that the employee suffered a work-related injury to the hip on January 14, 2016, and was entitled to wage loss from December 2, 2016. He further found that the employee had not reached MMI and that vocational rehabilitation should not be terminated. The employer and insurer appeal.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1(3). Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984). Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed. Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240. Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo. Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).

On appeal, the employer and insurer argue that the employee’s lack of credibility warrants a reversal of the judge’s findings. They further argue that the judge erred in adopting the opinion of Dr. Kraker over that of Dr. Friedland, as Dr. Kraker’s opinion lacked foundation and was based on the employee’s untruthful account of his medical history and incomplete medical information. Finally, they argue that the judge erred in disallowing evidence regarding the employee’s prior criminal conviction.

The employer and insurer point to a number of inconsistencies in the employee’s testimony in support of its assertion that the findings of the compensation judge are flawed. The “assessment of witnesses’ credibility is the unique function of the trier of fact.” Even v. Kraft, Inc., 445 N.W. 2d 831, 834, 42 W.C.D. 220, 225 (Minn. 1989) (citing Brennan v. Joseph G. Brennan, M.D., P.A. 425 N.W.2d 837, 839-40 (Minn. 1988)). As a general rule, it is not the function of this court, a reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility and probative value of witness testimony and to choose different inferences from the evidence than the compensation judge. Redgate v. Sroga’s Standard Serv., 421 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn. 1988). While there may be inconsistencies in the employee’s testimony as identified by the employer and insurer, they are not of such consequence as to justify a reversal of the judge’s findings.

Findings of fact should not be disturbed “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975). Here, the record supports the compensation judge’s findings that the employee suffered a work-related aggravation to his low back and an injury to the hip joint. The record reflects that the employee began complaining of right hip and groin pain as early as January 28, 2016, only two weeks after the injury. The employee had buttock pain and pain with prolonged sitting. The employee also had ongoing low back pain. Dr. Kraker concluded that the employee’s low back and hip pain resulted from his work injury. Because substantial evidence in the record supports the compensation judge’s findings, regardless of alleged inconsistencies in the employee’s testimony, we see no reason here to disturb those findings.

The employer and insurer argue that the judge erred in adopting Dr. Kraker’s opinion because he did not have the necessary foundation upon which to base his opinion. They claim that his opinion was based on an inaccurate history because the employee neglected to tell Dr. Kraker about prior diabetic neuropathy. They also claim that Dr. Kraker’s opinion lacked foundation because it was formed without the benefit of all prior medical records.

The law on whether an expert’s opinion has the proper foundation is well settled. The facts upon which an expert relies for an opinion must be supported by the evidence. An expert need not be provided with every possible fact, but must have enough facts to form a reasonable opinion that is not based on speculation or conjecture. Gianotti v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 152, 889 N.W.2d 796, 77 W.C.D. 117 (Minn. 2017). Dr. Kraker’s opinion appears to have the necessary foundation. He is a board certified orthopedic surgeon. He took a history from the employee that he had diabetes mellitus and also numbness in the legs and feet. He examined the employee with range of motion testing, and obtained diagnostic studies. He reviewed medical records and referred the employee to Dr. Palmer for evaluation of the hip. By the time he drafted his narrative report in January 2017, Dr. Kraker addressed the diabetic neuropathy and distinguished it from the employee’s symptoms following the work injury. We conclude that Dr. Kraker had enough facts to form a reasonable opinion and that opinion does not appear to be based on speculation or conjecture.

Finally, the employer and insurer argue that the compensation judge erred as a matter of law in rejecting evidence of the employee’s prior criminal conviction. The employee testified that he was intimidated by Dr. Friedland during his examination and was “not an aggressive person.”^[1] The employer and insurer then sought to introduce evidence of the employee’s prior criminal conviction to establish that he was an aggressive person in an effort to establish that the employee’s testimony was inconsistent and unreliable.

Whether the compensation judge erred by refusing to admit evidence regarding the employee’s prior criminal conviction is a legal question that this court may consider de novo. Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993). Minn. Stat. § 176.411 requires that findings of fact be based upon relevant and material evidence only. We do not consider evidence of the employee’s prior criminal conviction, which was for a misdemeanor offense,^[2] to be relevant to his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. To the contrary, the evidence in question is more prejudicial than probative in this instance.^[3] Furthermore, the employee’s offer of proof does not persuasively address how the conviction “involved dishonesty or false statement.” Generally, evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the compensation judge. Ziehl v. Vreeman Constr. Co., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Oct. 15, 1991). The compensation judge’s disallowance of evidence of the employee’s prior criminal conviction was not an abuse of his discretion in this case.

For the above reasons, we affirm the compensation judge.