TESSA M. WASHEK, Employee/Appellant, v. NEW DIMENSIONS HOME HEALTH and SFM MUT. INS. CO., Employer-Insurer/Respondents, and FAIRVIEW HEALTH SERVS., Intervenor.

The employee appeals the compensation judge’s findings and order denying reimbursement of costs associated with the purchase of a 2003 Dodge Grand Caravan as a cost associated with vocational rehabilitation.  We affirm.

On December 18, 2002, appellant Tessa M. Washek, sustained devastating injuries in the course and scope of her employment with New Dimension Home Healthcare when her vehicle was struck by a semi-truck, rendering her a paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair.  By statute, Ms. Washek is permanently and totally disabled.  Since the accident, circumstances and events have left a long trail of litigation with administrative and judicial decisions.  To date, the employer and insurer admitted liability and have paid wage loss benefits, permanent partial disability, rehabilitation expenses, medical expenses, and residence remodeling expenses.

On October 7, 2014, the employee filed a claim petition seeking reimbursement of her out-of-pocket expenses for the base cost of a 2003 Dodge Caravan handicap accessible van purchased on May 3, 2004, and for payment of a 2014 Toyota Sienna, a replacement handicap accessible van purchased with funds from a family relative.  The base cost of the 2003 Dodge Caravan was $17,727.00.  The conversion cost was separate.  The employer and insurer did not pay for the base cost of the 2003 Caravan but paid for the conversion cost of the Caravan, which enabled the employee to operate the van.  The cost of the 2014 Toyota Sienna was $32,466.08 after deduction of the proceeds from the sale of the 2003 Dodge Caravan.  The employer and insurer paid for the conversion costs which enabled the employee to operate the van^[1] but denied the claim for the base cost, asserting in their answer that they were only required “to upgrade the employee’s existing van to make it handicapped accessible.”

A hearing was held before Compensation Judge Bradley Behr on June 1, 2015.  At the hearing, the employee’s attorney stated for the record that the employee’s claim was for the base cost of both vans: “[T]he primary dispute here is whether or not a van is covered under the circumstances by the statute and whether or not the expense was reasonable and necessary for these vehicles that she did purchase.”^[2]  The employee set forth her argument for reimbursement in alternative form, either a medical expense or rehabilitation expense under the Act.

In Findings and Order served and filed July 24, 2015, the compensation judge found that the employee had purchased the 2003 Dodge Caravan from Cummings Mobility Conversions at a total cost of $17,727.00 and that the employer and insurer had paid for the conversion costs that enabled the employee to operate the van.^[3]  The compensation judge denied the base cost of both vehicles as medical expenses under the statute.  The judge also denied the cost of the 2003 vehicle as a rehabilitation expense after finding that the vehicle did not enable the employee to seek or engage in employment on a sustained basis.  The judge further denied reimbursement for the costs associated with the purchase of the 2014 Toyota Sienna as a rehabilitation expense on the basis that it was premature to determine whether the van is likely to assist the employee in returning to employment compatible with her education, skills, and disability.

The employee did not appeal the compensation judge’s findings denying the base cost of both vehicles as a medical expense.  The employee did appeal both findings denying reimbursement for the base costs of the 2003 and 2014 vehicles as a rehabilitation expense, but subsequently withdrew the appeal regarding reimbursement for the costs associated with the purchase of the 2014 Toyota Sienna.

The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether the findings of fact and order are clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.^[4]  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.^[5]  Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the reviewing court, looking at the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.^[6]  Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”^[7]  Questions of law may be considered by the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals de novo.^[8]

The employee contends that the compensation judge erred in denying a recovery for the base cost of the 2003 handicap accessible van as a rehabilitation expense under Minn. Stat. § 176.102, subd. 9(a)(2) of the act, which provides, in relevant part, that an employer is liable for the “cost of all rehabilitation services and supplies necessary for implementation of the [rehabilitation] plan.”

The employee’s case and the compensation judge’s decision rest on the case of Wong v. Won Ton Foods.^[9]  In Wong, this court upheld a compensable vocational rehabilitation benefit and affirmed the award of the cost of a handicap accessible van to an employee whose work injury rendered him a quadriplegic because the van would enable the employee to function independently and seek as well as engage in employment.  In Wong, the employee demonstrated a physical capability of returning to his pre-injury vocation, that he was highly educated, and had strong transferable skills.  Mr. Wong’s QRC was also of the opinion that Mr. Wong had a high potential to return to work within two years of the date of injury.  The Workers’ Compensation Act in effect at the time of the injury in Wong stated that “[r]ehabilitation is intended to restore the injured employee, through physical and vocational rehabilitation, so that the employee may return to a job related to the employee’s former employment or to a job in another work area which produces an economic status as close as possible to that the employee would have enjoyed without disability.”^[10]  Given the specific facts in Wong, this court concluded that the compensation judge reasonably found that the employee would benefit from vocational rehabilitation services and that “a handicap-equipped van would be useful in restoring the employee to a job related to his former employment or in another work area.”^[11]

We continue to be of the view that in appropriate circumstances the full cost of a handicap accessible van appropriately may be awarded to a disabled employee under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  However, the compensation judge here found the determinative facts were distinguishable from those in Wong.  Here, unlike in Wong, the judge found that “[t]he employee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] purchase of the 2003 Dodge Caravan and use of the vehicle from May 2004 through October 2014 assisted her in returning to employment compatible with her education, employment skills and physical disabilities.”^[12]  The question thus presented to us on appeal is whether the judge’s findings have substantial support in the record.  We conclude that they do and accordingly we affirm.

The employee claims that the 2003 Caravan was a necessary part of her rehabilitation services and therefore the employer and insurer are liable to pay for it.  The judge stated that: