SCOTT R. SCHUETTE, Employee/Appellant, v. CITY OF HUTCHINSON, SELF-INSURED/ BERKLEY RISK ADM’RS CO., LLC, Employer/Respondent, and BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, MEDICA HEALTH PLANS, and HEALTHPARTNERS, Intervenors.

The employee appeals from the compensation judge’s dismissal of the employee’s claim petition on the basis that the current claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata or the workers’ compensation statute of limitations.  We affirm.

On June 23, 2005, police officer Scott Schuette responded to an accident at the local high school involving a twelve-year-old girl who sustained horrific injuries in a fall from a pick-up truck.  The employee knew the victim and her family.  He administered CPR and drove the ambulance to the hospital.  The girl died from her injuries.  Soon after the accident, the employee began to experience anxiety, panic attacks, recurrent nightmares, flashbacks, and insomnia, and was eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

On November 12, 2008, the employee was at his hunting cabin.  He testified he was sleeping in the loft area, experienced one of his recurrent nightmares in the middle of the night, and took off running.  He went over the edge of the loft and landed on the floor below sustaining injuries to his left shoulder and back.

At the time of the employee’s injuries, a work-related psychological injury, standing alone, was not compensable under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act.  To be compensable, the psychological injury must have resulted in or from a work-related physical injury.^[1]  Following the accident, the employee has struggled to fit a complicated set of medical facts into the legal standard to meet the physical injury requirement.

The employee filed his initial claim petition on September 3, 2009, seeking workers’ compensation benefits for PTSD resulting from a physical injury to the brain on June 23, 2005, and, as a consequence of the 2005 injury, injuries to the left shoulder and thoracic spine on November 12, 2008.  A hearing was held before Compensation Judge Danny Kelly on March 14, 2012.  In his August 3, 2012, Findings and Order, Judge Kelly found the employee’s PTSD represented a mental-mental disability and was not compensable under Minnesota law as set forth in Lockwood.^[2]  Whether the employee sustained a compensable injury on November 12, 2008, was identified as an issue in the case, but the compensation judge made no findings specifically relating to the November 12, 2008, incident.  The compensation judge did, however, deny the employee’s claim “in its entirety.”^[3]

The employee appealed from Judge Kelly’s decision.  This court concluded the compensation judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law, and affirmed the dismissal of the employee’s claim petition.^[4]  The employee sought review by the Minnesota Supreme Court which found the compensation judge’s decision was not manifestly contrary to the evidence and also affirmed.

In footnote 3 of the supreme court’s decision, the court stated:

On March 27, 2014, the employee filed a new claim petition alleging a subsequent physical injury on November 12, 2008, in the nature of a “PTSD/back & shoulder injury.”^[6]  Factually, the employee alleged he was exposed to extreme mental trauma while on duty on June 23, 2005, resulting in PTSD.  On November 12, 2008, as the result of a PTSD-induced nightmare, he suffered thoracic spine and left shoulder injuries which the employee alleged were compensable as mental-physical injuries per Egeland v. City of Minneapolis and Aker v. Department of Natural Resources.^[7]

Following a hearing on May 14, 2015, Compensation Judge Stacy Bouman issued a Findings and Order on August 4, 2015, dismissing the employee’s claim petition on the basis that his current claim is barred by res judicata or the statute of limitations.  The compensation judge made no findings regarding the substance of the employee’s claim.  The employee has appealed, requesting the matter be remanded for a determination on the merits of the case.

The underlying facts in this case, as found by the compensation judge, are not disputed on appeal.^[8]  This court’s review of the compensation judge’s decision presents solely questions of law which we consider de novo.^[9]

In the recent decision of Mach v. Wells Concrete Products Co.,^[10] the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed application of the doctrine of res judicata in workers’ compensation proceedings.  “[R]es judicata is a finality doctrine that applies ‘when a subsequent action or suit is predicated on the same cause of action’ ” . . . “ ‘there was a judgment on the merits, and the claim involved the same parties or their privies.’ ”^[11]  A “cause of action or claim” is “a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing.”^[12]  The common test for determining whether an action is precluded by res judicata is to determine “whether the same evidence will sustain both actions.”^[13]

Res judicata applies generally to a set of factual circumstances giving rise to entire claims or actions.  Once there is an adjudication of a dispute between the parties, res judicata prevents either party from relitigating claims involving the same set of factual circumstances, regardless of whether a particular legal theory was actually litigated.^[14]  “[A] plaintiff may not split his cause of action and bring successive suits involving the same set of factual circumstances.”^[15]  A judgment on the merits constitutes an absolute bar to a second suit for the same cause of action and is conclusive between parties and privies, not only as to every matter which was actually litigated, but also as to every matter which might have been litigated in the first proceeding.^[16]

In unappealed findings, Compensation Judge Bouman found the employee prepared and submitted to the employer an Injury or Accident Report Form on December 18, 2008.  The employee described the accident as occurring on June 23, 2005, when he was involved in a traumatic incident.  He reported suffering PTSD as a result.  A “To whom it may concern” note attached to the report indicated he sustained injuries to his back and shoulder on November 12, 2008, while having a recurrent nightmare.  He stated the injuries were a direct result of his PTSD.^[17]

A review of the August 3, 2012, Findings and Order, and the decisions of this court and the supreme court, demonstrate that the issue of whether the November 12, 2008, incident resulted in a compensable injury was raised in the 2012 proceeding, and a judgment on the merits was issued in the case.  The claim asserted by the employee in the current proceeding was ripe in 2012, and the information necessary to establish the claim was available.  The factual circumstances giving rise to the present claim are identical to the operative facts underlying the employee’s claim in the first proceeding, and the employee submitted the same documentary evidence to support his claims in both proceedings.

Citing Mach, the employee argues, nonetheless, that the principles of res judicata “do not preclude the litigation of claims and issues that were not specifically decided in a prior proceeding” (emphasis added).^[18]  The employee maintains that in 2012, Judge Kelly made no findings or any order that even mentioned the November 12, 2008, injuries.  The employee argues that in the absence of specific findings relating to the November 12, 2008, injuries, he was not provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 2012 and the lack of findings regarding his shoulder and back injuries prejudiced his ability to effectively appeal Judge Kelly’s order denying benefits for the November 12, 2008, injuries.

The question of whether the employee sustained a compensable injury on November 12, 2008, was clearly at issue before Judge Kelly in 2012.  The employee presented evidence with respect to both the June 23, 2005, and the November 12, 2008, incidents, made arguments in support of his claims, and a determination of the claims presented at the hearing was made on the merits by Judge Kelly.  Judge Kelly’s determination that the employee’s PTSD was not a compensable injury under Minnesota law disposed of the employee’s claim of a consequential injury on November 12, 2008.  Thus, there was no reason for the judge to make specific findings regarding the November 12, 2008, injuries.  In his order, the Judge Kelly explicitly denied the employee’s claim “in its entirety” and dismissed the employee’s claim petition.^[19]  Both this court and the supreme court affirmed Judge Kelly’s determination and the dismissal of the employee’s action.^[20]

It is clear the employee’s current claim could have been made in the first proceeding on the same operative facts and based on the same evidence, but entitlement to compensation was argued based on a different legal theory instead.  The compensation judge properly determined that the employee’s current claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and we affirm.

The compensation judge further concluded that if the employee’s argument regarding res judicata is accepted, the employee must, by necessity, assert the current claim is new and was not previously asserted or adjudicated.  In that case, the judge concluded, the statute of limitations was not tolled, and the three-year statute of limitations has run and bars the employee’s current claim.

Minn. Stat. § 176.151 provides:

The employer and insurer filed a Notice of Insurer's Primary Liability Determination (NOPLD) with the department on January 6, 2009.  The three-year statute of limitation would have run on or about January 6, 2012.  The employee filed the first claim petition on September 3, 2009.  The claim petition initiating the present proceeding was filed on March 27, 2014.

Once jurisdiction has been obtained by the filing of a claim petition, that jurisdiction “continues until it is cut off by judgment or certiorari.”^[21]  A separate proceeding, new and independent from the previous action, may be barred by the statute of limitations.^[22]

In the 2012 proceeding, the employee’s injuries were determined to be noncompensable, no benefits were awarded, and the claim petition was dismissed.  The compensation judge’s determination was affirmed by both this court and by the supreme court on certiorari.  The employer and insurer had no continuing obligation to the employee and jurisdiction under the initial claim petition ended at that time.

Assuming the employee’s claim in the present proceeding is predicated on a separate claim or action, new and independent from that made in the original proceeding (and therefore not barred by res judicata), the claim currently before the court was not filed within the three-year statute of limitations and is accordingly barred.