The employee appeals the compensation judge’s findings that the employee was capable of work, failed to conduct a reasonable search for gainful employment, and did not demonstrate she was permanently and totally disabled.  The employee also appeals the judge’s calculation of her average weekly wage.  We affirm.

From 1981 through 1992, Jennamarie McKenna, the employee, worked as a locksmith while in the Navy.  In November 1999, she suffered a brain aneurysm and the condition was surgically treated.  The employee did not work for two years while she recovered and participated in rehabilitation.  She was diagnosed with short-term memory loss (aphasia) which still persists today.

From April 2001 to June 2012, the employee worked for Security Products Company, Inc. (SPC), as a safe and vault technician (technician) for about ten years and, thereafter, as an office/warehouse employee for about one year.  The parties stipulated at the hearing that the employee sustained three personal injuries and a Gillette^[1] injury while in the employ of SPC.  On May 20, 2003, the employee injured her left shoulder while working on a safe deposit lock.  On March 12, 2010, the employee sustained another work-related injury while crawling in and out of an 18 inch hole.  On November 5, 2010, the employee injured her shoulders while drilling out a safe deposit lock located overhead.  On June 19, 2011, the employee sustained a Gillette-type injury to her right and left shoulders culminating in a physical disability that precluded her from performing the duties of a technician.

On September 15, 2003, the employee underwent surgery for the May 2003 injury.  The surgery, performed by Carlos A. Guanche, M.D., was a left shoulder arthroscopic debridement of a SLAP^[2] tear and partial-thickness rotator cuff tear.  Thereafter, the employee participated in physical therapy and received multiple cortisone injections in her left shoulder.  The employee underwent a second surgery on July 29, 2004.  On that occasion, Kirk J. Aadalen, M.D., performed a left shoulder arthroscopy, Type II SLAP repair, subacromial decompression, and arthroscopic rotator cuff repair for a nearly complete tear.  In April 2005, the employee was released to return to work with no restrictions.  The employee resumed her regular technician duties with SPC.

On November 30, 2010, at a visit to Dr. Aadalen, the treating orthopedic surgeon, the employee complained of severe right shoulder pain, especially while performing work overhead, in addition to left shoulder tendinitis symptoms.  The doctor referred the employee for an MRI scan.  At a follow-up visit on December 21, 2010, Dr. Aadalen indicated that the MRI showed tendinopathy of the distal supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons of the right shoulder but no rotator cuff tear.  After discussing the options, the employee chose bilateral cortisone injections and a home therapy program.

On June 14, 2011, Dr. Aadalen again saw the employee due to significant pain in both shoulders.  Dr. Aadalen reviewed a report by QRC Michael Hall evaluating the employee’s ability to perform her job.  Dr. Aadalen was of the opinion that certain duties involved in the technician position would be difficult to perform on a long-term basis given the employee’s right and left shoulder conditions.  The employee was not able to return to her technician duties after June 19, 2011.

In September 2011, SPC offered the employee a full-time light-duty office/ warehouse job at the same rate of pay she had been earning at her technician position.  The job was created based on restrictions identified in a Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) conducted on August 1-3, 2011.  The FCE report indicates that the employee is capable of an eight- hour work day with no restrictions on sitting, standing, or walking.  The employee is able to frequently bend, stoop, squat, climb ladders and stairs, crouch, and balance.  The employee can kneel occasionally, and can push or pull 25 lbs. occasionally.  The employee can, on a seldom basis, push or pull 35 lbs.  The employee is restricted from any crawling and from reaching above shoulder level.  The employee can lift from waist to shoulder 7 lbs. occasionally and 15 lbs. on a seldom basis.  The employee cannot lift any weight from shoulder to overhead.  Dr. Aadalen reviewed the FCE on August 23, 2011, and concurred with the findings of the evaluation.  He considered the restrictions permanent.^[3]

Laura McDaniels, Psy.D., L.P., a neuropsychologist, evaluated the employee in September 30, 2011.  Relative to the employee’s cognitive condition and ability to work, Dr. McDaniels opined that employee “will have difficulty in functioning successfully in a work setting in which her responsibilities are most dependent on cognitive abilities.”  Dr. McDaniels also observed the employee will likely have trouble learning new information.  Dr. McDaniels noted employee would benefit from keeping instructions and directions to 1 or 2 steps and being permitted to write down information.  “She would likely do best in a setting with simple and repetitive type work with information written down in an organized manner to refer back to.”

On June 20, 2012, the employee was discharged by SPC due to absenteeism and performance issues unrelated to her work injuries.  As of the date of hearing, the employee has not worked since her discharge.

The employee initiated this matter by filing a Claim Petition on November 8, 2013.  The matter was heard by a compensation judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings on April 22, 2015.  At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the employee’s personal injuries of her right and left shoulders occurring on November 5, 2010.  The judge found Gillette-type injuries culminating on June 19, 2011, the last day she worked as a technician.  The judge found that the employee was capable of work and failed to conduct a diligent job search following her June 20, 2012, discharge from SPC.  The judge did not find the employee’s job search testimony persuasive.  The judge determined that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled relying on the opinion of QRC L. David Russell.  The employee appeals.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1.  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

A judge’s choice of experts is affirmed as long as the expert’s opinion is based on adequate foundation.  It is the function of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in expert testimony.  Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337, 342, 37 W.C.D. 364, 372-73 (Minn. 1985).  This court is required to uphold a compensation judge’s choice between expert opinions, unless the expert opinion, as chosen, assumes facts that are not supported by substantial evidence.  Id.

Evidence of a post-injury job search, or lack thereof, goes to the evidentiary weight of an employee’s claim that she is totally disabled.  See Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W. 185, 188-189, 30 W.C.D. 426, 432 (Minn. 1978); see also, Redgate v. Sroga’s Standard Serv., 421 N.W. 2d 729, 733, 40 W.C.D. 948, 954 (Minn. 1988) (“employees who are capable of work must make a diligent job search to establish total disability”).

Where the evidence will not permit a compensation judge to determine weekly wage in accordance with the statute, or where strict compliance with the statute will unfairly underestimate or exaggerate the employee’s wage, the judge may use another method of wage calculation as long as that method reasonably reflects the employee’s injury-related loss of earning power.  Sawczuk v. Special Sch. Dist. #1, 312 N.W. 2d 435, 34 W.C.D. 282 (Minn. 1981).  See, e.g., Hansford v. Berger Transfer, 46 W.C.D. 303 (W.C.C.A. 1991); Decker v. Red Wing Shoe Co., 41 W.C.D. 763 (W.C.C.A. 1988).

Three vocational experts evaluated the employee’s employment capabilities.  Lynn Hjelmeland, the employee’s QRC, began working with the employee in May 2013 for approximately three months.  In testimony, she indicated she wanted to accomplish two things with the employee: first, medical management with Dr. Aadalen and next, vocational testing.  From the record it appears only minimal medical monitoring was necessary.  Dr. Aadalen indicated that he could offer the employee nothing more than an occasional injection for flare up pain.  The QRC’s request for vocational testing was denied by SPC.

Relying on the evaluation of Dr. McDaniels, Hjelmeland was of the opinion that the employee is permanently and totally disabled.  She based this determination on the employee’s current work restrictions, high school education, transferrable skills, and the effects of the employee’s 1991 cerebral hemorrhage.  Hjelmeland cited the employee’s poor memory retention, cognition and intellectual limitations, the employee’s difficulty in learning new material, and difficulty learning on a computer or in an academic setting.  She was of the opinion that the employee would not present well as an employment candidate.  Hjelmeland also cited the employee’s seizure disorder as a reason the employee was unable to work as a professional driver.

Ken Askew, a vocational expert, examined and evaluated the employee at the request of the employee’s attorney.  Askew was also of the opinion that the employee should be regarded as permanently and totally disabled and that she is not employable.  Askew based his conclusion on the employee’s physical disability limitations regarding her bilateral shoulders in combination with the residual effects of the hemorrhage.  He felt the disabilities were “too grand for her to rise above or work beyond in order to return to any kind of competitive employment situation.”  Askew did not believe the employee could work in an office setting, as a driver, or in assembly work due to her cognitive limitations.  Askew believes the employee’s cognitive abilities are limited to a one or two step process.  On cross-examination, Askew denied knowing whether the employee’s current cognitive condition was worse than when she started with SPC ten years before.

L. David Russell, a vocational expert, evaluated the employee on behalf of SPC.  He administered vocational testing and reviewed the relevant medical records.  He was of the opinion that the employee is not permanently and totally disabled.  Russell based his opinion on the employee’s transferrable skills of using tools, reading plans, providing customer service, and light production.  Russell noted that although the employee may be limited to one or two step tasks without writing them down, if she were permitted a reasonable accommodation to write down the steps, she is able to perform more complex tasks.  Russell identified a number of job areas which were commonly available in the employee’s Twin Cities metropolitan area labor market, which he believed the employee could perform within the light to medium duty restrictions even with mild cognitive deficits.

The gist of the employee’s argument is that the court should disregard the judge’s choice of vocational expert opinion and substitute the employee’s.  A judge’s choice among vocational experts is a question of fact.  It is the function of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in expert testimony.  See Nord, 360 N.W.2d at 342, 37 W.C.D. at 372-73.  This court is required to uphold a judge’s choice between expert opinions, unless the expert opinion, as chosen, assumes facts that are not supported by substantial evidence.  Id.

The compensation judge found unpersuasive the opinions of the employees’ vocational experts that she was unable to learn new tasks given her cognitive deficits and had been able to perform her technical job duties only because of her extended experience on the job.  The judge noted that Hjelmeland and Askew based their conclusions on the opinion of Dr. McDaniels that the employee could only perform 1 or 2 step jobs.  A closer reading of Dr. McDaniels’ evaluation reveals that the doctor did not indicate that the employee could not work, but that with the accommodation of writing down multiple steps, she was employable.  The judge reasoned that the employee had performed jobs with significantly more than 1 or 2 steps in her 30 years of locksmithing involving the installation and repair of safes and vaults demonstrating the ability to perform job functions involving multiple steps.  In particular, the employee testified that as a technician she used her training and judgement to determine how to open different types of safe deposit boxes and vaults of various sizes.  She was required to reset or change combinations or locks, and she provided customer service when she interacted with bank employees and customers.  The employee testified that the locks presented a variety of problems and required a variety of solutions.  The judge noted that the employee was cognitively able to perform her job with SPC for 10 years following her brain aneurism and had undergone training to learn to open, repair, and reset newer electronic and digital locks that she was not familiar with during her earlier locksmith work history.

The judge, therefore, accepted Russell’s opinion that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled.  Russell opined that the employee has transferrable job skills, including the use of a variety of tools, repairing and programing locks, mechanical diagnosis and repair, and providing customer service.  The judge was persuaded by Russell’s testimony that the employee could perform jobs involving more than one or two steps, if they were written down, consistent with the observations of Dr. McDaniels.  The judge found that the employee was not permanently and totally disabled.  There is substantial evidence of record to support the judge’s decision.

Generally, employees are required to look for work to establish permanent total disability.  Hamner v. Wes Barrett Masonry, 403 N.W.2d 839, 39 W.C.D. 758 (Minn. 1987).  The compensation judge found that the employee did not conduct a reasonably diligent job search during the two and a half years following her discharge from SPC.  The judge based this finding on the employee’s vague testimony regarding her work search efforts, on her failure to submit any documentary records of a job search into evidence despite her testimony that she kept such records, and on the employee’s testimony that she had phone interviews but did not receive any job offers.  The employee offered no further details.

Evidence of a post-injury job search, or lack thereof, goes to the evidentiary weight of an employee’s claim that she is totally disabled.  See Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W. at 188-189, 30 W.C.D. at 432; see also, Redgate, 421 N.W. 2d at 733, 40 W.C.D. at 954 (“employees who are capable of work must make a diligent job search to establish total disability”).  The judge’s determination that the employee failed to conduct a reasonable job search is supported by substantial evidence.

The employee raised two issues regarding the compensation judge’s calculation of the employee’s average weekly wage.  First, the employee claims that she was a full time employee and that her weekly wage should be calculated based on a 40 hour work week.  Next, she argues that the judge first failed to calculate the average daily wage before determining the average weekly wage, contrary to Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subds. 8(a) and 18.

The employer and insurer argue that the employee was not a salaried employee but was paid based on time actually worked.  She was considered a full-time employee only for purposes of other employee benefits, i.e., vacation and sick leave.  The judge did not address this issue in her findings, however, the wage records in evidence support the employer’s argument that the employee was paid on an hourly basis, and not on a forty hour basis.   Based on this record, we decline to accept the employee’s 40 hour per week wage calculation argument.

The judge calculated the employee’s average weekly wage by averaging the employee’s earnings during the 26 weeks prior to each date of injury.  For the relevant period preceding the March 12, 2010, injury, the judge determined the employee’s average weekly wage to be $749.08, calculated by dividing gross earnings of $19,476.20 by 26 weeks.  The judge noted that the employee’s earnings per two-week pay period fluctuated from a low of $1,107.23 to a high of $1,743.00.

For the relevant period preceding the November 5, 2012, injury, the judge determined the employee’s average weekly wage to be $663.32, calculated by dividing gross earnings of $17,246.25 by 26 weeks.  The judge noted that the employee’s earnings per two-week pay period fluctuated from a low of $619.50 to a high of $1,743.00.

For the relevant period preceding the June 19, 2011, injury, the judge determined the employee’s average weekly wage to be $574.67, calculated by dividing gross earnings of $14,941.50 by 26 weeks.  The judge noted that the employee’s earnings per two-week pay period fluctuated from a low of $519.75 to a high of $1,533.00.

The judge also noted that the employee’s total hours varied from week to week, and therefore, averaging weekly wages over a 26 week period prior to the dates of injuries was a reasonable means of achieving an accurate reflection of her probable future earning power which is impaired by her work injuries.  Sawczuk, 312 N.W. 2d 435, 34 W.C.D. 282.  Minnesota case law grants judges this discretion.  Where the evidence will not permit a compensation judge to determine weekly wage in accordance with the statute, or where strict compliance with the statute will unfairly underestimate or exaggerate the employee’s wage, the judge may use another method of wage calculation as long as that method reasonably reflects the employee’s injury-related loss of earning power.  See, e.g., Hansford, 46 W.C.D. 303; Decker, 41 W.C.D. 763.  Given the evidence in this case, and the absence of sufficient evidence to determine the number of days worked, the calculation method used by the compensation judge was reasonable, and we affirm.