The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to address issues arising out of the Workers’ Compensation Act, including Minn. Stat. § 176.185, so long as a party has properly followed the process to place a justiciable controversy before the compensation judge.  As those steps have not been followed in this matter, we affirm the compensation judge’s dismissal of the Appellant’s petition.

Four workers’ compensation insurers^[1] entered into an agreement in 1990 in which each of them would pay 25 percent of the employee’s ongoing permanent total wage loss benefits.  Each insurer was “responsible for 25 percent of the employee’s weekly permanent total disability benefits.”  Each insurer was also responsible for paying the assessment pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.129.  One of the four insurers, American Mutual Insurance, was insolvent and MIGA agreed to waive any defense under Minn. Stat. § 60C.09, subd.2.  A second of the four insurers, Lumber Insurance, continued to pay its share pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.  A third of the four insurers, SFM, agreed to be paying agent to simplify the administration of paying benefits to the employee.  Only one check had to be written and sent to the employee or medical provider each period, instead of 4 separate checks from each of the other insurance companies.  And the final insurer, American Motorists, became insolvent.

 In June 2013, MIGA wrote to SFM advising that due to the insolvency of American Motorists, MIGA had taken over the handling of the work injury.  Citing Minn. Stat. § 60C.09, subd. 2(2), American Motorists/MIGA denied reimbursement of the benefits paid under the 1990 Award on Stipulation.  This resulted in SFM paying benefits to the employee pursuant to the stipulation without receiving American Motorist/MIGA’s 25 percent share.

Being bound by the responsibility of paying for the insolvent American Motorists/MIGA’s share, paying agent SFM filed a Petition for a Hearing on the Interpretation and Enforcement of the Stipulation for Settlement, or Alternatively, a Petition for Determination of Primary Liability.

The matter came before Compensation Judge William J. Marshall who dismissed SFM’s petition determining that he did not have jurisdiction under the Workers’ Compensation Act to hold a hearing to interpret and enforce a previously agreed upon provision.  He further concluded that once a stipulation for settlement is approved and awarded, he had no jurisdiction to go back and reevaluate the terms of the agreement.  Once approved, the compensation judge determined that no jurisdiction existed to reopen the previously settled claims.  SFM appeals.

On appeal, SFM maintains that the compensation judge misinterpreted the petition. SFM argues that the award on stipulation is an adjudication and within the jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).  It argues that the workers’ compensation court has exclusive jurisdiction over all questions of law and fact arising out of workers’ compensation claims.  SFM further argues that it is not making a contribution and reimbursement claim against MIGA, rather, it seeks a reasonable solution under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Because all four insurers who were parties to the stipulation agreed to contribute 25 percent for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits, SFM as paying agent should not have to carry the load for the insolvent American Motorists/MIGA.

Lumber Insurance also filed a brief in support of SFM’s position.  It argues that the compensation judge has jurisdiction to interpret the award on stipulation.  Because each insurer agreed to pay an ongoing stream of benefits, under Munn v. Travel Host of Duluth, 70 W.C.D. 248 (W.C.C.A. 2010), the compensation judge has authority to interpret the language of the stipulation.

In response, American Motorists/MIGA argues that OAH has no jurisdiction to change the terms of the stipulation.  They further argue that SFM has essentially filed a claim for contribution and reimbursement disguised as a petition for hearing.  While MIGA was a party for insolvent American Mutual, MIGA was not an agent for American Motorists when the parties settled the case in 1990, and therefore MIGA argues that the terms of the stipulation cannot be enforced against American Motorists/MIGA.

It has long been held that contribution and reimbursement claims against MIGA are not within the jurisdiction of this court.  Taft v. Advance United Expressways, 464 N.W.2d 725, 44 W.C.D. 35 (Minn. 1991).  This court does not have jurisdiction to interpret or apply the provisions of chapter 60C.  Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr. Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 70 W.C.D. 455 (Minn. 2010).  A solvent workers’ compensation insurer does not have a contribution claim against MIGA because it is not a “covered claim” under chapter 60C.  Maxwell Commc’ns v. Webb Publ’g Co., 518 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Minn. 1994).  The premise for this conclusion is that the purpose of the Guaranty Act is to protect policyholders and claimants, and not member insurers.  Id. at 833.  The Guaranty Act “is not a fund for the protection of state insurance companies from the insolvencies of fellow members.”  Id.  As a result, when there are equitable contribution claims involving successive insurers, MIGA cannot be required to share liability for injuries with a solvent insurer.

Notwithstanding, this court has authority for the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under the workers’ compensation law of the state in those cases that have been appealed to it.  Minn. Stat. § 175A.01, subd.5.  Here, SFM has not sought contribution or reimbursement against MIGA.  SFM is well aware that it cannot petition against MIGA in that regard.  Instead, SFM seeks a solution to those situations in which an insurer who agrees to pay the employee a percentage of benefits, can no longer pay because it becomes insolvent.  Who pays under that scenario?  Does SFM pick up the difference?  Do the other insurers split the difference equally among them?  We believe that the legislature provided a remedy for this situation in Minn. Stat. § 176.185, subd. 8a.  Therefore, this court has jurisdiction because there exists a statutory provision under the act which provides a remedy.  Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.185, subd. 8a.(a):

            If an insurer is or becomes insolvent as defined in section 60C.03, subdivision 8, the insured employer is liable, as of May 23, 2003, for payment of the compensable workers’ compensation claims that were covered under the employers’ policy with the insolvent insurer, to the extent that the Insurance Guaranty Association has determined that the claims are not covered claims under chapter 60C.  (Emphasis added.)

CONCURRING OPINION

I concur with the result reached by the majority in this case but respectfully disagree with the rationale.

In the stipulation for settlement at issue here the parties included two insurers, and MIGA, representing an insolvent insurer.  In that stipulation, MIGA raised the defense that the claims made of it were not “covered claims” under Minn. Stat. § 60C.09, subd. 2.  However, as part of the settlement, MIGA stipulated that the payments being made under the agreement were “benefits otherwise payable to the employee,”^[2] and agreed it would not “raise Minn. Stat. § 60C.09, subd. 2, as a defense against reimbursing State Fund Mutual^[3] the amounts indicated above.”

Subsequent to the settlement, another party insurer to the agreement became insolvent.  MIGA, on behalf of the newly insolvent insurer, denied further payment under the settlement agreement on the basis that it was not a “covered claim.”  MIGA’s position seems to be that despite being a party to the settlement on behalf of one insurer, it is not bound by that agreement on behalf of the newly insolvent insurer despite having stipulated to the nature of these payments (“otherwise payable to the employee”), and despite its explicit waiver of this defense.  I find that position untenable under these facts and have concluded that MIGA is liable for the obligations of the second insolvent insurer under the terms of their agreement.  Consequently, MIGA is now in default of a court-ordered agreement and that order may be enforced under Minn. Stat. § 176.451 by application for entry of judgment in district court.