JOSEPH A. GRUBA, Employee/Appellant, v. TRADESMAN INT’L, INC., and NEW HAMPSHIRE INS. CO./CHARTIS/GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVS., Employer-Insurer/ Respondents.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT OF APPEALS
APRIL 5, 2016
No. WC15-5896
JURISDICTION - SUBJECT MATTER. The compensation judge did not err in dismissing the employee’s petition for recovery of benefits paid under the North Dakota compensation system for which benefits the North Dakota system now seeks repayment as there is no subject-matter jurisdiction for the claim.
Determined by:
Patricia J. Milun, Chief Judge
David A. Stofferahn Judge
Manuel J. Cervantes, Judge
Compensation Judge: Bradley J. Behr
Attorneys: Carl J. Sommerer, Sommerer & Schultz, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the Appellant. Joshua M. Steinbrecher, Heacox, Hartman, Koshmrl, Cosgriff & Johnson, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota, for the Respondents.
Affirmed.
OPINION
PATRICIA J. MILUN, Chief Judge
BACKGROUND
The employee, Joseph Gruba, worked for the employer, Tradesmen International, on a project in Williston, North Dakota, on April 30, 2012, when the employee suffered a work injury to his left hand and wrist. The injury was reported to North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) which admitted liability. WSI paid $6,130.29 in economic benefits and $74,328.14 for medical benefits to the employee due to the work injury.
On June 29, 2012, the employee filed a Claim Petition at the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry alleging entitlement to temporary total disability benefits from April 29, 2012, through the present and continuing as well as payment of medical benefits. The employee served on WSI a Notice to Potential Intervenors dated March 20, 2013, and WSI failed to intervene in response. The matter came on for hearing before a compensation judge at the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings on June 25, 2013. The primary issues raised by the claim petition were whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed in Minnesota to address the employee’s claims under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act and, relatedly, whether the employee’s injury was compensable under Minnesota law. In an unappealed Findings and Order, dated August 9, 2013, and served and filed on August 12, 2013, the compensation judge found, in part, the following:
(a) the employee’s injury was compensable in Minnesota; (b) the employee was entitled to temporary total disability benefits during the time period from May 1, 2012 through July 8, 2012, less benefits paid by WSI; (c) no statutory authority in Minnesota existed to allow reimbursement of WSI for benefits paid to, or on behalf of, the employee pursuant to North Dakota law; and (d) the employer and insurer shall pay wage loss benefits for the period subject to a credit in the amount of wage loss benefits paid for the same time period by WSI.
On September 16, 2013, the employee filed a second Claim Petition alleging underpayment of claims pursuant to the August 2013 Order and, seeking penalties and subdivision 7 fees.
On April 21, 2014, Anne Jorgenson Green, Special Assistant Attorney General for the State of North Dakota sent correspondence to counsel for the employee dated April 17, 2014, indicating intent to commence a civil action of recovery against the employee if the employee failed to reimburse WSI. Serving a Notice of Right to Reimbursement under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-05, WSI sought reimbursement from the employee of all benefits paid arising from the April 30, 2012, work injury. In the same correspondence, Ms. Green indicated that WSI would not formally intervene in the case, citing Johnson v. Young & Davis Drywall, Inc., slip op. (W.C.C.A. August 8, 2001).[1]
In a letter dated April 25, 2014, counsel for the employee notified the court and all parties that the employee’s claim for underpayment of indemnity benefits, wrist surgery, and spine stimulator surgery were resolved. The employee noted a new issue, namely, that WSI had made a direct claim against the employee for reimbursement of workers’ compensation claims paid by the employer and WSI under North Dakota law. In light of this information, the employee amended the claim petition to include reimbursement claims for medical benefits and wage loss asking “the Court to resolve [the reimbursement issue] at the hearing now scheduled for June 19, 2014.”[2] The employee served on WSI a Notice to Potential Intervenors dated April 25, 2014, and WSI failed to intervene in response.
On May 13, 2014, WSI issued an Order under signature of Kim Ehil, Claims Director, reversing its acceptance of the employee’s claim under North Dakota workers’ compensation law, terminating all benefits payable to or on behalf of the employee and ordering the employee to reimburse WSI in the amount of $80,572.57.
On July 2, 2014, counsel for the employee sent correspondence to the compensation judge requesting that the employee’s second claim petition alleging underpayment of indemnity benefits, wrist surgery, and spinal stimulator surgery be withdrawn and dismissed without prejudice. Within two weeks of withdrawing this claim, the employee was served with a Summons and Complaint venued in Burleigh County District Court, North Dakota, seeking reimbursement pursuant to the May 13th order of WSI.[3] Based on an electronic search of court records for the State of North Dakota, the Summons and Complaint served on the employee on or about July 11, 2014, had not been filed in Burleigh County District Court and/or the South Central Judicial District Court of North Dakota.[4]
On July 23, 2014, the employee filed a third claim petition seeking payment of temporary total disability benefits for the period of indemnity benefits previously paid by WSI, as well as penalties for failure to timely pay medical bills and for medical benefits from multiple providers, including the medical benefits paid by WSI on the employee’s behalf for which WSI was now seeking reimbursement.[5] The employee served on WSI a Notice to Potential Intervenors dated July 23, 2014, and WSI failed to intervene in response.[6] As of the date of hearing, the employee had received all benefits for which WSI was seeking reimbursement; the employee had not reimbursed WSI in any amount nor had the employee answered the Summons and Complaint. As of the date of the hearing, no judgment had been entered against the employee pursuant to the Summons and Complaint and no potential intervenor had intervened in the case.
The matter came on before Compensation Judge Bradley J. Behr on written briefs and joint exhibits. In his Findings and Order dated November 4, 2015, the judge found that the employee received the equivalent of temporary total disability benefits in the amount of $6,130.29 and payment of medical costs in the amount of $74,328.14. Those benefits were found to have arisen from the April 30, 2012, work injury. The compensation judge also found that WSI and the North Dakota providers had been given notice of the right to intervene and none had done so. The compensation judge further found that none of the WSI benefits were owed in the form of reimbursement required of the employee, due to the lack of a judgment in any civil action regarding those benefits. In his ultimate finding, the compensation judge determined there was no subject-matter jurisdiction regarding out-of-state benefits. The judge dismissed the claim petition stating there was no claim upon which relief could be granted. The employee appealed.
DECISION
Standard of Review
A decision which rests upon the application of a law or rule to essentially undisputed facts involves a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1 (2015); Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff'd (Minn. June 3, 1993).
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Minnesota Statutes 175A and 176 vest workers’ compensation courts with limited jurisdiction to hear a class of cases that arise under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Within the limits provided in the statutes,[7] the legislature controls the types of cases that workers’ compensation courts have jurisdiction to consider. [8]
Like most courts, workers’ compensation courts generally determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists at the onset of litigation, before deciding the merits of a particular case. [9] There are exceptions to this general rule. In rare circumstances the court can dismiss a case on procedural grounds before resolving whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.[10] Courts have the authority to raise and determine their own subject-matter jurisdiction at any time, even after the court has entered judgment.[11]
On appeal the employee contends the compensation judge committed an error of law in finding the judge lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to address the employee’s alternative claims for either direct payment to himself or for reimbursement to North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance for treatment expenses previously paid by WSI. Based on the findings on stipulated facts and the parties’ joint exhibits, we affirm the compensation judge under Minnesota Statutes 175A and 176 in accordance with Krovchuk and Karstad v. Myles Lorentz, Inc.[12]
The Minnesota Supreme Court described subject-matter jurisdiction as “the court’s authority to hear the type of dispute at issue and to grant the type of relief sought.”[13] The supreme court has interpreted the statutory authority of workers’ compensation courts as limited.[14] The principles of waiver, consent, and estoppel do not apply to jurisdictional issues.[15] The actions of the parties to a claim cannot confer a workers’ compensation court with jurisdiction outside the limitations provided by the statute.[16]
In the present case the position of the parties is clear. The employer and insurer contend the workers’ compensation courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to order the employer and insurer to reimburse WSI workers’ compensation benefits paid on behalf of the employee under North Dakota law. The employee contends the medical expenses paid by WSI should now be considered unpaid charges in light of WSI’s order for reimbursement and commencement of civil litigation against the employee in North Dakota. To that end, the employee argues the workers’ compensation courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to order reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits paid on behalf of the employee under North Dakota law.
The employee maintains that he has a direct claim for payment and cites the case of Adams v. DSR Sales, Inc.[17] in support of his position. In Adams, the employee filed a claim petition seeking payment of various benefits including medical expenses and subsequently served notice of intervention rights on a number of health care providers in South Dakota and Minnesota. The employee then filed an amended claim petition which provided an itemization of medical bills and identified each provider. The providers did not file timely motions to intervene and the employer and insurer argued that the employee’s direct claim for payment of the provider’s medical treatment should therefore be denied. The compensation judge rejected the employer and insurer’s argument and determined that they were obligated to pay outstanding medical bills which were reasonable, necessary and related to the employee’s work injury. The WCCA affirmed the findings of the compensation judge and held that Mr. Adams made and retained a direct claim for medical benefits, specifically noting that unpaid medical expenses would remain the obligation of the employee.[18]
We recognize similarities between the present case and Adams, but we cannot disregard the differences between the key facts of each case. Here, unlike in Adams, the relevant medical expenses have been paid; and none of the North Dakota medical providers have requested payment from Mr. Gruba, Tradesmen International, or its insurer. Given these key facts, the remedy the employee seeks requires a determination by a Minnesota workers’ compensation court regarding the rights of the parties under North Dakota Law. Contrary to the employee’s contentions, we cannot assume subject-matter jurisdiction outside the limitations provided by the statute.
The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction regarding reimbursement of out-of-state workers’ compensation insurers for benefits paid under another state’s workers’ compensation law has arisen before our court in a number of prior cases. [19] In Boothe v. TFE, the employee was a Wisconsin resident hired in Minnesota and working for a Minnesota employer when he was injured in Michigan. The employer’s Wisconsin workers’ compensation insurer voluntarily began payment of benefits. When the employee later claimed benefits under Minnesota law, the Minnesota insurer commenced payment and requested a credit in the amount paid by the Wisconsin insurer. The Wisconsin insurer intervened seeking reimbursement of benefits paid in Wisconsin and also commenced an independent action in Wisconsin seeking reimbursement of Wisconsin benefits paid to the employee under a “reverse application” proceeding. In a findings and order the compensation judge awarded wage loss benefits for a significant period of time during which benefits had already been paid by the Wisconsin insurer. The judge did not consider the intervention claim by the Wisconsin insurer or the claim for credit and reimbursement by the Minnesota insurer and denied the claim citing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the WCCA agreed that the compensation judge lacked jurisdiction to order reimbursement to the Wisconsin insurer, but reversed the judge and awarded the Minnesota employer a credit in the amount of the wage loss benefits paid for the same time period by the Wisconsin insurer. The WCCA in Boothe determined there was no basis to conclude that the compensation judge made any error in dismissing the claim for reimbursement to the Wisconsin insurer under the principles of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The action by the Wisconsin insurer seeking reimbursement of Wisconsin benefits paid to employee Boothe under a reverse application proceeding is similar to the WSI order in the present case reversing its acceptance of the employee’s claim under North Dakota workers’ compensation law, and subsequently serving the employee with a North Dakota summons and complaint. In Boothe, the WCCA explicitly concluded that this court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to interpret and analyze the laws of another state to determine entitlement to the out-state benefits either through an order for direct payment or an order for reimbursement.
Since Boothe, an entire line of cases has moved through the courts outlining the application of subject-matter jurisdiction based on a simple principle: the jurisdiction of the Minnesota workers’ compensation courts is limited by statute solely to interpreting, analyzing and applying the workers’ compensation laws of this state [20] In Rundberg, the employee was initially paid Nebraska workers’ compensation benefits by the insurer who insured the employer in Nebraska but not in Minnesota. The employee later filed a claim in Minnesota and a compensation judge awarded benefits against the uninsured employer and the Minnesota Assigned Risk Plan. The compensation judge further ordered the Minnesota Assigned Risk Plan to reimburse the Nebraska insurer for workers’ compensation benefits paid to the employee under Nebraska law. On appeal, the WCCA vacated the order to reimburse the Nebraska insurer noting “the compensation judge and this court lack subject-matter jurisdiction to order the uninsured employer to reimburse the Nebraska insurer for Nebraska workers’ compensation benefits paid to the employee.”[21]
The import of the case law on this issue is clear. Neither a compensation judge nor the WCCA can expand subject-matter jurisdiction outside the limits of the statute. This court recognizes the current inchoate litigation pursued by WSI has placed unnecessary stress on the injured worker. Whatever actions are taken in the state of North Dakota against the employee cannot change the existing law in Minnesota. There is no remedy at present that can be afforded to the employee that does not require a determination regarding the rights of the parties under North Dakota law. Such a determination is outside the jurisdiction of the compensation judge and this court.
Under the stipulated facts in this case, we find no authority under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act to reverse and grant the compensation judge jurisdiction to order reimbursement to an out-of-state agency for compensation benefits previously paid under the laws of that state. We have no basis in statute or case law to apply or enforce the laws of the State of North Dakota. [22]
The compensation judge correctly declined to exercise jurisdiction over a claim for reimbursement under the stipulated facts in this case. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to issue an award directly reimbursing WSI for North Dakota benefits paid on behalf of the employee. We affirm.
[1] Joint Exhibit 2.
[2] Joint Exhibit 9.
[3] Joint Exhibit 12.
[4] Stipulated Facts, ¶ 26.
[5] Joint Exhibit 13.
[6] Joint Exhibit 14.
[7] Minn. Stat. § 175A.01, subd. 2; Hagen v. Venem, 366 N.W.2d 280, 37 W.C.D. 674 (Minn. 1985).
[8] Workers’ compensation courts also have jurisdiction over the interpretation and construction of petitions for peace officer benefits under Minn. Stat. § 299A.41. See Kramer v. State, 380 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 1986).
[9] See David v. The Heavy Equip. Co., No. WC15-5802 (W.C.C.A. Feb. 17, 2016).
[10] Minn. R. Civ. Pro. 12.02.
[11] In re Civil Commitment of Giem, 742 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 2007). See, e.g., Davidner v. Davidner, 304 Minn. 491, 493, 232 N.W.2d 5, 7 (1975); Rhoades v. K & C Distrib., 51 W.C.D. 305, 321-22 (W.C.C.A. 1994).
[12] Krovchuk, 48 W.C.D. at 608; Karstad, No. WC14-5775 (W.C.C.A. May 20, 2015).
[13] Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr. Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 152, 70 W.C.D. 455, 458 (Minn. 2010)(citing Robinette v. Price, 214 Minn. 521, 526, 8 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1943)).
[14] See Seehus, id.; Sundby v. City of St. Peter, 693 N.W.2d 206, 65 W.C.D. 137, 151 (Minn. 2005); Hale v. Viking Trucking Co., 654 N.W.2d 119, 123, 62 W.C.D. 701, 704 (Minn. 2002).
[15] Hale, 654 N.W.2d at 124, 62 W.C.D at 706; In re Giem, 742 N.W.2d at 427; see also Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15, 126 S. Ct. 403, 405 (2005)(discussing the distinction between jurisdictional rules and “claim-processing” rules); Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 421-22 (Minn. 2006) (discussing the distinction between jurisdictional rules and procedural rules).
[16] Hemmesch v. Molitor, 328 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn. 1983); Rundberg v. Hirschbach Motor Lines, 51 W.C.D. 193, 206 (W.C.C.A. 1994), summarily aff’d, 520 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1994).
[17] Adams, 64 W.C.D. 396 (W.C.C.A. 2004).
[18] Absent a showing of material prejudice by the failure of the providers to intervene, the providers in Adams were not barred from payment when the employee made a direct claim for payment of medical expenses. Reich v. F&S Constr., No. WC04-133 (W.C.C.A. October 21, 2004); Malenius v. Hibbing Taconite Co., No. WC08-178 (W.C.C.A. September 11, 2008).
[19] Hale, 654 N.W.2d 119, 62 W.C.D. 701; Erickson v. Otness Mgmt., 56 W.C.D. 323, 330. (W.C.C.A. 1997); Boothe v. TFE, 55 W.C.D. 353 (W.C.C.A. 1996); Rhoades, 51 W.C.D. 305; Petterson v. K & C Distr., 51 W.C.D. 295 (W.C.C.A. 1994); Rundberg, 51 W.C.D. 193; Johnson, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Aug. 8, 2001); Solem v. Ballard Int’ l Corp., slip op. (W.C.C.A. July 28, 1995); Evans v. Dave Evans Transp., Inc., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Aug. 24, 1994).
[20] See footnote 19.
[21] Rundberg, 51 W.C.D. 193. In its unpublished order affirming this Court’s decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated “Moreover, relator's claim is for the return of benefits paid pursuant to the Nebraska Act. Normally, rights created by the compensation act of one state cannot be enforced in another state.”
[22] Boothe, 55 W.C.D. 353; Rundberg, 51 W.C.D. 193; Johnson, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Aug. 8, 2001).