The employee’s attorney appeals from the judge’s award of Roraff^[1] fees and also claims entitlement to an additional award pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.225.^[2]  We affirm.

Attorney Thomas Longfellow represented Rhonda Mack [the employee] in a claim brought against ISD 701 and Hanover Insurance Group [the employer and insurer].  The matter proceeded to hearing in March of 2013, at which time the issues included whether the employee had sustained a Gillette^[3] injury, the nature and extent of the alleged injury, the employee’s entitlement to temporary partial and permanent partial disability benefits, whether the medical intervenor was entitled to reimbursement, and whether the employee’s attorney was entitled to Roraff fees.  Judge John Baumgarth issued his findings and order on April 15, 2013, in which he found a temporary injury, awarded six months of temporary partial disability benefits, denied permanent partial disability benefits, and awarded reimbursement to the intervenor and to the employee for out of pocket expenses.  The judge also determined that Mr. Longfellow was entitled to Roraff fees.

Mr. Longfellow filed a statement of attorney fees and costs, amended on May 22, 2013, seeking $7,612.50 as a Roraff fee and $1,881.85 in costs and disbursements.  He itemized 21.75 hours of time spent at $350.00 per hour.  The employer and insurer objected to the statement of fees.

The attorney fee claim proceeded to a telephone hearing with Judge Baumgarth.  In findings and order on attorney’s fees filed on October 9, 2013, he found that Mr. Longfellow had been successful in establishing primary liability but unsuccessful in establishing a permanent injury.  He found the nature of the dispute and proof needed to present the case was not unusual or burdensome, and he found that Mr. Longfellow’s experience and expertise supported his hourly rate.  The judge found that the $154.37 in contingent fees paid on the wage loss benefits, plus the $992.88 in contingent fees computed on the medical payments, plus $3,000.00 in Roraff fees was a reasonable and appropriate attorney fee.  Mr. Longfellow appeals.

The compensation judge found that Mr. Longfellow had been paid a contingent fee of $154.37, calculated on temporary partial disability benefit award, and that he was entitled to an additional fee of $992.88, payable by the employer and insurer, calculated on the $3,989.11 in medical expenses paid^[4] pursuant to the April 2013 findings and order.  The judge awarded an additional $3,000.00 in Roraff fees.  Mr. Longfellow appeals the award of $3,992.88, claiming that the total fee paid by the employer and insurer should be $7,612.50.

Mr. Longfellow contends that the judge erred by discounting his fee claim by 49% and that a mistake must have been made.  In support of this argument, he cites Stark v. Heritage Commc’ns, slip op. (W.C.C.A. May 10, 2000), for the proposition that an attorney’s entitlement to Roraff fees should not be conditioned on “the proportionate relationship between those owed benefits and other benefits found to be not owed.”  However, nowhere did the judge indicate that Mr. Longfellow had recovered a set percentage of the claimed benefits or that the judge intended to award the same percentage of claimed attorney fees.  Rather, without citing to Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 59 W.C.D. 319 (Minn. 1999), the judge nevertheless made findings on the factors specified by that case.  Specifically, the judge found that the case had limited value (unless the employee’s attorney established a permanent injury), that the nature of the dispute and the proof needed to present the case were not unusual or burdensome, that the experience and expertise of Mr. Longfellow supported his hourly rate, and that, while Mr. Longfellow had succeeded in establishing primary liability and in recovering some temporary partial disability benefits and medical expenses, he did not succeed in establishing a permanent injury or the employee’s entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits.

Mr. Longfellow further contends that all of his time was necessary to establish primary liability, that a good result was achieved, and that he is therefore entitled to all of his hours, multiplied by his hourly rate, which the judge found reasonable.  We are not persuaded.  This court has long said that a determination of a reasonable Roraff fee is not a matter of merely multiplying the attorney’s hourly rate by the amount of time spent on the case.  Borgan v. Bob Hegland, Inc., 62 W.C.D. 452 (W.C.C.A. 2002).  A determination of the amount of Roraff fees awarded in a particular case lies within the discretion of the compensation judge.  Newman v. Graceville Health Ctr., 52 W.C.D. 194 (W.C.C.A. 1994).

Mr. Longfellow also contends that the judge should not have discounted his hours for travel to and from Hibbing, Minnesota, contending that he was not commuting between his offices when he traveled and that he had already pro-rated his travel hours.   However, no evidence to that effect was presented at hearing, and, as he also admits, he did not appeal from the finding concerning that issue.  An appellant’s brief may not address issues not raised in the notice of appeal.  Minn. R. 9800.0900, subp. 1.

We rely on the record before us in reviewing a case on appeal.  Where the compensation judge who presided at the hearing on the merits is the same judge hearing the attorney fee claim, we generally give greater deference to the judge’s decision as to what constitutes a reasonable fee under the circumstances.  We will not reverse the compensation judge’s award or denial of attorney fees absent an abuse of discretion.  Dimon v. Metz Baking, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Oct. 7, 2003).  “The compensation judge abuses his or her discretion only when the award of fees is based upon a clearly erroneous conclusion given the record.”  Lucking v. EPC Loudon-Crookson Plastic Molding Corp., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Sept. 26, 2001).  We cannot conclude that the compensation judge abused his discretion here.  We therefore affirm his award of attorney fees.

At the hearing on attorney fees, Attorney Longfellow made a request for an additional award under Minn. Stat. § 176.225, based on the employer and insurer’s failure to pay undisputed costs.  The judge inquired as to whether Mr. Longfellow had given the employer and insurer notice of the this claim before that day, and when Mr. Longfellow indicated that he had not, the judge ruled that he would “not be dealing” with that issue.  On appeal, Mr. Longfellow outlines why he is entitled to this additional award.

Minn. Stat. § 176.225 provides in part as follows:

In the instant case, notice of a claim under Minn. Stat. § 176.225 was not given until the start of the hearing.  The judge was certainly within his discretion to refuse to hear a claim presented under those circumstances.  No further discussion of this issue is warranted.