Salrecon and Commerce & Industry Insurance Company appeal the compensation judge’s findings that the employee was employed by Salrecon, not by BT-PCE, and the resulting determination that Salrecon was not entitled to reimbursement or contribution from BT-PCE.  We affirm.

In 2006, Salrecon began demolishing a taconite plant for salvage in northern Minnesota.  In March 2007, BT-PCE entered into an agreement with Salrecon to remove siding from the plant with payment being determined by the square footage of siding removed.  Part of this agreement included the requirement that BT-PCE provide workers’ compensation for its employees.  BT-PCE’s manager obtained workers’ compensation insurance in April 2007.  At least five BT-PCE employees began working at the site on April 22, 2007.^[1]  Salrecon and BT-PCE changed the agreement to a system where Salrecon would use the BT-PCE employees where they were best suited and would pay BT-PCE for its employees’ wages plus 15 percent.  BT-PCE would invoice Salrecon for the wages plus 15 percent and for any supplies provided and then pay its employees.  Salrecon supervisors then directed the BT-PCE employees’ work.  BT-PCE’s manager also agreed to help Salrecon find employees.  Salrecon interviewed these employees, determined whether to hire them, and set their wage, but these employees were put on BT-PCE’s payroll.  A Salrecon supervisor testified that he assumed that BT-PCE would provide workers’ compensation insurance for these employees.

In July 2007, Salrecon contacted Guadalupe Guevara, the employee, who had worked for Salrecon in the past, and asked him to return to work for Salrecon at the site in Minnesota.  The employee accepted the job offer and traveled to Minnesota.  The employee testified by deposition that Salrecon provided his lodging in Minnesota, took his application, and provided his tools, work clothes except boots, protective gear, and work equipment.  Salrecon also determined his wage, supervised him, directed his work activities, and had the right to fire him.  The employee was added to BT-PCE’s payroll.  BT-PCE’s manager provided the employee’s paycheck but did not supervise him or control his work activities.  In the fall of 2007, BT-PCE’s manager sent a memorandum to the workers on BT-PCE’s payroll to provide I‑9 documentation by November 5, 2007, or their paychecks would be withheld.  BT-PCE did not pay any of the workers for the pay period when the employee was injured, but paid them on November 15, 2007, for the week before the injury.

On November 15, 2007, debris fell on the employee and he sustained extensive work-related injuries resulting in quadriplegia.  Salrecon, LLC, and its insurer have paid $540,902.14 in indemnity benefits and $860,189.50 in medical expenses to or on behalf of the employee under a temporary order.  On November 5, 2009, Salrecon filed a petition for contribution and/or reimbursement against BT-PCE and its insurer Accident Fund Insurance Company of America, for benefits paid.  Salrecon alleged that the employee was employed by BT-PCE, not by Salrecon, at the time of his injury.

A hearing on the petition for contribution was held on September 10 and 11, 2013.  At the hearing, Salrecon also argued that the employee was jointly employed or that BT-PCE had agreed to provide workers’ compensation insurance while acting as a labor broker.  The parties stipulated that the employee’s injury arose out of and in the course of employment and that the employee was statutorily permanently and totally disabled as a quadriplegic as a result of the work injury.  The issues presented at the hearing were 1) whether the employee was employed by BT-PCE, 2) whether the employee was employed by Salrecon, 3) whether the employee was jointly employed by BT-PCE and Salrecon, 4) whether Salrecon was entitled to reimbursement or contribution from BT-PCE, and 5) if there was joint employment, whether there was an agreement for BT-PCE to provide workers’ compensation for the individuals jointly employed on the job site.  The judge found that the employee was employed by Salrecon, not by BT-PCE, and that Salrecon was not entitled to reimbursement or contribution.  The judge did not make a specific finding on whether the employee was jointly employed and did not address whether there was an agreement for BT-PCE to provide workers’ compensation insurance for employees such as the employee in this case.  Salrecon appeals.

In reviewing cases on appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1.  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, “[f]actfindings are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Foods Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).  Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Id.  A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo.  Krovchuk v. Koch Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).

Salrecon argues that the compensation judge’s findings and memorandum fail to provide sufficient information for adequate review of the legal standard applied and the rationale for her findings.  The judge is not required to discuss every piece of evidence introduced at the hearing.  See, e.g., Regan v. VOA Nat’l Housing, 61 W.C.D. 142, 149 (W.C.C.A. 2000), summarily aff’d (Minn. Apr. 6, 2001).  In this case, the judge included a detailed discussion of the facts in her memorandum.  The compensation judge’s findings and memorandum sufficiently show the judge’s reasoning and provide an adequate basis for this court to review her decision.  See Lang v. H & W Motor Express, slip op. (W.C.C.A. June 11, 1991) (absence of detailed explanation for rejection of certain evidence is not a basis for remand or reversal where the findings and order indicate the basis for the decision).  Salrecon also argues that the compensation judge’s findings regarding the determination of which company is the employee’s employer should be reviewed de novo as a determination of an employment status, similar to independent contractor cases such as Hunter v. Crawford Door Sales, 501 N.W.2d 623, 48 W.C.D. 637 (Minn. 1993).  We disagree.  This court has stated that the question of which entity had employed an employee was a question of fact.  See Titchenal v. Radio Ingstad Minn., Inc., 51 W.C.D. 1, 4 (W.C.C.A. 1994).  The findings supporting the compensation judge’s determination will be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.

The compensation judge found that the employee was employed by Salrecon and not by BT-PCE.  The judge used the general five-factor test to determine whether an employer-employee relationship existed for the purpose of obtaining workers’ compensation benefits.  Those factors include (1) the right to control the means and manner of performance, (2) the mode of payment, (3) the furnishing of materials or tools, (4) the control of the premises where the work is done, and (5) the right of the employer to discharge.  Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Minn. 1980).  Further, as a general rule, the “‘nature of the relationship is to be ascertained, not from the label given to it by the parties themselves, but from the consequences which the law attached to their arrangements and to their conduct.’”  Hunter, 501 N.W.2d at 624, 48 W.C.D. at 639 (quoting Edelston v. Builders and Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 551, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25, 27 W.C.D. 909, 910 (1975)).

The evidence in the record supports the compensation judge’s findings that Salrecon was the employee’s employer, not BT-PCE, at the plant demolition site.  Salrecon employees located the employee and offered him employment.  BT-PCE’s manager did not locate the employee or refer him to Salrecon.  In addition, Salrecon provided the employee’s lodging in Minnesota, took his application, determined his wage, supervised him, and had the authority to fire him.  Salrecon’s owner or employees gave him his work directions each day, provided his tools, work clothes except for boots, protective gear, and work materials.

The most important factor in determining the existence of an employment relationship is the right of the employer to control the performance of the employee’s work duties.  Newland, 295 N.W.2d at 618; Hunter, 501 N.W.2d at 624, 48 W.C.D. at 639.  While the employee was added to BT-PCE’s payroll, its manager did not supervise him or control his work activities.  The money for the employee’s paycheck, as well as the other employees, came from Salrecon.  The employee testified that he had never heard of BT-PCE and had never spoken to BT-PCE’s manager.  His only contact with BT-PEC’s manager was his knowledge that the manager sometimes brought the paychecks for distribution.  The compensation judge found the employee’s testimony credible.  Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s findings that Salrecon was the employee’s employer and that BT-PCE was not, and we affirm.

Salrecon also argues that the compensation judge erred by failing to make findings on all of the contested issues of fact and law in the case.  Minn. Stat. § 176.371 provides that a compensation judge's decision must determine all contested issues of fact and law.  Specifically, Salrecon argues that the judge failed to address the issue of whether an agreement existed between Salrecon and BT-PCE as to the provision of workers’ compensation under a labor broker arrangement where BT-PCE was providing temporary workers for Salrecon, putting them on BT-PCE’s payroll, and providing workers’ compensation insurance.  Salrecon requests a remand to the compensation judge for a determination of whether such a labor broker agreement existed between Salrecon and BT-PCE as joint employers.

Joint employers are generally liable for an employee’s workers’ compensation liability in the proportion of their wage liabilities.  They are also allowed to make a different arrangement for payment of workers’ compensation under Minn. Stat. § 176.071, which provides:

In this case, Salrecon argues that BT-PCE is a general employer acting as a labor broker for Salrecon, and therefore that the employee was hired under a labor-broker agreement.  We disagree.  BT-PCE did not find the employee and refer him to Salrecon; Salrecon found him and hired him.  BT-PCE did not provide payment of wages to the employee, only payroll services.  The employee had no contact with BT-PCE other than through receipt of his paycheck and communication regarding documentation.  There is no evidence to support Salrecon’s argument that Salrecon and BT-PCE were joint employers of the employee under the loaned-servant doctrine.  The judge found that the employee was employed by Salrecon and that BT-PCE was not an employer for the employee.  Since BT-PCE was not an employer under any theory, it cannot be a joint employer and cannot be liable for workers’ compensation for the employee or for reimbursement or contribution to Salrecon.  Therefore, the remaining issues were moot and the compensation judge did not err by not addressing whether joint employment existed or whether Salrecon and BT-PCE had agreed to a different arrangement for workers’ compensation liability.  Accordingly, we affirm the compensation judge’s decision.