The employee appeals from the compensation judge’s decision that it was premature to determine whether the employee was permanently and totally disabled.  We affirm.

The employee worked with her husband for about ten years as an over-the-road truck driver for Carlson Trucking, Inc. [the employer].  On June 7, 2010, the employee sustained an injury to her low back in the course and scope of that job.  She was 63 years old and was receiving Social Security retirement benefits on the date of her injury.  The employer and insurer admitted liability and paid various benefits, including temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses.

An MRI scan performed in July of 2010 disclosed degenerative disc disease and a disc herniation at L3-4.  Conservative treatment failed to alleviate her symptoms, and, on July 23, 2011, the employee underwent surgery consisting of a decompression and a right L3-4 microdiscectomy.

The employee initially experienced some resolution of her leg and low back pain, and, by October 2011, she had been released to work with a 20-pound lifting limit.  In late December, after she completed physical therapy, her restrictions were modified, with her lifting limit increased to 25 pounds, and she was advised to avoid repetitive lifting, bending, stooping, and twisting.

The employee had rehabilitation assistance from QRC Lea Oswald.  Initial services consisted primarily of medical monitoring.  Then, in January of 2012, the employee began receiving job placement assistance.  The employee’s job placement plan and agreement [JPPA] targeted employment in retail sales, courier and driving jobs, light assembly, office work, and any other position within the employee’s restrictions.

During the course of the employee’s job search, her symptoms increased, and, in March of 2012, her doctor took her back off work.  Several months later, in July of 2012, the employee was evaluated by vocational expert Dr. Phillip Haber.  After three days of psychological, aptitude, and physical testing, Dr. Haber concluded that the employee was permanently and totally disabled, primarily because of her physical condition.  Also in July of 2012, the employee’s surgeon reported that the employee had reached maximum medical improvement [MMI] and that she had an 18% whole body impairment related to her low back condition.

The employee continued to experience increasing low back and leg symptoms, and she underwent another MRI.  That scan, performed in December 2013, revealed a recurrent herniation at L3-4 with some migration of a free fragment.

In January 2013, the employee was seen by another surgeon, Dr. Ensor Transfeldt, for a second opinion.  Subsequently, on April 4, 2013, the employee underwent a second surgery, performed by Dr. Transfeldt, consisting of a revision decompression, L3-4, on the right, and an L3-4 discectomy.

The employee was initially very pleased with the results of the second procedure, especially the alleviation of most of her leg symptoms.  She was referred to physical therapy after surgery and experienced an apparent exacerbation of symptoms during the third therapy session.  Thereafter the employee stopped physical therapy and began pool exercises instead.  The employee has not worked since the date of her injury.

The employee claimed entitlement to permanent total disability benefits and benefits for an 18% whole body impairment.^[1]  The employer and insurer denied the claims, and the matter came on for hearing before a compensation judge on July 3, 2013.  Evidence included the employee’s medical records; certain rehabilitation records; the report and testimony of Dr. Haber; the report and testimony of the employer and insurer’s vocational expert, David Berdahl; and the testimony of the employee and of her QRC.  In a decision issued on July 24, 2013, the compensation judge awarded benefits for the 18% permanent partial disability rating as claimed, but she denied the claim for permanent total disability benefits, finding a decision on that issue premature.  The employee appeals.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1 (2012).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

An employee is totally disabled if her physical condition, in combination with her age, education, training, and experience, causes her to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income.  See Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5; Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Constr. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 153 N.W.2d 130, 24 W.C.D. 290 (1967).  In the present case, the compensation judge concluded that a finding of permanent total disability was premature.

On appeal, the employee argues initially that the compensation judge erred as a matter of law “in failing to make a prompt determination of the Employee’s eligibility for permanent total disability benefits.”  This argument has no merit.  The judge’s finding that a permanent total disability determination was “premature” in fact constituted a determination of the employee’s eligibility as of the hearing date, and this court has affirmed this same kind of conclusion in numerous other cases.  See, e.g., Kaufman v. Eveleth Mines, 66 W.C.D. 212 (W.C.C.A. 2006); Avery v. Farmstead Foods/Seaboard Corp., 60 W.C.D. 204 (W.C.C.A. 2000); Groberg v. Trevilla Nursing Home, 47 W.C.D. 319 (W.C.C.A. 1992); Young v. Fairview-Univ. Med. Ctr., No. WC04-108 (W.C.C.A. July 28, 2004).  Clearly such a finding is permissible if supported by the record.

The employee also contends that the judge erred in her reasoning and application of the law and that her findings are not supported by substantial evidence.  We disagree.

Certainly some evidence supports the employee’s claim.  She was 66 years old on the date of hearing, she still experiences significant symptoms, she has not worked since the date of her injury in 2010, she was not released to work as of the hearing date, and she does not have any substantial post-secondary education.  In addition, after three days of testing, Dr. Haber concluded that the employee was permanently and totally disabled.  However, other evidence of record amply supports the judge’s decision.  Specifically, the hearing was held only three months after the employee’s most recent surgery, and that surgery was at least partially successful.  The employee was scheduled to see Dr. Transfeldt shortly after the hearing, and the employee’s QRC expected the doctor to address the issues of MMI and the employee’s need for restrictions, which had not yet been set.  In addition, both Mr. Berdahl and the employee’s QRC testified that, given these circumstances, a finding of permanent total disability was premature.  It is also worth noting that the employee has had only two or three months of active job search and placement services since her injury.

In her memorandum, the compensation judge explained her decision on permanent total disability as follows:

I respectfully dissent.  I would reverse the compensation judge’s finding that it was premature to make a permanent total disability determination and remand for additional proceedings.

The compensation judge was presented with the employee’s claim for permanent total disability benefits.  Rather than addressing the claim for permanent total disability benefits, the compensation judge decided that the claim was premature.  There is no indication that the claim lacked legal ripeness; there does not appear to be any contingent or legally required future event upon which the claim rests.  The timing of the claim was determined by the employee and her attorney.  Whether different timing might result in a stronger or weaker claim is a matter of legal judgment for the petitioner.  The compensation judge had the discretion here to leave the record open for the pending medical appointment, but the employee’s claim should not be potentially delayed until all treatment is exhausted.

The majority says, “[t]he judge’s finding that a permanent total disability determination was ‘premature’ in fact constituted a determination of the employee’s eligibility as of the hearing date . . . .”  If this is the correct interpretation of the compensation judge’s action, the employee’s claim up to the date of hearing would be barred as a matter of res judicata in any future proceeding, and the distinction between a finding that the employee is not permanently and totally disabled as of the date of hearing and a finding that the claim was premature, is rendered meaningless.

Defining the issue actually decided by the compensation judge is important for two reasons.  First, as noted above, there are res judicata consequences to reading this as a determination on the merits.  Second, this court’s review of the compensation judge’s actions requires a review of the weight of evidence on the issue.  Here, the employee presented substantial evidence supporting her claim for permanent total disability benefits, but the evidence relied upon by the compensation judge primarily addressed whether the claim was premature.  Based on the record presented, it appears there is very little evidence directly supporting a finding that she was not permanently and totally disabled as of the date of hearing.