The employer and insurer seek to appeal from an interlocutory order denying their motion to dismiss.  We dismiss the appeal.

The employee sustained a work-related low back injury on December 12, 1993, while working for the employer, North Memorial Hospital.  She underwent a lumbar laminectomy and discectomy on January 12, 1994.  The employee initially returned to work under restrictions but her symptoms worsened.  After an MRI showed a recurrent or residual L4-5 herniation, she underwent a decompression and posterolateral fusion at L4-5 on September 28, 1994.  The employee was found to be permanently totally disabled by Compensation Judge Gary Mesna in 1996.  This finding was appealed by the employer and insurer and this court affirmed.  Brown v. North Mem’l Hosp., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Feb. 6, 1997).  The employer subsequently paid ongoing permanent total disability payments.

In April 2009, the employee entered into a stipulation for settlement with the self-insured employer where she received a cash payment of $225,000 in return for a full, final, and complete closeout of “any and all claims against the employer and insurer - past , present, and future - for benefits provided by the worker’s compensation laws of the State (except for future non-chiropractic medical care and treatments as limited below) arising out of the employee’s personal injury of December 20, 1993, and/or out of any consequential physical injury or any consequential mental health condition of the employee.”

In the stipulation, the employee alleged that she had sustained injury to her back and left leg, that she was permanently and totally disabled, and that “it is more likely than not that she has developed, or will develop some type of chronic pain or other mental health response to her injury.”  The employer admitted only an injury to the employee’s lumbar spine.  The employer further alleged that she was capable of work, and that she had “suffered no consequential condition as a result of her injury herein.  Further, there is no real likelihood that she will develop any such conditions.”  The stipulation expressly closed out “psychiatric treatment and medications, psychological treatment, counseling, mental health treatment . . . [and] formal in-patient or out-patient multidisciplinary pain management programs.”

The employee represented herself in the settlement negotiations.  The stipulation was reviewed by Judge Mesna, who found it to be fair, reasonable, and in conformity with the workers’ compensation act.  An Award on Stipulation was issued on April 20, 2009.

In 2010, the employee retained an attorney who filed a medical request seeking payment for surgery and other treatment for the employee’s right knee.  In 2012, Judge Mesna determined that the 1993 work injury was not a substantial contributing cause of the employee’s right knee condition.

On July 8, 2013, the employee filed a claim petition alleging entitlement to permanent total disability benefits from April 24, 2009, and continuing, and to permanent partial disability compensation for a 20 percent whole-body impairment associated with the 1993 injury to the employee’s back and left lower extremity, along with consequential anxiety, major depression, and chronic pain syndrome.  The claim petition was supported by a psychological evaluation performed in January 2013 by Jonathan Hoistad, a licensed psychologist.

The self-insured employer answered on July 12, 2013, denying the employee’s claims and further asserting that these new claims were barred by the terms of the 2009 stipulation.  The employer filed a motion to dismiss the employee’s claim petition.  The employee failed to respond to the motion, and on August 15, 2013, Judge Mesna dismissed the claim petition, without prejudice.

The employee refiled her claim petition on November 13, 2013.  The employer filed its answer on November 22, 2013, and on the same date once again filed a Motion to Dismiss.

In its motion, the employer contended that the stipulation closed out not only the claims for injury to the low back and left leg, but also for a consequential psychological or chronic pain condition, pointing to the wording of the stipulation and of the employee’s allegations therein.  As further evidence bearing on whether the employee knew of and intended to close out any consequential psychological conditions, the employer also pointed to various treatment records in which the employee had previously been diagnosed with and treated for depression and chronic pain in association with her treatment for the work injury.

The compensation judge found that the Stipulation for Settlement did not foreclose the employee’s claims, and issued his Order Denying Motion to Dismiss on January 8, 2014.  The employer and insurer have appealed from that Order to this court.  No proceedings have as yet been held on the substance of the employee’s claims.

A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo.  Krovchuk v. Koch Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).

Review by the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals is limited to the review of “an award or disallowance of compensation, or other order affecting the merits of the case.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1.  “As a general rule, an ‘order affecting the merits of the case’ is one that ‘finally determines the rights of the parties or concludes the action.’”  Herbst v. Jones Truck Lines, 59 W.C.D. 442, 444 (W.C.C.A. 1999) (citation omitted).  The policy behind the general rule is to prevent piecemeal appeals and protect the rights of all parties until all claims have been adjudicated in the trial court.  Johnson v. Johnson, 363 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. App. 1985) (citing Comment, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. May 6, 1985).

This court has previously held that an order denying a motion to dismiss a claim is not an appealable order, as it does not finally determine the rights of the parties or conclude the action.  See, e.g., Kellison v. Anderson Trucking Servs., 67 W.C.D. 613 (W.C.C.A. 2007); Thompson v. AT&T, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Dec. 21, 2000).

In their brief, the appellants argue that their appeal is properly within our purview.  They point out that in Jurva v. M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc., No. WC13-5588 (W.C.C.A. Dec. 13, 2013), this court considered an appeal from an order determining a motion to dismiss.  However, in Jurva, the appeal was from an order granting dismissal of a party.  Unlike an order denying dismissal, an order granting dismissal is an appealable order, since it constitutes a final determination of the claims affecting that party.

Since the order from which appeal is taken is not an appealable order, we dismiss the employer and insurer’s appeal.  The appellants may subsequently seek review of the order denying dismissal by an appeal from a final judgment by the compensation judge in the case.