The employer and insurer appeal from the compensation judge’s determination that the employer and insurer are required to pay the employee’s disability benefits based on an average weekly wage of $294.04.  We affirm.

The employee, Judy Anderson, began working for the employer herein, Crossmark, in January 2012.  Her work at Crossmark would involve visiting grocery stores and gas stations to stock and arrange merchandise and to audit stores to make sure that items were properly shelved.

The employee’s first day with Crossmark was January 9, 2012.  That day, she fell while walking in the door of a grocery store.  The employee sustained an injury to her left arm.  The employer and insurer admitted primary liability for the left arm injury of January 9, 2012.  However, the parties dispute the employee’s average weekly wage.  In particular, the parties dispute whether the employee’s earnings from multiple employers during the 26 weeks before the employee’s injury date should have been included in the calculation of the employee’s average weekly wage.

The parties stipulated that the employee would have likely worked about 20 hours per week with Crossmark, earning $10.50 per hour.  Accordingly, they stipulated that the employee’s average weekly wage with Crossmark alone would have been $210.00 per week.  The employee alleges that additional wages earned at two other employers, New Concepts in Marketing (NCIM) and Sunflower, should also be included in her average weekly wage calculation.^[1]

The employee began working for NCIM in 2006.  Her job with that company involved demonstrating food products at grocery stores.  The employee typically worked six-hour shifts on weekend days.  She would communicate with a scheduler to determine when she was available during a month, and she was not guaranteed a set number of hours or jobs with NCIM.  NCIM paid the employee about $52.00 per demonstration.  In the 26 weeks leading up to the injury on January 9, 2012, the employee received earnings from New Concepts on 20 different occasions, totaling $1,500.84.

The employee began working for Sunflower in December 2011, shortly before her work injury.  At Sunflower, the employee did similar food demonstrations in grocery stores.  The employee worked for Sunflower on two different occasions before her injury, earning a total of $180.00.  She testified that in January 2012, she was scheduled to work seven jobs with Sunflower.  However, she said she was unable to work those jobs after the injury at Crossmark.  No documentary evidence was submitted to support this testimony.

The employee conceded that there could be some weeks where she would not be scheduled for any demonstration jobs with any of her other employers because no jobs were available.  The employee testified that the work she was doing “offered flexibility” and allowed her to choose assignments that matched her needs.  The employee testified that she did qualify for and collect unemployment benefits sporadically between October 2009 and December 2011.  The employee said she would have no longer been qualified for unemployment benefits after being hired at Crossmark.

Crossmark bought out NCIM about four to six months after the employee’s date of injury.  The employee testified that NCIM became “like a division” of Crossmark, but would still operate in the same manner.  The employee testified that she believed she would be working for both Crossmark and NCIM and that she would be working for NCIM “on top of” the 20 hours per week with Crossmark.

In her findings and order, the compensation judge decided to include pre-injury earnings from both NCIM and Sunflower in the calculation of the employee’s average weekly wage.  The compensation judge found that the employee worked 20 weeks for either or both of those companies during the 26 weeks before her work injury at Crossmark.  The compensation judge then combined the $1,500.84 earned through NCIM with the $180.00 earned from Sunflower, for a total of $1,680.84.  She divided the $1,680.84 total by the 20 weeks worked and arrived at an average weekly wage of $84.04 leading up to the employee’s date of injury.  She then added the $84.04 to the stipulated weekly earnings from Crossmark, $210.00, and determined that the employee’s total average weekly wage should be $294.04.

In reviewing cases on appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1.  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, “[f]actfindings are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Foods Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).  Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Id.

“[A] decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which [the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals] may consider de novo.”  Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993).

The employer and insurer argue that the employee’s earnings from Sunflower and NCIM should be excluded from her average weekly wage calculation because that employment was not regular employment as required by the workers’ compensation act.  Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 8a (renumbered from Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 3 in 2008), states that “If, at the time of injury, the employee was regularly employed by two or more employers, the employee’s earnings in all such employments shall be included in the computation of daily wage.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 18, also states that “If, at the time of the injury, the employee was regularly employed by two or more employers, the employee’s days of work for all such employments shall be included in the computation of weekly wage.”

“Determination of whether an employee was ‘regularly employed’ is a question of fact and must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.”  Ricke v. Plantenberg’s Mkt., Inc., 68 W.C.D. 142, 146 (W.C.C.A. 2008) (citing Hormann v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Ctr., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Feb. 2, 2001); Freeney v. Minnesota Arena Football, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Oct. 20, 1998); Brown v. Boxers Grill & Party Pub, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Mar. 31, 1998)).  In Newbauer v. Pepsi Bottling Group, this court stated that “‘regular’ means, in common parlance, ‘steady or uniform in course, practice or occurrence, not subject to unexplained or irrational variation;’ and ‘returning, recurring, or received at stated, fixed or uniform intervals.’” 43 W.C.D. 339, 342 (W.C.C.A. 1990) (citation omitted).  The term “regularly employed,” is used in contrast to “casual” employment, a distinction which “must be determined with principal reference to the scope and purpose of the hiring.”  Id. (citing McSherry v. City of St. Paul, 202 Minn. 102, 277 N.W. 541 (1938)). “When there is a continuing engagement to serve the employer in his business at such times as the particular and essential service may be needed, the employment is not ‘casual’ according to any of the judicial definitions of that term.”  Id.

“Income from other employment in which an employee was engaged on a recurring basis may be included in the wage calculation so long as the employment was regular in the sense that, in light of the history, scope and purpose of the employment, such employment and earnings would likely recur or continue on an ongoing basis.”  Ricke, 68 W.C.D. at 146-47 (citing Beissel v. Marschall Line, Inc., 58 W.C.D. 470 (W.C.C.A. 1998) (other citations omitted)).  Ultimately, the object of wage determination is to “arrive at a fair approximation of [the employee’s] probable future earning power which has been impaired or destroyed because of the injury.”  Sawczuk v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 312 N.W.2d 435, 437-38, 34 W.C.D. 282, 287 (Minn. 1981) (citation omitted).

In Beissel, this court explained that “wages from other employments which were inherently casual, had become casual prior to the injury, or had effectively ended prior to the injury, have been excluded from the wage calculation.”  58 W.C.D. at 474.^[2]  However, this court has also held that “income from other employment in which the employee was engaged on an ongoing or recurring basis was properly included in the wage calculation even in cases where the employee was not actively performing that job on the date of injury, so long as the other employment was regular in the sense that, in the light of the history, scope and purpose of the other employment, such employment and earnings would likely have recurred or continued on an ongoing basis but for the employee’s injury.”  Id.^[3]

The employer and insurer argue that the employee was not guaranteed work with Sunflower and NCIM, that she had the option of working or not, and that she could choose not to bid on jobs if they did not fit into her schedule.  In addition, there were some weeks when food demonstration jobs were not available.  Therefore, the employer and insurer argue that the pre-injury employment was not regular and that it would not continue as regular after the injury, especially considering the nature of the employment at Crossmark.  We disagree.  Although there were weeks where the employee may not have had employment available to her through Sunflower or NCIM, she did work at either or both NCIM and Sunflower during 20 of the 26 weeks prior to her date of injury.  She testified that she was scheduled to work a number of times for Sunflower in January 2013, and she testified that she believed her employment with NCIM could continue in a similar manner, even after Crossmark bought it out.

The employer and insurer also argue that the employee was in transition from one employer to another and, therefore, that she could not include earnings from her prior employers in the average weekly wage.  In making this argument, the employer and insurer rely heavily on Baragar v. Jordan Transformer, L.L.C., 71 W.C.D. 469 (W.C.C.A. 2011), summarily aff’d (Minn. Aug. 31, 2011).  In Baragar, the employee was self employed, leading up to his work with the date of injury employer.  Id. at 471.  However, the employee indicated that he was “concentrating” on his work for the new employer at the time of his injury, and he said he was “unable to recall” bids for other jobs.  Id. at 472.  He was also cross-examined based on earlier deposition testimony that he did not intend to do any work other than for the new employer and that he wanted the security of a regular job.  Id. at 471.  On review, this court concluded that there was “no definite evidence of continuing ‘regular’ work by the employee” in a self-employment business after he began working for the date of injury employer, and there was no evidence that the secondary employment and resultant earnings “would likely recur or continue on an ongoing basis.”  Id. at 474.  Therefore, this court determined that it was “unreasonable for the compensation judge to presume that the employee was - - or perhaps even could have been - - ‘regularly’ employed at, and earning roughly the same wages at, both jobs simultaneously.”  Id. at 475.

Here, by contrast, the employee testified that she intended to keep working with NCIM and/or Sunflower even after starting with Crossmark.  The employer and insurer argue that, as in Baragar, the employee’s own “speculative” testimony is insufficient to support inclusion of her wages from NCIM and Sunflower in her wage calculations after she started with Crossmark.  However, the employee here had established an ongoing pattern of obtaining demonstration work through NCIM and/or Sunflower.  See Fletcher v. Labor Force/Labor Finders-MN, slip op. (W.C.C.A. June 20, 1995), summarily aff’d (Minn. Oct. 1, 1990) (including wages from temporary agencies given the employee’s ongoing pattern of obtaining successive work assignments and his testimony that he planned to continue with that work leading up to and after the work injury); Newbauer v. Pepsi Bottling Group, 43 W.C.D. 339 (W.C.C.A. 1990) (including wages from seasonal lawn-care business).  Unlike Baragar, the employee indicated that she did expect additional work from NCIM and Sunflower and that she actually had work scheduled through Sunflower.

We acknowledge that the employee did not present calendars or other documentary evidence to support her testimony that she had scheduled additional work after the date of injury, but it is not the role of this court to evaluate the credibility and probative value of witness testimony and choose different inferences from the evidence than the compensation judge.  See Krotzer v. Browning-Ferris/Woodlake Sanitation Serv., 459 N.W.2d 509, 512-13, 43 W.C.D. 254, 260-61 (Minn. 1990); Redgate v. Sroga’s Standard Serv., 421 N.W.2d 729, 734, 40 W.C.D. 948, 957 (Minn. 1988).  The compensation judge had sufficient evidence, including the employee’s testimony, of the employee’s work patterns and of the unique work arrangements with NCIM and Sunflower to reasonably conclude that the employee was regularly employed by both NCIM and Sunflower at the time of the injury.  Therefore, we affirm.