The employer and insurer appeal from the compensation judge’s decision that the injuries the employee sustained while rescuing an injured motorist arose out of and in the course of his employment.  We affirm.

In March or April of 2010, the employee began working for Tierney Brothers Construction [the employer] as a storm damage estimator.  Sean Tierney had between six and eight employees performing this work, which entailed inspecting roofs for storm damage and then trying to obtain roofing repair contracts with the affected homeowners.  During the period of the employee’s employment, much of the work was performed in the vicinity of Grinnell, Iowa, which had experienced severe storms.  Tierney typically took three to five estimators with him to Iowa, often carpooling in the same vehicle.  The estimators stayed in Iowa for several days to a week before returning to Minnesota.  Tierney paid for all food and lodging during these trips, and the employee and Tierney often shared a hotel room.

On July 14, 2010, the employee and Tierney worked in Johnston, Iowa, and then headed back east on the interstate toward Grinnell, where they were staying at the time.  Tierney was driving; the employee was the only passenger.  During that trip back to Grinnell, they came upon the scene of an accident involving two automobiles and a semi-tractor and trailer.  One of the automobiles was pinned between the semi and the concrete median barrier, and both of those vehicles were apparently on fire.  The employee testified that he could see someone in the cab of the semi and told Tierney to stop the car.  Tierney responded by saying that they needed to go on to Grinnell and that others were taking care of it.  The employee testified that he then again yelled for Tierney to stop, Tierney slammed on the brakes, and they both ran toward the accident.

The employee saw a woman in the pinned automobile, screaming for help.  He was exposed to the fire and thick smoke before he finally managed to pull the woman, who was badly burned, out through the rear window of her car.  As the two ran from the fire, the car exploded.  In the meantime, Tierney helped another bystander get the driver of the semi out of that vehicle.  An ambulance eventually arrived to take care of the accident victims, and the employee and Tierney then continued on their way to Grinnell.

The employee claimed entitlement to benefits as a result of a pulmonary injury and also post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD] allegedly resulting from his rescue of the trapped motorist.  The employer and insurer denied liability, alleging, in part, that the employee had not been acting in the course and scope of his employment when the alleged injuries occurred.^[1]  When the matter came on for hearing, the employee was the only witness to testify.^[2]  In a decision issued on May 13, 2013, the compensation judge resolved the issues in the employee’s favor and awarded benefits.  The employer and insurer appeal.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1 (2012).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

“[A] decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which [the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals] may consider de novo.”  Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993).

The employer and insurer allege that the compensation judge erred as a matter of law in concluding that the employee’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, contending that the judge misconstrued applicable precedent and that compelling legal and policy considerations mandate reversal of the judge’s award.  In effect, the employer and insurer would have us conclude that, as a matter of law, the employee deviated from the boundaries of his employment when he rescued the motorist from the burning car.  We are not convinced.

There are apparently only three Minnesota Supreme Court cases dealing directly with workers’ compensation coverage for injuries occurring during rescues by bystanders.^[3]  In the first of these cases, Weidenbach v. Miller, 237 Minn. 278, 55 N.W.2d 289, 17 W.C.D. 186 (1952), the employee was a driver-salesman for a beverage company.  He and the owner of the company were traveling on the highway along Lake Minnetonka when they saw a man who had fallen through the lake ice and was calling for help.  The employee, who was driving, stopped the truck to render assistance, arguably at the employer’s direction or suggestion.  The employer too exited the truck and followed the employee, who had gone onto the ice to stretch out a branch to the man in the water.  The employee himself then fell through, as did the employer, who had gone onto the ice to rescue the employee.  The employer was ultimately pulled out of the water by others and survived, but the employee drowned.

Following a hearing, a referee found against the deceased employee, and that conclusion was affirmed by the industrial commission on appeal.  In analyzing the case on further appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court began with a general discussion of the law dealing with the concept of “arising out of.”  Restating the long-recognized difficulty of formulating a comprehensive definition, the court explained that “these difficulties are particularly noticeable in cases such as the one we now have before us, where an injured employee acts in an emergency to prevent harm to some other person.”  Id. at 284, 55 N.W.2d at 292, 17 W.C.D. at 192.  The court then went on to analyze and quote at length a number of cases from other jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme Court case of O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 71 S.Ct. 470, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951).  In that case, an employee drowned trying to save a swimmer in a dangerous channel running along a company-maintained recreation center.  Compensation under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was allowed under the theory that the conditions of the employment created a “zone of special danger” and that a reasonable rescue attempt was foreseeable, as an incident of the employee’s service.  The Minnesota court observed that O’Leary had been characterized as a case falling in the “twilight zone,” where the expert judgment of the administrative agency should prevail.  Weidenbach, 237 Minn. at 285, 55 N.W.2d at 293, 17 W.C.D. at 193 (citations omitted).  In discussing the question of foreseeability and special danger in the Weidenbach matter, the court explained that

The second Minnesota Supreme Court case dealing with injuries sustained during rescue activities is Carey v. Stadther, 300 Minn. 88, 219 N.W.2d 76, 27 W.C.D. 365 (1974), in which the employee, a feed salesman, died while trying to rescue a man at the bottom of a pit that had been dug for a cesspool.^[4]  The compensation judge concluded that the employee’s death occurred in the course and scope of his employment but, by split decision, the industrial commission reversed, basing its decision on Weidenbach.  Carey v. Stadther, 26 W.C.D. 612 (Indus. Comm. 1973).  On appeal from the industrial commission’s decision, a divided supreme court found Weidenbach distinguishable and reinstated the compensation judge’s decision on grounds that the employee had died performing an action “absolutely consistent with the type of conduct [the employer] encouraged in its sales representatives.”  Carey, 300 Minn. at 95, 219 N.W.2d at 80, 27 W.C.D. at 373.  Because the employer actively expected its salesmen to engage in helpful community services and viewed such activities as essential sales techniques, the court concluded that it was not necessary to decide whether a dangerous rescue attempt might otherwise arise out of and in the course of a salesman’s employment.  Nevertheless, the court went on to observe that

Finally, the supreme court commented on the law governing rescues in Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 2005).  In that case, the question was whether the deceased employee’s coworkers - - the head trainer, assistant trainer, and medical services coordinator - - could be held personally liable in tort for the employee’s death.  An again divided court concluded that coemployees have immunity from civil liability pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act as long as the coemployees were acting in the course and scope of their employment.^[5]  In reviewing applicable law regarding the boundaries of a worker’s employment, the court observed, in part, as follows:

As can be seen from the cases described above, the law regarding workers’ compensation coverage for rescues is complicated at best, and it is worth reiterating that the supreme court was divided in all three cases.  We acknowledge that the Stringer majority summarized Weidenbach as a case in which benefits were denied because the employee had not been expressly directed to aid the drowning man.  However, the Stringer court had no reason to discuss all the implications of Weidenbach, in that it was merely summarizing the general state of the law, and the nuances present in Weidenbach were not important to resolving the liability question in Stringer.  Weidenbach itself is not so simple.  Certainly the court majority in Weidenbach concluded that the employer there had made no express direction for the employee to help.  However, the court also concluded that it was up to the industrial commission to determine whether there had been an implied direction to help, and they deferred to the commission’s judgment on that point.  Weidenbach, 237 Minn. at 293, 55 N.W.2d at 297, 17 W.C.D. at 200.  The court in Weidenbach also referenced the principle of deferring to the expert judgment of the administrative agency in questions of arising out of, and it seems probable that the court affirmed the commission’s decision to deny compensation at least in part on those grounds.  See id. at 285, 55 N.W.2d at 293, 17 W.C.D. at 193.

The Carey court, discussing the issue subsequent to Weidenbach, seemingly approved an extension of coverage to rescues on policy grounds, consistent with the rule enunciated in Larson’s treatise.^[6]  It is true, as the employer and insurer note, that Carey was decided under the former rule of liberal construction.  However, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that such cases remain good law unless expressly overturned.  Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271-72 n.2 (Minn. 1992).

The employee in the present case was a traveling employee, already in a category of expanded workers’ compensation coverage.  See, e.g., Voight v. Rettinger Transp., 306 N.W.2d 133, 33 W.C.D. 625 (Minn. 1981).  The duties of his employment placed him on the road on a regular basis.  It is reasonably foreseeable that workers in jobs involving substantial driving will come upon accidents, and, when they do so, it is similarly foreseeable that such workers may at times be moved to render aid.  The employee here was not required to leave the road he was traveling to render assistance to the accident victims, ^[7] and the compensation judge concluded that, by his actions, Sean Tierney had implicitly directed the employee to help at the accident scene.^[8]  As such, the judge’s factual inference on the issue of implied direction is different than the inference drawn by the industrial commission in Weidenbach, and Weidenbach is therefore distinguishable.^[9]  For this reason, and given all of the other circumstances, we conclude that the judge’s decision is not clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.  We therefore affirm her conclusion that the employee’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment.