The employer and insurer appeal from the compensation judge’s determination that the employee sustained a work-related injury, as alleged, and that the employee provided appropriate statutory notice of her injury.  We affirm.

The employee, Wendy Linder, worked for the employer, Regis Corporation, as a payroll specialist.  Part of her job included putting paper checks in envelopes and then into storage bins.  The payroll department stored these plastic bins containing paychecks on shelves until they were shipped out.

The employee, as a part of her duties with the employer, would occasionally move the storage bins filled with checks to the shelving located in the payroll department.  At hearing, the employee testified that the boxes weighed up to 50 pounds.  Darcy Musack, a claims manager for the employer, testified at hearing that the boxes weigh up to 25 pounds.

The employee claimed that on December 7, 2006, she sustained an injury to her lumbar spine in the course and scope of her employment with the employer.  The employee testified that she injured herself while retrieving one of the check boxes from a row of shelving in the payroll department.  She said she was reaching slightly above shoulder level to pull the bin off the shelf, and that in the course of taking the bin off of the shelf, she twisted to her left side and fell into the shelving behind her, although she did not fall to the ground.  The employee also testified that during this incident, she felt a pop in her back and experienced tingling down her left leg to her knee.

The employee further testified that she immediately reported her injury to her supervisor, Valerie Hall, but she did not fill out a first report of injury.  The employee explained that although she was injured, she did not want to make a workers’ compensation claim, and she was afraid that she would be terminated from her position with the employer.

The employee saw Dr. Paul Reicho at Park Nicollet Clinic on December 9, 2006.  Dr. Reicho reported that the employee had a 48-hour history of lumbar back pain with some extension in the left lower extremity.  The doctor reported that the employee “denies any prior history of back problems.”  The employee did not report any mechanism of injury to explain her condition.  Dr. Reicho did not provide a recommendation regarding work ability.

The employee testified that she took a week off from work to rest her back, and she said she was absent from December 15, 2006 through December 22, 2006.  However, no physician ever removed the employee from work during that time, and the employee’s wage records indicate that she was paid during that period.  Nonetheless, the employee indicated that about a week after her injury, when she recalled returning to work, she had a meeting with her supervisor, Ms. Hall, and Lisa Wannergin, the payroll lead.  The employee testified that she told them “That my back still hurts from when I was moving those boxes.”

The employee testified that in February 2007, she had an ergonomic evaluation of her workstation, and her computer was moved up to accommodate her inability to sit for long periods of time.  There was no record of an ergonomic evaluation contained in the employee’s personnel file.  However, the employee indicated on cross-examination that she believed that the ergonomic evaluation was available to any employee that wanted it.  In addition, one of her coworkers, Melissa Power, recalled that the employee’s monitor had been raised after the employee hurt her back because of difficulty sitting.^[1]

The employee did not treat for her low back again until February 25, 2007, when she returned to Park Nicollet Clinic complaining of back pain that had developed over the past three days.  There was reportedly no specific event to account for the employee’s condition.

On March 7, 2007, the employee returned to Park Nicollet indicating she had concerns about low back pain.  She said it had been going on for the past two weeks, and there was no particular injury.  The employee was assessed with L5-S1 lumbar radiculopathy.  Physical therapy was recommended.

In early March 2007, the employee submitted Family Medical Leave Act paperwork, indicating that she had low back pain that began in late February 2007.

The employee started a course of physical therapy in late March 2007, and she testified that she discussed her mechanism of injury with the therapist.  The employee testified that her physical therapist then encouraged her file a workers’ compensation claim with the employer.  Records show that an initial physical therapy assessment was performed on March 26, 2007.  The record from that date indicates that there was “no known cause” for the employee’s condition.

The employee indicated that she remembered having a conversation with Ms. Musack, the employer’s claims manager, shortly after the initial physical therapy appointment.  The employee testified that she spoke with Ms. Musack regarding her injury, in the hallway at Regis Corporation, and that Ms. Musack wrote an incident report at that time.  The employee believed that the conversation would have taken place on March 27, 2007, the day after the initial physical therapy appointment.

Ms. Musack testified that the employee had approached her at her desk on March 27, 2007 to allege an injury to her lumbar spine.  The employee was unable to provide specific details relating to the injury, and the employee stated that she may have injured her back while lifting a box in December 2006 or while shoveling snow at home.  Ms. Musack later verified that Minnesota had received seven inches of snow on February 22, 2007.  The employee had been unable to give a specific date for the injury, and she also informed Ms. Musack that she had not reported a work-related injury.  Ms. Musack indicated that she provided a toll-free number to the employee so she could report the injury to the workers’ compensation carrier, which is standard policy for the employer.  However, the employee did not call the 800 number.  Therefore, Ms. Musack testified that she followed up and reported the injury on the employee’s behalf to the claims department on March 29, 2007.  Ms. Musack testified that she chose an injury date of December 15, 2006, initially, because the employee had not been able to specify a date of injury.

The employee gave a recorded statement on April 2, 2007.  In her statement, the employee said that she had been injured on December 11, 2006.  She said that after going to the doctor, she told Valerie Hall, her supervisor, that she had picked up the checks and hurt her back.  The employee also reportedly told Ms. Wannergin, the payroll lead, and a coworker, Melissa Power, about the incident.  Ms. Musack conceded that she did not speak to the other individuals mentioned by the employee with regard to reporting her work injury, including Ms. Hall.

On June 21, 2007, the employee underwent surgery to remove a herniated disc.  She remained off work from the date of surgery through October 1, 2007.  Her ultimate diagnosis was herniated disc L5-S1 on the left side.  When the employee returned to work after surgery, she testified that she had help with boxes and could sit and stand as needed.

The employee was laid off for economic reasons on October 30, 2008.

The employee continued to treat through Park Nicollet Clinic.  In October 2008, she had mild recurring low back pain and leg pain that were persistent and worsening.  As of August 5, 2009, her physicians at Park Nicollet were noting low back pain and left leg pain consistent with an S1 radiculopathy.  A lifting restriction of 30 pounds was recommended.

At the request of the employer and insurer, the employee underwent an independent medical examination with Dr. Richard Hadley on August 6, 2009.  The employee told Dr. Hadley that she had experienced abrupt onset of low back pain on December 7, 2006, while she was lifting a bin of payroll checks from a shelf, and she banged the wall behind her.

Dr. Hadley noted that the contemporaneous medical records, including those from December 9, 2006 and February 25, 2007, noted no history of injury.  He opined that “available records fail to document a work-related injury as alleged on or about December 7, 2006.”  Dr. Hadley felt that there was “inadequate documentation in the available records to attribute any medical condition or this disability to the injury of December 7, 2006.”  He did recommend that the employee follow lift and carry restrictions of no more than 20 pounds, but he opined that the employee could work a 40-hour work week.  Dr. Hadley opined that none of the medical care or workers’ compensation benefits sought were related to an injury at work on December 7, 2006.

Dr. Robert Wengler evaluated the employee and issued a report dated June 8, 2011.  Dr. Wengler indicated that the employee sustained a herniated disc on December 7, 2006.  He felt that the December 7, 2006 incident was the precipitating factor in the employee’s condition and had resulted in the employee’s need for surgery and treatment.

The case eventually came on for hearing on December 12, 2012, and the issues presented included whether the employee had sustained a compensable injury and whether she had given proper statutory notice of any such injury.  In addition to the medical records and pleadings, the compensation judge heard the testimony from the employee and Ms. Musack, as described above.

In her post-hearing deposition, Ms. Power testified that the employee told her about a work injury in December 2006.  Ms. Power also confirmed that the employee’s coworkers had been assisting her with her work activities.

The compensation judge concluded that the employee did sustain a work injury, and she explained in her memorandum of law that she “determined that the preponderance of the evidence supports a conclusion that the employee sustained a work-related back injury on December 7, 2006, because of the testimony regarding the occurrence itself and the visit to Dr. Reicho on December 9, 2006,” and the compensation judge noted the testimony indicating that the employee had help with lifting and other work activities after the injury date.

The compensation judge also noted the employee’s testimony that she had told her supervisor, Valerie Hall, about the injury within days after it happened but that she was worried about her job and did not want to go on workers’ compensation.  The compensation judge also found that the employee had given proper notice to the employer within 111 days of the incident, when she told Darcy Musack about the injury, and the compensation judge found that the employer had not shown any prejudice as a result of the length of time before notice was given.  As such, the compensation judge determined that notice would be considered complete pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.141.

Ultimately, the compensation judge concluded that the employee did sustain an injury arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment at Regis on December 7, 2006 and that the employee provided proper notice of her work injury.  Therefore, the compensation judge awarded the benefits at issue.

In reviewing cases on appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1.  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, “[f]actfindings are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Foods Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).  Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Id.

The employer and insurer argue that there was “no objective evidence” in the record to support the compensation judge’s determination that the employee sustained a work injury on December 7, 2006.

The employer and insurer first argue that the only evidence the employee was able to offer in support of her claim “was her own subjective and self-serving testimony.”  They also assert that the compensation judge failed to make a finding relating to the employee’s credibility.  Absent that finding, the employer and insurer argue that there can be no support for the compensation judge’s award of benefits.

Although this court is required to look at all the evidence in performing its review function, it must give due weight to the compensation judge’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses and must uphold the findings based on conflicting evidence or evidence from which more than one inference might reasonably be drawn.  Even v. Kraft, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 831, 834, 42 W.C.D. 220, 225 (Minn. 1989) (citing Hengemuhle, 358 N.W.2d 54, 37 W.C.D. 235 and Gibberd by Gibberd v. Control Data Corp., 424 N.W.2d 776, 40 W.C.D. 1040 (Minn. 1988)).  Assessment of witness credibility is the unique function of the trier of fact.  Brennan v. Joseph G. Brennan, M.D., 425 N.W.2d 837, 839-40, 41 W.C.D. 79, 82 (Minn. 1988).  It is not the role of this court to evaluate the credibility and probative value of witness testimony and choose different inferences from the evidence than the compensation judge.  See Krotzer v. Browning-Ferris/Woodlake Sanitation Serv., 459 N.W.2d 509, 513, 43 W.C.D. 254, 260-61 (Minn. 1990); Redgate v. Sroga’s Standard Serv., 421 N.W.2d 729, 734, 40 W.C.D. 948, 957 (Minn. 1988).

The compensation judge made specific findings as to what occurred with regard to the employee’s work injury on December 7, 2006.  In doing so, the compensation judge reviewed the contemporaneous medical records, including the visit with Dr. Reicho just two days after the date of injury and the treatment that followed in the spring of 2006.  While these treatment records do not contain a specific indication as to the employee’s mechanism of injury, they do indicate that the employee sustained a back injury in early December 2006.  The compensation judge acknowledged the deficiency of a specific reference to a work injury in the medical records, but in her memorandum, the compensation judge explained that “It is not unusual for inconsistent information to appear in reports and for employees to fail to understand the need for making sure that medical records and employer records clearly have information regarding a work injury.”

The compensation judge also reviewed the testimony presented, including the hearing testimony from the employee and Ms. Musack and the deposition testimony from Ms. Power.  In her memorandum, the compensation judge indicated that she “determined that the preponderance of the evidence supports a conclusion that the employee sustained a work-related back injury on December 7, 2006, because of the testimony regarding the occurrence itself . . . .”  Thus, the compensation judge, at least implicitly, found the testimony regarding the occurrence of the injury itself to be credible.  In addition, the compensation judge noted in her memorandum that she rejected Ms. Musack’s testimony, and the employer and insurer’s position, that the employee’s injury occurred as a result of shoveling snow or some other cause.

In addition to the credibility issues discussed above, the employer and insurer challenge the compensation judge’s reliance on Dr. Wengler’s conclusions, which they assert were based largely on the employee’s own history regarding the injury itself.

Dr. Wengler’s opinions did rely, in part, on the employee’s history regarding the injury itself.  As the compensation judge noted, Dr. Hadley, by contrast, only based his opinion on the lack of a specific mechanism noted in the initial medical records.  The compensation found that the medical records showed that as of the visit on December 9, 2006, “the employee had a back injury.”  She then determined that Dr. Wengler’s opinions were “most consistent with course of the employee’s back injury.”  In other words, the compensation judge considered both the employee’s history and the “objective” evidence noted in the contemporaneous medical records in deciding to credit Dr. Wengler’s opinion over that of Dr. Hadley.

It is the function of the compensation judge to resolve conflicts in expert medical testimony.  See Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337, 37 W.C.D. 364 (Minn. 1985).  This court is required to uphold a compensation judge’s choice between expert medical opinions, unless the expert opinion, as chosen, assumes facts that are not supported by substantial evidence.  Id.  Even where evidence is conflicting or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from it, the findings of the compensation judge are to be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, and we “must give due weight to the opportunity of the compensation judge to judge credibility.”  Redgate, 421 N.W.2d at 734, 40 W.C.D. at 957.

The compensation judge was aware of the aware of the potential inconsistencies and credibility concerns raised by the employer and insurer on appeal.  Ultimately, she balanced the evidence presented to her and determined that the employee’s injury occurred at work in December 2006.  The compensation judge determined, at least implicitly, that the employee’s testimony regarding the occurrence of the injury itself was credible, and in doing so she rejected the employer and insurer’s position that the injury was due to shoveling snow or other causes as indicated by Ms. Musack.  This is exactly the type of factual and credibility determination that is left to the compensation judge, and because substantial evidence supports her decision, including the testimony and medical records discussed above, we affirm.

The employer and insurer argue that the employee failed to establish that she provided statutory notice of the claimed incident.  “To prove a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employee must show that the employer had timely notice or knowledge of the employee’s injury within the statutory period.”  Miller v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 73 W.C.D. 145 (W.C.C.A. 2013) (citing Issacson v. Minnetonka, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 865, 866, 40 W.C.D. 270, 272 (Minn. 1987)).  “Minn. Stat. § 176.141 provides that no compensation for an injury shall be allowed unless the employer has ‘actual knowledge of the occurrence of the injury’ or written notice is given to the employer within 180 days after the occurrence of the injury.”  Denais v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 69 W.C.D. 206, 211 (W.C.C.A. 2009).^[2]  “The purpose of the requirement of actual knowledge or notice is to permit the employer to make such investigation as is necessary to determine liability after a claim.”  Id. (citing Miller v. Peterson Constr. Co., 229 Minn. 22, 38 N.W.2d 48, 15 W.C.D. 513 (1948)).

Actual knowledge under the statute has been defined as information on which to base inquiry if the employer so desires or, at minimum, information such as a reasonable person would usually act upon in the ordinary course of human affairs.  Denais, 69 W.C.D. at 211 (citing Nelson v. Reid & Wackman, 228 Minn. 137, 36 N.W.2d 544, 15 W.C.D. 479 (1949)).  The facts and circumstances of a traumatic injury or disability must be such as would put a reasonable person on inquiry that the disability is work-related.  Denais, 69 W.C.D. at 211 (citing Pojanowski v. Hart, 288 Minn. 77, 81, 178 N.W.2d 913, 916, 25 W.C.D. 206, 209 (1970)).  “Generally, where an employer has actual knowledge of an accident at work and the injury, notice thereof is unnecessary.”  Denais, 69 W.C.D. at 212 (citation omitted).  Actual knowledge does not require the employer to know that the employee claims his injury is work related.  Id. at 213.

The compensation judge cited the employee’s testimony that she told one of her supervisors, Valerie Hall, about the injury shortly after it happened.  The employee also testified that she discussed the incident with Ms. Hall and Lisa Wannergin when she returned from the time off that she recalled taking shortly after the injury.  The employee also sought help with lifting from her coworkers.  In addition, the compensation judge noted that the employee had her computer raised at some point to allow her to stand.^[3]  The compensation judge explained, in her memorandum of law, that she determined that the evidence discussed above established that the employer did have notice of the injury shortly after it happened in December 2006.  She also explained that she credited the employee’s version of events over those presented by Ms. Musack, who had not spoken with Ms. Hall or Ms. Wannergin.  Ms. Hall’s post-hearing recorded statement indicated that she did not remember anything about December.

The compensation judge acknowledged that the employee testified that she did not want to report a work injury because of concerns about her job and that this was somewhat inconsistent with the testimony about telling Ms. Hall and Ms. Wannergin about the injury right away.  However, she concluded that any inconsistencies were outweighed by the fact that only Ms. Musack testified, that Ms. Musack had not spoken with either Ms. Hall or Ms. Wannergin, and that Ms. Hall’s recorded statement indicated she did not remember anything about December 2006.  As such, the compensation judge rejected the employer and insurer’s position that the employee had not provided notice to the employer.  Again, this is the type of factual and/or credibility determination that is left to the compensation judge, and we will not disturb her determination that the employer did have notice of the injury shortly after it occurred.

The compensation judge then went on to state that even if there had been evidence to show that notice had not been given until March 27, 2007, the employee still complied with Minn. Stat. § 176.141 by reporting the injury to Ms. Musack within 111 days of the injury.  Where notice is provided to the employer more than 30 days but less than 180 days from the occurrence of the injury, compensation is still payable if the employee “shows that failure to give prior notice was due to the employee’s . . . mistake, inadvertence, ignorance of fact or law, or inability, or to the fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit of the employer or agent.”  See Freyholtz v. Blackduck Sch. Dist. No. 32, 613 N.W.2d 757, 758, 60 W.C.D. 219, 220 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 176.141).  However, as the Supreme Court also noted in Freyholtz, the statute indicates that “where notice of injury is provided within 30 days from the occurrence of the injury, ‘no want, failure, or inaccuracy of a notice’ will bar compensation unless the employer shows prejudice.”  Id.

The employer and insurer argue that the employee did not show that the delayed notice was due to the employee’s mistake, inadvertence, ignorance of fact of the law, or due to the fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit of the employer.  However, the compensation judge found that the employee provided sufficient reasons for the delay in providing notice to Ms. Musack to satisfy the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 176.141.  Regardless of the discussion of Minn. Stat. § 176.141 and its application to notice given after 30 days, though, the compensation judge found the employee’s testimony persuasive regarding her report of the injury to the employer, and she did not feel that the remainder of the evidence discredited that testimony.  Again, while more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence presented here, the findings of the compensation judge are supported by substantial evidence with regard to notice, including the employee’s testimony.  Redgate, 421 N.W.2d at 734, 40 W.C.D. at 957.  As indicated above, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the compensation judge’s determination that the employer had timely notice of the work injury, and we affirm.