The employer and insurer appeal from the compensation judge’s determination that the employee sustained a Gillette injury^[1] to his right hip that culminated on October 3, 2011, and from the finding that the employee provided timely notice of his injury to the employer.  We affirm.

James Kranz began working for the Coca Cola Company as a delivery driver in 1997.  In this job, he delivered Coca Cola beverages and related products to bars, restaurants, grocery stores, and convenience stores in the Twin Cities Metro area.

Mr. Kranz drove a Freightliner truck pulling a single-axle trailer to make his deliveries.  The truck was already loaded when he began his day, and he would typically make 18 to 20 stops in a day.  The employee usually worked without a helper.

When he arrived at a stop, Mr. Kranz used doors in the side of the trailer to access the product he was delivering at that location. Cases of cans and bottles, and boxes of syrup, were stacked on the ground.  Mr. Kranz then placed the stack on a two-wheeled hand cart by kicking the cart under the stack.  Mr. Kranz testified that he usually used his right leg to kick the bottom of the hand cart as he pulled the top toward himself so as to balance the load on two wheels.  When loaded, the hand cart weighed between 50 and 100 pounds depending on the product being delivered.  It was not unusual for the employee to have to pull the hand cart up and over a curb or step to enter the delivery site.  In addition, some of his stops required him to deliver the product to a basement, and he would “bounce” the hand cart down the steps holding the two-wheeler back as it went down.  Cases of the product would then be stacked by Mr. Kranz as desired by the customer.

Mr. Kranz did this job for the employer since he was hired in 1997, and he was still performing all of the duties of the job as of the date of the hearing.

The employee testified that he had never had any problems or complaints with his hips before he began working for the employer in 1997.  In 1998, he noticed some slight right hip pain while he was pheasant hunting.  The pain did not interfere with his work or other activities, but he saw a chiropractor for about six months.

On March 22, 2010, Mr. Kranz saw Dr. Sue Mollner at the Allina Medical Clinic in Hastings.  He reported symptoms of intermittent right hip pain for the past 10 years, but stated that in the last few weeks he had been unable to sleep because of the pain.  He was also experiencing numbness in his right hand.  Dr. Mollner referred Mr. Kranz to Capitol Neurology for his right hand symptoms and to Summit Orthopedics for his right hip pain.

Mr. Kranz saw Dr. Neil Dahlquist at Capitol Neurology on March 29, 2010.  After a number of tests were completed, Mr. Kranz was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS).  He then began treatment with Dr. Dahlquist for this condition.  There is no indication in the record that this disease or treatment for MS has any involvement with the employee’s claimed work injury or right hip condition.

Mr. Kranz was seen by Dr. Paul Yellin at Summit Orthopedics on April 5, 2010.  The employee had been placed on steroid medication for his MS, and he noted that his right hip pain had improved.  Examination showed limited range of motion in both hips.  X-rays indicated moderate to severe arthritic changes in both hips and Dr. Yellin diagnosed “end-stage arthritis” in both hips.  Since the pain was controlled by the steroid medication he had received for his MS, no further treatment was provided by Dr. Yellin.

Mr. Kranz testified that his hip pain was worse in the summer of 2011 and he concluded at that time that his work was aggravating his right hip.  He discussed this with his immediate supervisor and then a distribution supervisor.  He was apparently told that if he felt his condition was work-related, paperwork would need to be completed.  The employee filed a first report of injury with the employer on September 12, 2011.

Mr. Kranz did not return to Dr. Yellin until October 3, 2011.  He reported to Dr. Yellin that his right hip pain had gotten progressively worse, and examination showed reduced range of motion when compared with the previous examination.  X-rays revealed complete loss of the joint space in the right hip.  Dr. Yellin discussed joint replacement surgery with Mr. Kranz, but decided to proceed with a therapeutic injection in the right hip.  No work restrictions were placed on Mr. Kranz.  In his chart note from that office visit, Dr. Yellin also stated,

The employee filed a claim petition in January 2012, alleging that he had sustained a Gillette injury to his right hip.

The employer and insurer had the employee evaluated by Dr. Paul Dworak on May 4, 2012.  Dr. Dworak diagnosed Mr. Kranz as having “advanced degenerative osteoarthritis of the right hip.”  His opinion was that the employee had not sustained a Gillette injury to his right hip, stating instead that the bilateral osteoarthritis was “most likely related to femoral acetabular impingement syndrome.”

The employee did not see Dr. Yellin again until October 8, 2012.  He told Dr. Yellin that his right hip pain had continued to worsen.  Dr. Yellin recommended hip replacement surgery.

The employee’s claims were heard by Compensation Judge Kathleen Behounek on November 8, 2012.  The employee was the only witness to testify at the hearing.  Dr. Yellin and Dr. Dworak provided deposition testimony.  In her findings and order of January 15, 2013, the compensation judge determined that the employee had sustained a Gillette injury to his right hip culminating on October 3, 2011, that the employee had given timely notice of his injury, and that the requested right hip replacement surgery was reasonable, necessary, and causally related to his work injury.  The employer and insurer have appealed the findings of a Gillette injury, the date of injury, and notice. The employer and insurer agree the hip replacement surgery is reasonable and necessary.

The employer and insurer make a number of arguments on appeal:  substantial evidence does not support the finding of a causal relationship between the employee’s work and his right hip condition; the compensation judge erred in finding the date of the Gillette injury to be October 3, 2011; the compensation judged erred in finding that the employee provided timely notice of his injury; and the compensation judge improperly expanded the issues at hearing.  We review each of these arguments in turn.

The first issue raised by the employer and insurer is whether substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s determination of a Gillette injury.  To prove a Gillette injury, an employee must establish “a causal connection between her ordinary work and ensuing disability.”  Steffen v. Target Stores, 517 N.W.2d 579, 581, 50 W.C.D. 464, 467 (Minn. 1994).  “The question of a Gillette injury primarily depends on medical evidence.”  Morose v. Maislin Transport, 413 N.W.2d 507, 512, 40 W.C.D. 175, 182 (Minn. 1987).  We have previously held that a medical opinion with adequate foundation will support a compensation judge’s finding as to the existence of a Gillette injury.  Stevens v. AAA Cooper Transport, 65 W.C.D. 431 (W.C.C.A. 2005); Dillon v. Pennco Constr., No. WC08-127 (W.C.C.A. Sept. 5, 2008).

In the present case, the compensation judge was presented with opposing medical opinions on the appropriate diagnosis as well as the causal relationship between the employee’s work as a delivery driver and his right hip condition.  Dr. Yellin diagnosed the employee as having “end-stage osteoarthritis,” and concluded that the employee’s job had aggravated the condition of his right hip so as to require total hip replacement surgery.  Dr. Dworak instead concluded that the employee’s diagnosis was “advanced arthritis of bilateral hips, the right more severe than the left,” as a result of a congenital condition he identified as “a CAM femoroacetabular impingement syndrome, along with associated acetabular dysplasia of his right hip.”  In Dr. Dworak’s opinion, Mr. Kranz’s job or physical activity had nothing to do with his right hip problems.

In her memorandum, the compensation judge stated that she was accepting “the opinions of the employee’s treating physician, Dr. Yellin, that the employee’s condition was exacerbated by repeated work activities resulting in a Gillette-type injury.  Dr. Yellin’s description of the employee’s mechanism of injury is consistent with the employee’s symptoms and imaging results.”  In their appeal, the employer and insurer acknowledge that, pursuant to Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337, 37 W.C.D. 364 (Minn. 1985), it is the province of the compensation judge to choose between competing medical opinions.  Notwithstanding this rule, the appellants argue that the compensation judge erred in relying on Dr. Yellin’s opinion.

The employer and insurer question whether Dr. Yellin had adequate foundation for his opinion.  They allege that his opinion was based in part on an assumption that the employee was jumping down from his truck, an assumption they claim is incorrect, and that Dr. Yellin was not aware of the employee’s history of weight lifting, including doing deep knee bends.

On the question of Dr. Yellin’s knowledge of the physical requirements of the employee’s job with the employer, we disagree with the appellants’ assessment.  Dr. Yellin was provided a detailed hypothetical by the employee’s attorney at his deposition, setting out the employee’s duties.  In addition, the employee completed a form his attorney had prepared setting out the physical requirements of his job.  That five-page form, titled “Physical Demands Analysis,” had been provided to Dr. Yellin as well.  Finally, Dr. Yellin was shown pictures of the truck and trailer used by the employee.  We conclude Dr. Yellin had ample information as to the employee’s job so as to establish foundation for an opinion on causation.  We also note parenthetically that the photos demonstrate the lower of the two steps used to get out of the truck cab is at the level of the employee’s knees or slightly above.  “Jumping” does not appear to be an inaccurate word to describe what would be required for the employee to exit the cab.

At Dr. Yellin’s deposition and in the hypothetical question provided to Dr. Dworak, the attorney for the employer and insurer presented information about the employee’s weight lifting at a health club as well as his previous employment for a trash disposal company.  Neither doctor found these activities to be significant. Dr. Yellin specifically concluded that these activities were not as significant as the employee’s 14-year work history for the employer, and Dr. Dworak was of the opinion that the employee’s right hip condition was due to congenital factors and not related to any physical activity.

Finally, the employer and insurer argue on appeal, as they did before the compensation judge, that the opinion of Dr. Dworak, not Dr. Yellin, should have been accepted.  However, it is not the function of this court to parse the evidence and reach a conclusion as to what this court would have decided if we were the fact finder.  Our task is to determine whether the compensation judge’s decision is based on a medical opinion with adequate foundation.  If so, we will generally affirm the compensation judge.  Smith v. Quebecor Printing Co., 63 W.C.D. 566 (W.C.C.A. 2003).  We see no reason to diverge from the general rule in the present case.

The employer and insurer also contend that this matter should, at the least, be remanded for further consideration because the compensation judge failed to provide sufficient explanation for her choice of Dr. Yellin’s opinion.  For support, they refer to a recent decision by this court, McCarney v. Malt-O-Meal Co., 73 W.C.D. 171 (W.C.C.A. 2013).  In McCarney, however, the case was remanded because it appeared the compensation judge relied on the opinions of a doctor who had an incorrect opinion as to when an aggravation of a preexisting condition becomes a compensable injury.  We find that McCarney has no relevance to the present case.

More specifically, this court has not required a compensation judge to explain why he or she accepted or rejected particular evidence.  Jacobson v. Metropolitan Corp., 70 W.C.D. 117 (W.C.C.A. 2010).  The record before us, the findings of the compensation judge, and her memorandum provide an adequate record to permit us to review whether substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s decision.  Hart v. Evtac Mining Co., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Oct. 31, 2005).

The compensation judge’s determination that the employee sustained a Gillette injury to his right hip as the result of his employment is supported by substantial evidence when reviewing the entire record as a whole and it is affirmed.

The compensation judge determined that the employee’s injury culminated on October 3, 2011.  The appellants contend that the compensation judge erred in reaching this conclusion and argue that the date of October 3, 2011, does not correlate with any ascertainable event.

In Schnurrer v. Hoerner-Waldorf, 345 N.W.2d 230, 233, 36 W.C.D. 504, 508 (Minn. 1984), the court noted that there could be a number of ascertainable events in a case and the date when the employee “had sustained those injuries should be determined on all the evidence bearing on that issue.”  A finding as to the time of a Gillette injury is one of fact for the compensation judge, and this court has generally affirmed the compensation judge when that determination is based on substantial evidence.  Pettis v. Metal Matic, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Jan. 18, 2000); Furey v. Grand Itasca Clinic & Hosp., No. WC06-207 (W.C.C.A. Dec. 5, 2006); Cramer v. United Parcel Servs., 72 W.C.D. 519 (W.C.C.A. 2012).

Following the rationale of Schnurrer and our mandate to affirm a compensation judge’s factual findings when they are supported by substantial evidence, we have affirmed a compensation judge’s determination of the date of a Gillette injury as being when the employee first required medical treatment for the injury, Shaffer v. The Minnesota Orchestra, 53 W.C.D. 341 (W.C.C.A. 1995); when the employee’s treating doctor related the condition to her employment, Neff v. Supervalu, Inc., 71 W.C.D. 217 (W.C.C.A. 2011); when the employee’s symptoms recurred after they had previously subsided, Giesbrecht v. Interplastic Corp., 64 W.C.D. 30 (W.C.C.A. 2003); and when the employee sought regular medical care even though no significant time from work had been lost, Cramer v. United Parcel Servs., 72 W.C.D. 519 (W.C.C.A. 2012).

The employee saw his family doctor on March 25, 2010 for right hip pain as well as numbness in his right hand.  He was referred to a neurologist who diagnosed MS and started the employee on oral prednisone.  As a result, when he saw Dr. Yellin for the first time on April 5, 2010, his right hip pain had improved, and Dr. Yellin provided no treatment.  It was not until October 3, 2011, when he saw Dr. Yellin again, that the employee received any medical treatment for his right hip.  It is also the first time the employee had been advised by a medical doctor that his condition was aggravated by work.  During all of this time, the employee had continued to perform his regular duties.  Given this evidence, we conclude the determination of the compensation judge that the employee’s Gillette injury culminated on October 3, 2011, is supported by substantial evidence, and the compensation judge’s determination on this issue is affirmed.

The appellants argue that the employee failed to give timely notice of his injury as required by Minn. Stat. § 176.141.  The uncontroverted evidence on this point is that the employee told his supervisors in the summer of 2011 that he believed his work was aggravating his right hip and a first report of injury was filed in September 2011.

The appellants’ argument on this point is based on their claim that if a Gillette injury were found, the appropriate date of injury would be March 25, 2010.  We have concluded earlier in this decision that the compensation judge’s determination of an injury date of October 3, 2011, is supported by substantial evidence.  Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s finding that the employee provided timely notice of his injury.

In Finding 2 of her findings and order, the compensation judge stated, “the employee worked as a driver for Waste Management from 1989 until 1997.  The employee did not have significant hip pain through that period of that employment.”  The employer and insurer argue on appeal that the compensation judge improperly expanded the issues at hearing and considered the potential liability of a non-party employer.  We disagree.

The attorney for the employer and insurer asked Dr. Yellin on cross-examination about the employee’s physical activity when he worked for Waste Management and asked specifically about the employee “hopping down approximately two feet daily on various terrains of asphalt and gravel daily.”  The written hypothetical provided to Dr. Dworak also referenced in some detail the physical requirements of the Waste Management job.

The employer and insurer raised the issue of whether the employee’s work for Waste Management could be considered an aggravating factor in his right hip condition.  The compensation judge did not err or expand the issues at the hearing in making her findings.