The employee appeals from the compensation judge’s decision that she failed to give timely notice of injury as specified in Minn. Stat. § 176.141.  We affirm.

The employee began working as a director of institutional sales for Paul A. Schmitt Music Company [the employer] in 1999 or 2000.^[1]  Her job involved selling musical instruments to schools and other facilities.  Her office was located in the Galleria, in Edina, not far from her home.  She traveled frequently by car to meet with clients, and she also drove regularly to the employer’s warehouse in Brooklyn Center to check on inventory.  Her compensation was commission-based, and she had no set hours of work.

On Wednesday, March 11, 2009, the car the employee was driving was rear ended as the employee was stopped at a traffic light about four blocks from her office.  Police records indicate that the employee called the Edina police to report the accident at 3:07 p.m. that day, and an officer arrived at the accident scene shortly thereafter to prepare a report.  The employee testified that the accident occurred as she was traveling back to her office following a trip to the Brooklyn Center warehouse.  She further testified that, because she was shaken up in the accident, she went home rather than returning to her office as planned.

The employee reported for work the next morning as usual.  When she told a coworker about the accident, that coworker advised her to seek medical care to protect her health and her right to insurance coverage.^[2]  The employee then went to the emergency department of Fairview Southdale, where she was seen by Dr. James Moe.  Dr. Moe prescribed Vicodin for pain and advised the employee to rest and follow up with her usual physician.  He also instructed the employee not to drive while taking the Vicodin.

After being seen at the hospital, the employee returned to her office to pick up some materials to use to work from home.  The employee testified that, at that time, around noon the day after the accident, she called Beth Palmer, the employer’s benefits administrator, to report the accident, explaining to Ms. Palmer that she had been traveling between the warehouse and her Galleria office when the collision occurred.  According to the employee, Ms. Palmer ended the conversation abruptly after informing the employee that the accident was not work-related and that she should contact her automobile insurer.  The employee subsequently retained an attorney and applied for no-fault benefits.  Ms. Palmer denies having ever received a call from the employee about the accident.

On the evening of Sunday, March 15, 2009, four days after the accident, the employee sent an email to Ms. Palmer, advising her that she would not be at work the next day because of the accident.  The employee ultimately returned to her usual job duties, but she continued to receive treatment for ongoing neck and shoulder symptoms.

On June 7, 2009, about three months after the accident, the employee sent Ms. Palmer an email in which she listed various sales she had made and the commissions owing for those sales.  At the end of the email, the employee asked if she would have to take vacation for a medical appointment to treat the continuing effects of the March accident.

The employee was terminated from her employment with her employer in early January 2011.  Ten months later, in October 2011, the employee filed a claim petition alleging entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits related to her March 2009 automobile accident.  She testified that she had waited as long as she did to make a claim because she did not want to cause trouble at work.  The employer and insurer denied that the accident had occurred in the course and scope of the employee’s employment^[3] and asserted that the employee had not provided the employer with timely notice of the injury.

The matter came on for hearing before a compensation judge on October 4, 2012.  Issues included primary liability and notice as well as the extent of the employee’s disability and the specific nature of the injuries.  The employee, Ms. Palmer, and a coworker testified at hearing.  Documentary evidence included the employee’s medical records, certain wage and personnel records, and copies of the employee’s two emails to Ms. Palmer.  Following the hearing, the compensation judge concluded that the automobile accident and the employee’s resulting injuries were work-related.  He also concluded, however, that the claim was barred because the employee had not given timely notice of injury as specified by statute.  The employee appeals.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1 (2012).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

Minn. Stat. § 176.141 provides as follows:

The employee testified that she called Ms. Palmer, the employer’s benefits administrator, on March 12, 2009, after being seen at the emergency room, and that she told Ms. Palmer that her car accident had occurred while she was returning to the office from the employer’s warehouse in Brooklyn Center.  Ms. Palmer, on the other hand, maintains that she never talked to the employee about the accident that day and that she would have remembered such a conversation, had it occurred, because she sees only a handful of workers’ compensation claims per year.  The compensation judge expressly found Ms. Palmer’s testimony to be more credible on this issue.  Credibility assessments are generally for the compensation judge, see Even v. Kraft, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 831, 42 W.C.D. 220 (Minn. 1989), and we find no basis to reverse the judge’s decision on this point here.

The employee also contends that, even aside from the disputed telephone call, the remaining evidence, especially the employee’s email to Ms. Palmer, compels the conclusion that the employer had actual knowledge of the work-related nature of the employee’s car accident.  This is a closer issue but, ultimately, we are not persuaded.

The email the employee sent to Ms. Palmer on March 15, 2009, four days after the automobile accident, has a subject line reading “tomorrow” and reads, in its entirety, as follows:

“Actual knowledge” has been defined as information that a reasonable person would act upon in the ordinary course of affairs.  Rinne v. W.C. Griffis Co., 234 Minn. 146, 47 N.W.2d 872, 16 W.C.D. 348 (1951).  However, “for actual knowledge to exist, an employer must have some information connecting work activity with an injury . . . .  It is simply not enough that the employer is aware that an employee [is experiencing symptoms].”  Issacson v. Minnetonka, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 865, 867, 40 W.C.D. 270, 273 (Minn. 1987).  In the present case, we cannot conclude that the compensation judge erred as a matter of law in finding the email communications from the employee to Ms. Palmer insufficient to establish actual knowledge, especially given the brevity of the notes, the fact that there were only two such emails over the course of many months prior to the employee’s termination, and the fact that Ms. Palmer was the employer’s payroll administrator as well as the employer’s benefits administrator.^[4]

In his memorandum, the compensation judge explained his conclusion on this issue as follows:

Given the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the judge’s decision is clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence, and we affirm.