ROBERT GALCERAN, Employee, v. CENTIMARK and CRAWFORD & CO./BROADSPIRE SERVS., INC., Employer-Insurer/Appellants, and DOHERTY STAFFING SOLUTIONS and WAUSAU UNDERWRITERS INS. CO., Employer-Insurer.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT OF APPEALS
SEPTEMBER 4, 2013

No. WC13-5574

HEADNOTES

APPEALS - INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.  The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 176.421 to consider a party’s appeal from an order denying its motion for dismissal of a petition for contribution and reimbursement before a hearing.

Dismissed.

Determined by:  Milun, C.J., Stofferahn, J., and Cervantes, J.
Compensation Judge:  Danny P. Kelly

Attorneys:  Michael D. Miller and Jeffrey R. Homuth, McCollum, Crowley, Moschet, Miller & Laak, Minneapolis, MN, for the Appellants.  Erin E. Lord and Jeffrey B. Nelson, Erstad & Riemer, Minneapolis, MN, for the Respondents.

 

OPINION

PATRICIA J. MILUN, Chief Judge

Centimark and its insurer appeal the compensation judge’s order denying their motion to dismiss the petition for contribution and reimbursement.  We grant Doherty and its insurer’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

On November 6, 2009, Robert Galceran, the employee, sustained a work injury in the nature of carpal tunnel syndrome while working for Doherty Staffing Solutions (Doherty), which was insured for workers’ compensation liability by Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company.  Doherty and its insurer accepted liability and paid temporary total disability benefits, medical expenses, and rehabilitation expenses.  The employee reached maximum medical improvement and was released to return to work without restrictions.  The employee’s temporary total disability benefits ceased on March 22, 2010, and his employment with Doherty was terminated on the same day.  On March 29, 2010, he was hired as a roofer by Centimark, which was insured for workers’ compensation liability by Crawford & Company, administered by Broadspire Services, Inc.

In August 2010, Doherty voluntarily reinstated temporary total disability benefits when the employee experienced a recurrence of his carpal tunnel symptoms.  The next month, the employee was examined by his primary physician, Dr. Michael Forseth, who opined that the liability for the employee’s carpal tunnel condition after August 16, 2010, was equally apportioned between the two employers.  Doherty filed a petition for a temporary order for payment of benefits on October 27, 2010.  The temporary order was issued on November 24, 2010.  On June 8, 2011, Doherty filed a petition for contribution and reimbursement against Centimark, seeking fifty percent of all benefits paid after Aug. 16, 2010.  Centimark objected to the petition for contribution.

In the fall of 2011, Doherty and the employee negotiated a full, final, and complete settlement leaving medical expenses open.  A partial award on stipulation was served and filed on December 21, 2011.  On January 17, 2012, the employee filed a new claim petition against Centimark for a July 27, 2010, date of injury, seeking benefits for the recurrence of carpal tunnel syndrome.  Centimark denied primary liability.  The claim petition and the petition for contribution were subsequently consolidated for hearing on February 8, 2012.  Before the hearing, Centimark and the employee settled on a full, final, and complete basis, including medical expenses.  An award on stipulation was served and filed on July 19, 2012.  A few weeks later, Centimark filed a motion to dismiss the petition for contribution.  Doherty objected to the motion to dismiss the petition, and a hearing on the motion was held on January 28, 2013.  Compensation Judge Danny Kelly denied the motion for dismissal of the petition.  Centimark appealed to this court.  Doherty filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and Centimark objected.

DECISION

The issue before this court is whether the compensation judge’s order denying a motion to dismiss a petition for contribution and reimbursement is presently appealable.

The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals is a court of limited statewide jurisdiction, the scope of which is governed by statute.[1]  With limited exceptions, there is no right of immediate appeal from an interlocutory order by a compensation judge.[2]  Here, the order denying dismissal by the compensation judge did not conclusively determine the disputed question on liability, nor did it resolve an issue completely separate from the merits of the claim.  Appeals of interlocutory orders that bypass dismissal are rare and this case does not meet an extraordinary circumstance to warrant an exception.  The order denying dismissal will be effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment by the compensation judge on the petition for contribution.[3]

We conclude the compensation judge’s order is an interlocutory order that does not prevent a later determination on the merits of the case.  The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 176.421 to consider Centimark and its insurer’s appeal from the order denying their motion for dismissal of the petition prior to the record hearing.  The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted and the appeal dismissed.



[1] Minn. Stat. § 175A.01, subd. 5.

[2] Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1 (appeals to this court may be taken from “an award or disallowance of compensation, or other order affecting the merits of the case”).

[3] See Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1; Mierau v. Alcon Indus., Inc., 386 N.W.2d 741, 38 W.C.D. 652 (Minn. 1986); Johnson v. Midwest Precision Machining, 71 W.C.D. 105 (W.C.C.A. 2011) (orders that do not prevent a later determination on the merits are not appealable).