The employee appeals from the compensation judge’s determination that he refused a suitable job and from the resulting decision that temporary total disability benefits should be discontinued pursuant to Minn. Stat. §176.101, subd. 1(i).  We affirm.

The employer, Loop Parking Company, provides parking lot management services for parking facilities.  In 2005, the employer hired the employee, Yusuf M. Ahmed, and assigned him to work full time in the day shift at a parking facility known as Lot 20.  After the employee had worked in this assignment for about six years, the employer lost the account for Lot 20.  Rather than lay the employee off, the employer offered him a temporary night shift assignment at another lot, covering for the absence of an employee who was on extended medical leave.  The employee accepted the job, but testified that he hoped to be returned to day hours once the temporary assignment ended.

On January 21, 2012, the employee sustained an admitted work injury to his right knee and had right knee surgery on October 23, 2012.  On December 6, 2012, the employee was released to work by Dr. Nancy Luger, who restricted the employee to sedentary work for the next four weeks, with no running to retrieve cars.  On December 12, 2012, the employer contacted the employee’s QRC for clarification on what Dr. Luger considered sedentary work.  The QRC responded by email providing a definition of sedentary work from the U.S. Department of Labor.

On December 14, 2012, Fred Gefre, the employee’s general manager, called the employee and left a voicemail message offering the employee a job which had opened up on the night shift.  A written description of the job offer was emailed to the employee’s QRC by the employer on the same date.  The job offered was as a parking lot attendant, primarily cashiering while seated on a high chair.  The employee was required to do some minimal walking at the beginning and end of each shift to retrieve tickets from electronic ticket dispensers, and to tag any vehicles left over at the end of the shift.  The employer noted that the job was one with which the employee was quite familiar as it was at a lot across the street from one he previously worked at.  The employee does not dispute that the job was within his restrictions.

The employee called back on Saturday, December 15, stating that he would need at least until Monday to arrange for child care.  He called again on Monday, December 17, reporting that he was having difficulty in making child care arrangements.  The employer needed to fill the position and told the employee that they needed his answer by December 24, 2012.  The employee agreed to let them know by that date.

On December 22, 2012, the employee went to Group Health Urgent Care complaining of pain in his right upper back and shoulder.  The employee attributed the pain to using a cane for his right knee problems.  He was diagnosed with a muscle and tendon problem.  Flexeril was prescribed for muscle spasm and physical therapy was recommended.  No work restrictions were imposed.

The employee called Fred Gefre from the clinic on December 22, 2012, after his appointment.  There is contradictory testimony over what was said during that conversation.  It is undisputed that one topic of the telephone call was the employee’s concern over whether workers’ compensation would pay for the medication that had been prescribed at the urgent care appointment.  Mr. Gefre told him that he would need to contact his lawyer or “the work comp people.”  Mr. Gefre further testified that the employee told him that he was having new health issues and would not be able to take the part-time job that had been offered.  The employee, on the other hand, testified that he never told Mr. Gefre that he couldn’t take the job.

There is no evidence of any other communications from the employee to the employer either accepting or refusing the job offer.  On December 24, 2102, Mr. Gefre sent an email to the employee’s QRC advising him that the employee “was unable to return to work at the position we offered him” and that the employer had to fill the position with another employee.

On January 24, 2013, the employer and insurer filed a notice of intent to discontinue workers’ compensation benefits based on the employee’s refusal of suitable work.  A compensation judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings issued an Order on Discontinuance on March 7, 2013, granting discontinuance.  The employee filed an Objection to Discontinuance, resulting in the hearing below before Compensation Judge Gary P. Mesna.  Following that hearing, the judge found that the employee had refused an offer of work pursuant to Minn. Stat. §176.101, subd. 1(i), and granted discontinuance of temporary total disability compensation.  The employee appeals.

Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 1(i), provides that temporary total disability benefits shall cease if the employee refuses an offer of work consistent with a plan of rehabilitation filed with the commissioner or, in the absence of such a plan, if the employee refuses an offer of suitable employment that the employee can do in his physical condition.  The employee’s refusal of a job offer may be construed where it is clearly apparent from the employee’s conduct such as when there is an unjustifiable and intentional failure to respond to the job offer in a reasonable time.  Opsahl v. K & S Heating, No. WC06-134 (W.C.C.A. August 15, 2006).

The employee contends on appeal that the compensation judge’s determination was unsupported by substantial evidence, alleging that, “any statement from the Employee that he would not or could not take the job” is “[m]arkedly absent from the trial testimony or exhibits.”  Employee Brief at 5.  This is not entirely accurate, since the employer’s general manager, Fred Gefre, testified that the employee had told him by telephone on December 22, 2012, that he was unable to take the offered job.  Although the employee disagrees that he so stated, the question of which version of the conversation was more credible was one committed to the compensation judge.

The compensation judge noted that, regardless of the specifics of the conversation that day, the employee had offered no evidence, whether by testimony or otherwise, to indicate that he had accepted the job offer, or asked for further extension to decide, by December 24, 2012, the date by which the employee and employer had both agreed that an answer needed to be given.  The judge concluded that “[i]t is reasonable to consider it a refusal of the job offer when the employee did not accept the job by the deadline, request an extension of time, or provide medical documentation of [an] inability to return to work.”  Memorandum at 4.

The employee counters that the employer’s email to the QRC on December 24, 2012, noting that the employee had been unable to return to work in the offered job, constituted a unilateral withdrawal of the job offer before the end of the agreed date for an answer, so that it would have been impossible for the employee to refuse or accept.  We note, however, that even if we were to construe the email’s language as a potential withdrawal of the offer, there was no evidence to suggest that the employee was made aware of and deterred by the language of the email sent to his QRC, or that he made any attempt to accept the offer by the close of that day.  Under the specific facts in this case, we cannot conclude that the judge erred in concluding that the employee had constructively refused the job offer when he failed to accept it by the mutually agreed deadline.

The employee next argues that the discontinuance was legally unsupported because the evidence before the compensation judge failed to include a rehabilitation plan, so that it would have been impossible for the judge to assess whether the job offer was one which was consistent with a rehabilitation plan.  We note, however, that there was also no evidence that a rehabilitation plan had in fact been filed.  Accordingly, the compensation judge did not err in construing the issue before him simply as one whether the offered job was one which the employee could physically perform in his disabled condition.

Finally, the employee points out that case law has emphasized that the question of a job offer and its acceptance or rejection must be viewed in the context of what is reasonable under the facts and circumstances.  He argues that the nine days he was given to decide whether to accept or reject the offer was an unreasonably short period in light of his limited English language skills and his need to obtain day care.  However, the employee did not allege at the hearing that he did not understand the job offer or the timing of an acceptance of that job because of any language difficulty.  Further, the employee did not testify that he had been unable to arrange child care within the nine-day period.  The employee was already very familiar with the job duties, having performed essentially the same work for the employer since 2005.  Overall, we cannot say that the compensation judge clearly erred in finding that nine days was reasonable period of time for the employee to respond to the employer’s job offer.

Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s decision and it is affirmed.