RYAN JANIKOWSKI, Employee, v. RYAN JANIKOWSKI and VANLINER INS. CO., Employer-Insurer/Appellants, and CONSULTING RADIOLOGISTS, DOCKTER-LUTZ CHIROPRACTIC, and NORAN NEUROLOGICAL CLINIC, Intervenors.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT OF APPEALS
FEBRUARY 29, 2012
No. WC11-5325
CAUSATION - SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. Where the compensation judge reasonably concluded from the records of two doctors that the employee’s injury was something other than a mere temporary contusion that did not rise to the level of an injury, the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee sustained a work-related injury on August 26, 2009, was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY - BACK; STATUTES CONSTRUED - MINN. R. 5223.0390, SUBP. 3.C.(2). Where, although she may not have directly quoted specific medical findings directly responsive to the language of the permanency schedules, the compensation judge did identify in the medical record certain indicators reasonably associated with the language of the schedules, the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee’s condition satisfied the schedule’s requirement of “persistent objective clinical findings” was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
WAGES - CALCULATION; WAGES - SELF-EMPLOYMENT. The compensation judge’s calculation of the employee’s pre-injury wage, imputing to the employee a hypothetical wage of $1,000 a week based on the amount he paid his workers to perform the same physical work he was performing, is legally erroneous and contrary to the supreme court’s holding in Jellum v. McGough Constr. Co., Inc., 479 N.W.2d 718, 46 W.C.D. 182 (Minn. 1992). An employee’s wage from self-employment may be determined with reference to the annual net income of the employee’s business, Newbauer v. Pepsi Bottling Group, 43 W.C.D. 339 (W.C.C.A. 1990), to the employee’s income tax returns, Wallak v. Ace Plumbing & Heating 42 W.C.D. 772 (W.C.C.A. 1990), or to an imputed wage based on what it would cost to hire someone to do the work performed by the employee, but only if it does not exceed the earnings of the employee’s business. Egan v. Shannon’s Plumbing & Heating, 61 W.C.D. 580 (W.C.C.A. 2001). The compensation judge’s wage finding is reversed and remanded for reconsideration and new findings.
MEDICAL TREATMENT & EXPENSE - REASONABLE & NECESSARY. Where the treating physician had indicated that he considered the employee’s August 2009 injury to have been an exacerbation of the employee’s 2007 injury, the doctor’s statement that he related certain recent treatment of the employee’s condition “ultimately” to the 2007 injury did not imply that the doctor considered that treatment unrelated to the employee’s August 26, 2009, injury, and the compensation judge’s award of medical benefits was not clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.
REHABILITATION - SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. Substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee remains restricted by his work injuries and is entitled to a rehabilitation consultation.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
Determined by: Johnson, J., Wilson, J., and Milun, C.J.
Compensation Judge: Penny Johnson
Attorneys: Donald W. Kohler, White Bear Lake, MN, for the Respondent. Thomas L. Cummings and Nancy M. Aboyan, Jardine, Logan & O’Brien, Lake Elmo, MN, for the Appellants.
MAJORITY OPINION
THOMAS L. JOHNSON, Judge
The employer and insurer appeal from the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee sustained a low back injury on August 26, 2009, that arose out of and in the course of his employment, from the judge’s awards of permanent partial disability and medical benefits, from the judge’s award of a rehabilitation consultation, and from the judge’s finding as to the employee’s weekly wage. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
From about 2002 to 2005, Ryan Janikowski, the employee, performed household moving services for Mohawk Moving & Storage Company while driving a truck owned by another individual. In 2005, the employee formed his own company, leasing for purchase first one and eventually two trucks to perform the same services for Mohawk.
In the course of his self-employment, on March 6, 2007, the employee sustained a work-related injury to his back, for which he obtained chiropractic treatment for about three months beginning March 10, 2007, from chiropractors at Dockter-Lutz Chiropractic. Mr. Janikowski’s workers’ compensation insurer, Vanliner Insurance Company, admitted liability for the injury and ultimately commenced payment of benefits based on a weekly wage of $1,133.86. The employee evidently received chiropractic treatment again for a back problem beginning on or about February 6, 2008, but he did not receive any wage replacement benefits at that time. About a year later, on March 6, 2009, while still similarly self-employed, the employee sustained another admitted work-related back injury. Following this injury, he was for several weeks intermittently disabled from work, again undergoing chiropractic treatment with the chiropractors at Dockter-Lutz Chiropractic. The employee continued to work, however, and, on June 25, 2009, the insurer filed an amended Notice of Intention to Discontinue benefits on that basis. On August 5, 2009, the employee filed a medical request, seeking approval of a lumbar MRI scan and payment of certain chiropractic bills that exceeded his twelve-week limit under the treatment parameters.
The employee alleged that on August 26, 2009, while still self-employed, he sustained another injury to his low back when he fell from the top rung of a six-foot ladder. About two weeks after the alleged injury, the employee saw Dr. Kelly McTeague at Express Healthcare, who ordered x-rays which were read to be “o.k.” Dr. McTeague diagnosed back pain and prescribed ibuprofen. The doctor declined to recommend restrictions in light of the employee’s having worked for two weeks since his claimed injury, but referred the employee for further evaluation with regard to his limitations. On September 16, the employee saw a physician’s assistant at Twin Cities Occupational Health who issued physical restrictions. A medical conference was held on the employee’s medical request on September 17, 2009.
On September 21, 2009, the employee filed a claim petition, alleging entitlement to compensation for Gillette-type injuries[1] and/or acute injuries to his low back sustained on March 6, 2007, February 6, 2008, March 6, 2009, and/or August 26, 2009. Benefits requested in the petition included a rehabilitation consultation and possibly retraining, temporary total disability benefits continuing from August 26, 2009, and undetermined permanent partial disability benefits. On October 1, 2009, an arbitrator/mediator issued her decision on the employee’s medical request, granting the employee’s request for both the MRI scan and payment of the chiropractic expenses, consequent to his admitted low back injury of March 6, 2009. On October 2, 2009, the employer and insurer filed an answer to the employee’s claim petition, in part denying primary liability for any 2008 injury and for any injury on August 26, 2009. The employer and insurer admitted injuries on March 6, 2007, and March 6, 2009, but it asserted that those injuries were temporary and had resolved, that all due benefits had been paid, and that, due to the employee’s return to work without notice prior to June 12, 2009, the employee had been overpaid temporary total disability benefits. On October 23, 2009, the employer and insurer filed a request for formal hearing with regard to the arbitrator/mediator’s decision of October 1, 2009.
On November 9, 2009, the employee underwent the awarded lumbar MRI scan, which was read to reveal mild disc bulging from L2-3 through L4-5 and a broad-based disc protrusion at L5-S1 with an associated annular tear that was contacting but not compressing the left S1 nerve root. On November 23, 2009, the employee saw osteopath Dr. Ronald Tarrel at the Noran Neurological Clinic, to whom the employee complained of ongoing low back discomfort radiating into the left lower extremity. Upon examination, Dr. Tarrel noted a normal gait and no evidence of incoordination but weakness in the left lower extremity with dorsiflection and inversion of the left ankle. Dr. Tarrel diagnosed chronic lumbar sprain consequent to the work injuries in February 2007 and August 2009, with objective weakness and radiating left lower extremity symptoms consistent with an L5 radiculopathy.
On November 30, 2009, the employee was examined for the insurer by orthopedic surgeon Dr. Paul Wicklund. In his report on December 2, 2009, Dr. Wicklund indicated that he had found “MRI evidence for left L5-S1 disk herniation [but] without objective neurologic findings.” Although he also found “slight increased sensation in the L5 nerve root distribution on the left” and “slight increased sensation in the distribution of the S1 nerve root on the left,” it was Dr. Wicklund’s opinion that the employee did not sustain any permanent injury to his lower back either on August 26, 2009, or on any of the previous three dates of admitted and alleged injury. It was Dr. Wicklund’s opinion that the employee sustained a contusion on August 26, 2009, but that that injury had not required any treatment or restrictions. Dr. Wicklund opined further that the employee had reached maximum medical improvement [MMI] with regard to his March 6, 2009, injury on June 6, 2009.
On April 4, 2010, Dr. Tarrel reviewed the December 2, 2009, report of Dr. Wicklund, the records of Dockter-Lutz Chiropractic, a report and CD of surveillance taken of the employee’s activities, and various other recent treatment and diagnostic records. In his report on that date, Dr. Tarrel indicated that the employee’s primary work-related injury had occurred on March 6, 2007, rather than in February 2007. He opined that the employee had sustained exacerbations of that injury on subsequent dates that had ultimately resulted in a permanent condition, the most significant of those exacerbations having occurred on August 26, 2009. It was Dr. Tarrel’s opinion that, consequent to work injuries stemming back to March 6, 2007, the employee had sustained a permanent partial disability of 13% of the whole body - - 10% for a multilevel lumbar pain syndrome under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 3.C.(2), and an additional 3% for a lumbar radicular syndrome under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 4.D.(1). Dr. Tarrel further opined that the employee should remain restricted to only moderate lifting and that all chiropractic treatments related to the employee’s lumbar condition since March 6, 2007, together with the MRI scan and evaluation received by the employee at Occupational Health and all treatment for his injuries at the Noran Clinic, were reasonable and necessary to cure or relieve the employee’s work injuries.
In June 2011, Dr. Wicklund issued a supplementary report, in which he indicated that his review of more recent records from Dockter-Lutz Chiropractic and the Noran Neurological Clinic did not alter his previous opinion - - that the employee had reached MMI without any permanent impairment with regard to his work injuries, that the employee did not require any physical restrictions, and that no ongoing medical or chiropractic treatment or diagnostic MRI scan was reasonable or necessary with regard to any of the employee’s work injuries. Dr. Wicklund explained that his permanency conclusion was based on his observation of no objective physical findings.
All matters were consolidated for hearing on June 7, 2011. Issues at hearing included the following: (1) did the employee sustain an injury to his low back arising out of and in the course of his employment on or about August 26, 2009; (2) if so, had the effects of that injury resolved; (3) did the employee sustain a permanent partial disability of 13% of the whole body related to his low back; (4) was the employee entitled to a rehabilitation consultation; (5) what was the employee’s weekly wage at the time of his admitted or alleged work injuries on March 6, 2007, February 6, 2008, March 6, 2009, and August 26, 2009; and (6) were the expenses of the employee’s treatment at five named providers reasonably required as a result of an injury on August 26, 2009. No claims for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, or overpayment of wage loss benefits were submitted to the compensation judge at the hearing.
In addition to his own testimony, evidence offered at hearing by the employee included documentation indicating that wages paid to teamsters union semi-trailer truck drivers employed in Minnesota range from $20.01 to $27.00 per hour - - or from $800.40 to $1,080 per week. The employee also offered into evidence his federal income tax returns for years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Schedule C[2] of the returns indicated in part that the employee had gross business income of $238,311 for 2006, $304,797 for 2007, $391,587 for 2008, and $84,044 for 2009. In 2006, the employee reported that he had $11,966 in net profit and paid $51,920 in contract and casual wages, that in 2007 he earned $13,541 in net profit and paid $88,458 in contract and casual wages, that in 2008 he earned $16,328 in net profit and paid $104,780 in contract and casual wages, and that in 2009 he had a net business loss and paid $11,358 in casual wages. The employee also offered into evidence a document from the Minnesota Department of Employment Development titled “Occupations in Demand,” which indicated that the median annual wage for heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers in Minnesota is $43,708 per year.
Evidence offered at hearing by the employer and insurer included the testimony of Qualified Rehabilitation Consultant Michael Kahnke that, in his opinion, a reasonable approximation of the employee’s weekly wage on the dates of injury at issue could only be based on the Schedule C that the employee submitted each year to the Internal Revenue Service with his tax returns. Mr. Kahnke testified further that the documentation of teamsters wages submitted into evidence by the employee would have no bearing on the employee’s earning capacity on the dates of his injuries, because the employee was not a member of the teamsters.
By findings and order filed August 1, 2011, as amended October 4, 2011, the compensation judge concluded in part as follows: that the employee did sustain a compensable injury to his low back on August 26, 2009; that all treatment at issue had been reasonable and necessary and causally related to that injury; that the effects of the August 26, 2009, injury had not yet resolved; that the employee had sustained a permanent partial disability of 10% of the whole body related to that injury; that the employee’s wages in his self-employment were difficult to determine, but a fair approximation of his lost earning capacity due to his work injuries was $1,000 per week; and that the employee was entitled to a rehabilitation consultation. The employer and insurer appeal.
DECISION
1. Injury on August 26, 2009
The compensation judge found the employee sustained an injury to his low back on August 26, 2009, that arose out of and in the course of his employment. The insurer contends that this finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. It argues that all evidence suggests that the alleged injury of August 26, 2009, was no more than a contusion that did not rise to the level of an injury, that the employee had been actively seeking treatment for his March 6, 2009, back injury right up until August 21, 2009, just five days before any event on August 26, 2009, and that the employee was still subject to prior restrictions on the date of the latter event and did not seek treatment for that event until two weeks after its occurrence. It argues further that the fact that the employee had been actively seeking treatment for his March 2009 injury right up until August 21, 2009, was an important factor overlooked by Dr. Tarrel in concluding that a compensable injury did occur on August 26, 2009, contrary to the opinion of Dr. Wicklund. We are not persuaded.
At his November 28, 2009, examination of the employee, Dr. Tarrel found weakness in the employee’s lower left extremity with dorsiflexion and inversion of the left ankle, together with radiating left lower extremity symptoms consistent with an L5 radiculopathy. We do not note such findings in the record of the employee’s exams immediately following any of his earlier, admitted, work injuries. Further, Dr. Tarrel specifically stated that on August 26, 2009, the employee sustained a significant aggravation of his March 2007 injury. The appellant does not argue that Dr. Tarrel lacked foundation for this opinion. While Dr. Wicklund disagreed, it is the responsibility of the compensation judge to resolve conflicts in expert testimony. See Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337, 342-43, 37 W.C.D. 364, 372-73 (Minn. 1985). The compensation judge’s finding of a work-related injury on August 26, 2009, is, therefore, affirmed. See Hengemuhle, 358 N.W.2d at 59, 37 W.C.D. at 239.
2. Permanent Partial Disability
The compensation judge found the employee sustained a 10% whole body impairment related to his August 2009 low back work injury. In reaching this conclusion, the judge rejected both Dr. Wicklund’s 0% rating and Dr. Tarrel’s rating of 13%, which the judge concluded “inappropriately combined ratings from subparts 3 and 4 of Minn. R. 5223.0390.” The judge’s 10% rating was based solely on subpart 3.C.(2) of the rule, which provides a rating for lumbar pain syndrome where there are, at multiple vertebral levels,
[s]ymptoms of pain or stiffness in the region of the lumbar spine, substantiated by persistent objective clinical findings, that is, involuntary muscle tightness in the paralumbar muscles or decreased range of motion in the lumbar spine, and with any radiographic myelographic, CT scan, or MRI scan abnormality not specifically addressed elsewhere in this part.
Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 3.C.(2). The insurer contends that the judge’s award of compensation for even a 10% impairment is unsupported by substantial evidence. It argues that, while referencing the reports of Dr. Tarrel, the judge actually made no finding concerning any evidence of the persistent objective clinical findings required by the rule at issue. The insurer asserts “[b]ecause there were no persistent objective clinical findings of involuntary muscle tightness in the paralumbar muscles, and no decreased ranged of motion in the lumbar spine, there is no substantial evidence, under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 3C(2), for a finding of 10% permanent partial disability.” We are not persuaded.
The records of Dockter-Lutz Chiropractic contain numerous findings of muscle spasm and references to a decreased lumbar range of motion. The November 2009 MRI scan demonstrated several abnormalities including disc bulging from L2-3 through L4-5 and a disc protrusion at L5-S1. The judge was reasonably entitled to interpret these facts and observations from the employee’s medical record as persistent objective clinical findings and so to conclude that the employee’s condition was “most consistent with a lumbar pain syndrome.” These findings, together with the opinion of Dr. Tarrel provide substantial support for the compensation judge’s finding of permanent partial disability. Because it is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the judge’s decision with regard to the employee’s permanent partial disability. See Hengemuhle, 358 N.W.2d at 59, 37 W.C.D. at 239.
3. Weekly Wage
The employee commenced self-employment in late 2005 as an owner/operator of a moving company. Mr. Janikowski hired drivers as needed and casual laborers to help load and unload the trucks. He testified he paid his drivers $1,000 per week. For the years 2006 through 2009, the employee filed federal tax returns that included a Schedule C detailing the income and expenses from his self-employment. The employee testified these tax returns were an accurate reflection of his earnings from his business. Mr. Janikowski did not pay himself a wage from his business. Mr. Janikowski’s yearly net profit for the years 2006 thru 2009, as set forth on Schedule C, divided by 52 reflects the following average weekly income:
2006 = $11,966 ÷ 52 = $230.12
2007 = $13,541 ÷ 52 = $260.40
2008 = $16,328 ÷ 52 = $314.00
2009 = ($29,735) ÷ 52 = - 0 -
The compensation judge stated that even when the employee was fully functional, his net profit from the business left very little to pay for his own labor. The judge further noted the business generated substantial receipts but these were largely offset by substantial expenses leaving only a small net profit. The judge concluded the employee’s low profit was not a fair representation of the value of his labor and, therefore, rejected the use of the employee’s tax returns to determine his wage on the dates of his four injuries. Instead, the compensation judge imputed to the employee a hypothetical wage of $1,000.00 a week on the date of each of his injuries. The compensation judge stated: “While not a perfect representation of the employee’s earning capacity at the time of injury, the $1,000 per week he paid his own workers to perform the same physical work he was performing is a fairer representation of his lost earning capacity rather than his actual net profits.” (Mem. at 8.)
The employer and insurer appeal the compensation judge’s finding that the employee’s wage was $1,000 on the date of each of his personal injuries. The employer and insurer contend the compensation judge erroneously ignored the employee’s actual earnings from his self-employment as reflected on his tax returns and inappropriately established a weekly wage higher than the employee’s actual earnings. The compensation judge’s method of calculation, the employer and insurer contend, overstates the employee’s probable impaired future earning capacity. The employee responds that $1,000 per week is a fair approximation of his lost earning capacity caused by his personal injuries.
Self-employment situations often present difficult wage issues. In certain cases, the employee’s wage from self-employment is best determined with reference to the annual net income of the employee’s business. See, e.g., Newbauer v. Pepsi Bottling Group, 43 W.C.D. 339 (W.C.C.A. 1990). In numerous cases, this court has held that tax returns provide a reasonable basis to determine an employee’s weekly wage on the date of injury. Wallak v. Ace Plumbing & Heating 42 W.C.D. 772 (W.C.C.A. 1990). In Egan v. Shannon’s Plumbing & Heating, a case involving a question of the employee’s post-injury earning capacity, this court approved a determination of the employee’s earnings based on what it would cost to hire someone to do the work performed by the employee. However, the court cautioned that the imputed wage could not exceed the earnings of the employee’s business and if the business earnings were insufficient to pay that imputed wage, the employee’s earnings would equal the earnings of the business. Egan, 61 W.C.D. 580 (W.C.C.A. 2001).[3]
In Jellum v. McGough Constr. Co., Inc., 479 N.W.2d 718, 46 W.C.D. 182 (Minn. 1992), the employee was a university student who worked for McGough during school vacations when she sustained a work-related injury. Following her injury, the employee resumed her education and upon graduation was qualified as an elementary school teacher. The employee was, however, unable to find a job as a teacher and took a job as a telemarketer. She then brought a claim for temporary partial disability benefits which a compensation judge awarded, based upon the difference between the employee’s wage with McGough and her post-injury earnings. On appeal, a panel of this court concluded that the weekly wage the employee earned as a construction laborer for McGough Construction was not representative of her earning capacity. Rather, the court stated the employee’s temporary partial disability benefits should be based on the difference between the employee’s earning capacity as a first year elementary school teacher and her post-injury earnings. On appeal, the supreme court reversed that decision concluding that the weekly wage at the time of injury is a relatively concrete quantity and the statutory method for measuring weekly wage should not be disregarded.
There was no evidence in this case which would have allowed the compensation judge to apply Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subds. 3 and 18 to compute the employee’s weekly wage. In such a case, the compensation judge may use another method to calculate the weekly wage so long as that method reasonably reflects the employee’s loss of earning power.[4] Hansford v. Berger Transfer, 46 W.C.D. 303 (W.C.C.A. 1991). We cannot agree that the wage the employee paid his own workers to do the same work he was performing is a more fair representation of his lost earning capacity than the actual net profits of his business. The employee decided to operate his own business and, unfortunately, that business was only marginally profitable for three years and lost money in 2009. We acknowledge the employee earned more money before he started his own business, but that fact alone does not entitle the employee to some hypothetical weekly wage greater than his actual earnings. Were that the case, any injured employee able to prove an ability to make more money elsewhere would be entitled to that higher weekly wage. That simply is not the law. The compensation judge’s wage finding is legally erroneous and contrary to the Jellum decision. Accordingly, the compensation judge’s wage determination is reversed and the case is remanded to the compensation judge for reconsideration and new findings.
4. Medical Treatment
The compensation judge concluded that the claimed medical treatment received by the employee on or after August 26, 2009, was reasonably required to cure or relieve the employee’s work injury of that date. The employer and insurer contend that this conclusion is unsupported by substantial evidence. The appellants argue that there is no indication that any of the treatment at issue - - including the initial treatment with Dr. McTeague two weeks after the alleged injury date, the MRI scan on November 10, 2009, or even the treatment with Dr. Tarrel beginning November 23, 2009 - - was related to the August 26, 2009, work incident at issue. They assert that Dr. Tarrel specifically concluded that both his own treatment and the employee’s earlier MRI scan were “related ultimately to injuries sustained on March 6, 2007.” Relying again on the opinion of Dr. Wicklund, they argue again that the employee sustained only a contusion on August 26, 2009, and that “there is no indication that the contusion made his symptoms any more significant,” “no indication that the Employee needed any ongoing medical or chiropractic treatment as a result of the August 26, 2009 incident,” and “no reason for the Employee to have undergone an MRI in light of the lack of objective physical findings.” The employer and insurer argue in the end that all of the employee’s work injuries, including any injury on August 26, 2009, have now resolved without any further need of any medical or chiropractic treatment. We are not persuaded.
Dr. Tarrel indicated in November 2009 that he considered the employee’s injury of August 26, 2009, to have been an exacerbation of the employee’s 2007 injury. But whether the medical treatment at issue was necessitated by the 2007 injury, the 2009 injury, or some combination thereof is not the issue. Dr. Tarrel opined that all treatment at issue was reasonable and necessary to cure or relieve the employee’s ongoing low back condition. The compensation judge could reasonably rely on that opinion and so we must affirm the judge’s conclusion. See Hengemuhle, 358 N.W.2d at 59, 37 W.C.D. at 239.
5. Rehabilitation Consultation
The compensation judge concluded that the employee is entitled to a rehabilitation consultation. The employer and insurer contend that this conclusion is unsupported by substantial evidence, in that, based again on the opinion of Dr. Wicklund, all of the employee’s work injuries have resolved, and the employee is not currently subject to any related physical restrictions or in need of any related medical treatment. We do not agree.
We have already addressed this reasoning earlier in this decision, concluding that, because it was reasonably based on Dr. Tarrel’s medical opinion, the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee remains restricted by his work injuries is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the compensation judge’s finding that the employee is entitled to a rehabilitation consultation.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part)
PATRICIA J. MILUN, Judge
This case presents five issues for determination: first, whether the employee sustained a low back injury in the course and in the scope of his employment on August 26, 2009; second, whether the employee is entitled to a 10% permanent partial disability rating; third, whether the medical treatment received was reasonable and necessary to cure or relieve the employee’s work-related conditions; fourth, whether the employee is entitled to a rehabilitation consultation; and fifth, what was the employee’s weekly wage on the date of each injury. I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the compensation judge’s determination that the employee sustained a work-related injury on August 26, 2009, and further concur in the majority’s affirmance of the permanency, medical and rehabilitation benefits.
However, as to the majority’s decision regarding the determination of weekly wage, I disagree. The majority states “[w]e cannot agree that the wage the employee paid his own workers to do the same work he was performing is a more fair representation of his lost earning capacity than the actual net profits of his business.” In essence, the majority substitutes their factual determination of what would be a reasonable wage with the compensation judge’s determination of such based on her review of the evidence presented at trial. Substantial evidence and existing case law fully support the compensation judge’s findings on the employee’s weekly wage as a self-employed independent owner-operator. I, therefore, would not reverse finding 8 or remand this matter to a compensation judge for further findings. Based on the analysis below, I would affirm the judge as to her weekly wage finding under the substantial evidence rule in accordance with Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees,[5] Decker v. Red Wing Shoe Co.,[6] and Bradley v. Vic’s Welding.[7]
The compensation judge noted in her memorandum that the parties agreed in this case that the employee’s weekly wage at the time of injury was irregular and difficult to determine. In such situations, the 26 week calculation is generally used to determine the employee’s wage.[8] There was no evidence in this case that the employee paid himself a regular wage. Where evidence necessary to comply with the statutory wage calculation directives is not available, a compensation judge may use another method to calculate the employee's wage, as long as that method reasonably reflects the employee's injury-related loss of earning power.[9] At Finding 8, the compensation judge concluded that a fair approximation of the employee’s lost earning capacity due to all four of his alleged injuries was $1,000, based in large part on the employee’s testimony that that was the amount he paid his contract drivers.
The majority states the compensation judge rejected the use of the employee’s tax returns to determine his wage on the date of his injuries. I disagree. The compensation judge, in fact, quite extensively used these tax returns in her analysis of the wage determination issue. The compensation judge did reject the “use of the business net profit per year as a fair approximation of the employee’s lost earning capacity due to the injury.”[10] However, the judge went on to explain that while she rejected the employee’s net profit she did consider the business revenues as reflected in the tax returns. “The net profit represents the success (or lack of success) of the business as a whole. It is affected by many factors, including management of the business as a whole, including the relative cost of leasing, operating, repairing, and maintaining the trucking equipment needed in the business. . . . The weekly wage calculation for a self-employed individual involves more than simply determining an actual profit at the time of injury.”[11] It is clear that using the tax returns as her basis, the judge carefully considered and analyzed the employee’s business revenue and expenses (especially those related to replacement driver labor) as factors that directed the computation of the business income.
The compensation judge in this case spent over three pages of her four-page memorandum explaining in copious detail the rationale behind her calculation of the employee’s weekly wage at $1,000. She noted the employee’s testimony that, from 2002 to 2005, prior to his self-employment and the first of his injuries but prior also to his extra administrative work in running his own business, the employee earned about $1,200 per week. She cited her review of the employee’s Exhibit J, the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development’s “Occupations in Demand” publication, listing the median wage of heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers in Minnesota as $43,708 per year, or $840.54 per week. Reflecting generally that same bracket of $1,200 versus $840.54, she cited the evidence that teamster wages for truckers in the employee’s class ranged from $800 to $1,120, acknowledging that the employee was not a member of the teamsters’ union. She noted that the employee’s gross receipts at his self-employment were substantial - - $238,311 in 2006, $304,797 in 2007, and $401,394 in 2008, although his company appears relatively unprofitable, based on his tax returns. The employee’s tax returns for 2006, 2007, and 2008, the three tax years preceding his employee’s work injuries, indicated that the employee’s company’s net profits for those years were $11,966, $13,541, and $16,328, respectively, yielding weekly profits of only $230.12, $343.68, and $314.00, respectively, accounting for the employee’s temporary total disability the second year. The judge reasoned in this regard that “[t]here are many reasons for a business to be unprofitable and the labor the business owner provides is only one factor in the profitability of the company.”[12] Citing several such reasons, she concluded that “[i]n this case, the employee’s relatively low net profit is not a fair representation of the value of his labor as a household goods mover,”[13] adding that, in light of the employee’s $1,200 weekly wage a few years earlier, “$1,000 per week is only minimally adequate to represent his lost earning capacity.”[14]
The employee was a self-employed independent owner-operator who did not pay himself a regular wage. The employee’s weekly wage at the time of injury was irregular and difficult to determine and therefore it was appropriate to review income records from the prior calendar year to assist in determining the weekly wage. “Where the evidence necessary to comply with the statutory directives concerning calculation of weekly wage is not available, the compensation judge may use another method as long as that method reasonably reflects the employee’s injury-related loss of earning power.”[15] The compensation judge candidly acknowledged that there was no perfect representation of the employee’s earning capacity at the time of each injury. She analyzed the evidence under the legal standard used by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bradley and found the straight calculation of the business profit for each year, as argued by the majority here, would result in a calculation of a weekly wage that would seriously understate the employee’s earning capacity at the time of each injury. The judge’s determination was not unreasonable in that it neither unfairly overstated or unfairly understated the employee’s actual earnings.[16] “While the computation of weekly wage is frequently based upon actual wages, there are various circumstances which make the claimant’s actual earnings during a particular period an unreliable measure of his future earning power.”[17] The record as a whole supports the judge’s findings and conclusions of law. The majority looked at the evidence and came to a different factual conclusion than the compensation judge. Under the substantial evidence rule and in accordance with Hengemuhle, Decker, and Bradley, I would affirm.
[1] See Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200, 21 W.C.D. 105 (1960).
[2] Schedule C is entitled Profit or Loss from Business.
[3] See also Jensen v. Vernon Erickson, (slip op., W.C.C.A. June 8, 1998).
[4] The only evidence of the employee’s actual earnings from his employment was the tax returns. At the hearing, the employee’s contention was that his weekly wage should be computed not based on his actual earnings but rather on what the employee paid others to perform work for his business.
[5] Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).
[6] Decker v. Red Wing Shoe Co., 41 W.C.D. 763 (W.C.C.A 1988), summarily aff’d (Minn. Mar. 30, 1989).
[7] Bradley v. Vic’s Welding, 405 N.W.2d 243, 39 W.C.D. 921 (Minn. 1987).
[8] Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 3, renumbered as subd. 8a in 2008, and subd. 18.
[9] Decker, 41 W.C.D. at 765-66.
[10] Memorandum at 8 (emphasis added).
[11] Memorandum at 8.
[12] Memorandum at 7.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Hansford v. Berger Transfer, 46 W.C.D. 303, 309-10 (W.C.C.A. 1991) summarily aff’d (Minn. Mar. 19, 1992); see also Decker, 41 W.C.D. at 765-66.
[16] See Hansford, 46 W.C.D. at 310.
[17] Bradley, 405 N.W.2d at 246, 39 W.C.D. at 924.