The employer and insurer appeal from the compensation judge’s decision that the employee injured his cervical spine in an accident at work.  We affirm.

The employee began working for Wal-Mart [the employer] as an automobile service technician in May of 2007.  On the morning of September 7, 2009, he sustained injuries at work when a tire exploded, throwing him about ten feet across the room.  The employee testified that he must have struck his head because he had two “goose eggs,” but he could not recall whether he lost consciousness.  He subsequently sought treatment in the emergency department of Hutchinson Health Center.

According to records from the emergency department evaluation, the employee “complain[ed] of left hand and wrist discomfort and no other injury.”  X-rays showed fractures of two metacarpal bones and a hairline fracture of the distal radius on the left.  A short cast was applied, and the employee was advised to follow up for further treatment.

The employee saw Paul Coleman, a physician assistant with Orthopedic & Fracture Clinic, the next day.  Mr. Coleman later referred the employee for surgery because the fractures were not healing satisfactorily.^[1]  The employee testified that he told Mr. Coleman, on his first day of treatment, that he was experiencing headaches, and that he told all subsequent medical providers about having headaches and neck pain following the September 7, 2009, incident.  Treatment records, however, contain no references to such symptoms for several months.

In November of 2009, the employee told Mr. Coleman that his left hand and little finger were numb.  The following month, at the end of December, the employee began chiropractic treatment for back and neck pain and headaches that had purportedly begun in November.  In January 2010, numbness was again noted in Mr. Coleman’s records, and the employee also reported experiencing headaches and weakness in his grip.  Then, in February, the employee reported that he had left arm pain from his neck into his hand.  Mr. Coleman referred him for an MRI, and that scan, performed in March, disclosed a large herniation at C6-7, resulting in severe left foraminal narrowing and canal narrowing with cord compression, and moderate to severe right C5-6 foraminal narrowing and central foraminal narrowing with mild contact and compression of the cord.

On April 6, 2010, the employee underwent decompression and fusion surgery at C5-6 and C6-7, performed by Dr. David Strothman.

In June of 2010, Dr. Thomas Nelson reviewed the employee’s medical records and issued a report addressing the question of causation of the employee’s neck condition and need for treatment.  In that report, Dr. Nelson indicated that the employee’s neck condition was not related to the September 7, 2009, tire explosion, explaining as follows:

The matter came on for hearing before a compensation judge on December 6, 2011, for resolution of the employee’s claim for medical and chiropractic treatment expenses related to his neck condition.  The employer and insurer admitted that the employee had injured his left hand and wrist in the September 7, 2009, work accident but denied that the employee had injured his cervical spine at that time.  Evidence included the employee’s testimony, his medical records, and the report of Dr. Nelson, the employer and insurer’s independent examiner.

In a decision issued on January 11, 2012, the compensation judge resolved the causation issue in the employee’s favor and ordered the employer and insurer to pay for the claimed cervical spine treatment.  The employer and insurer appeal.

On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether “the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1 (2010).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, “they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

In a narrative report dated August 31, 2011, Dr. Strothman wrote, in part, as follows about the employee’s history and the cause of his neck condition:

The compensation judge expressly accepted the opinion of Dr. Strothman over the contrary opinion of Dr. Nelson, the employer and insurer’s medical expert.  On appeal, the employer and insurer argue that the compensation judge erred in this regard, in that Dr. Strothman’s opinion was premised on his acceptance of the employee’s account of the onset of his symptoms.  And, according to the employer and insurer, the employee’s version of events is so “full of contradictions, inconsistencies, and ‘explanations’ [that] no rational trier of fact could find [it] credible or persuasive.”

We acknowledge that none of the employee’s medical providers, beginning in the emergency department on the date of injury, made any reference to complaints of headache or neck pain until at least late December of 2009.  We are also aware that, once those complaints began appearing in the employee’s medical records, the duration of the symptoms was generally noted to be several weeks, rather than the several months that had passed since the work incident.  The employee, however, offered some explanation for these discrepancies.  He testified, for example, that he had sometimes misunderstood the nature of the forms he completed and was confused about what he was being asked.  In any event, contrary to the argument of the employer and insurer, the lack of head or neck symptoms noted in the employee’s early treatment records does not constitute a “physical fact,” or “truth,” that the compensation judge was obligated to base his decision on.

The employee was 36 years old on the date of the injury.  The tire explosion threw him ten feet, and he landed with enough force to break several bones in his hand.  There is no evidence that he had any history of neck symptoms or treatment prior to the incident in September 2009.  He testified that he began experiencing headaches immediately after the accident and that he did not understand why the treating providers failed to document his complaints.  The employer and insurer’s arguments notwithstanding, the compensation judge was entitled to accept the employee’s testimony to this effect.  See, e.g., Even v. Kraft, Inc., 443 N.W. 2d 831, 42 W.C.D. 220 (Minn. 1989).  In addition to this evidence, Dr. Strothman reported that the tire explosion had caused the employee’s neck condition and need for treatment and, again, the compensation judge was entitled to accept this opinion as well.  See Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337, 37 W.C.D. 364 (Minn. 1985).  Based on the record as a whole, we find no grounds adequate to overturn the judge’s decision on causation.  His award of cervical treatment expenses is therefore affirmed.