The employee appeals from the compensation judge’s determination that she failed to rebut the presumption that she retired from the labor market at age 67.  We affirm.

Di Ann C. Olson, the employee, sustained injuries on September 13, 1999, and September 18, 2002, arising out of and in the course of her employment with 3M Company, the employer, which was insured by Old Republic Insurance Company.  The employer and its insurer admitted liability for the employee’s injuries.

As a result of her 2002 injury, the employee underwent surgery in the nature of an open reduction internal fixation of the left hip, with use of a lag screw and plate affixed to the femur.  Following surgery, the employee experienced complications and developed thrombophlebitis of the left leg, requiring treatment with Heparin and Coumadin for three months.

The employee was released to return to work by her physicians in December, 2002.  However, the release was extremely limited and was conditioned on the employee’s progress.  In January 2003, a transitional return to work plan was developed, which called for the employee to perform light-duty work, on a limited basis, with an eventual return to full-time work.  The employee attempted the light-duty assignments but found that, even with limited hours of work, she was unable to perform the job due to pain in her hip and leg.  For this reason, the employee decided in January 2003 to retire from her job with the employer.  The employee met with Darlene Ellingson, a human resources director, and asked if she was eligible for retirement.  Ms. Ellingson assured the employee that she was eligible.  The employee retired from her employment with the employer effective March 1, 2003.

The employee subsequently filed a claim petition seeking permanent total disability benefits.  In a finding and order served and filed February 16, 2005, a compensation judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings found the employee permanently and totally disabled as a result of her September 18, 2002, work injury.  The decision of the compensation judge was not appealed, and the employer and insurer commenced payment of permanent total disability benefits.

On October 26, 2009, the employee turned 67 years of age.  Thereafter, the employer and insurer filed with this court a petition to discontinue permanent total disability benefits based on the retirement presumption contained in Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4.^[1]  By decision dated June 29, 2010, this court granted the petition.  Olson v. 3M Co., No. WC10-5054 (W.C.C.A. June 29, 2010).  Thereafter, the employee filed a claim petition seeking continuing permanent total disability benefits.  In a findings and order served and filed January 21, 2011, a compensation judge concluded that the employee failed to rebut the retirement presumption of Minn. Stat. §176.101, subd. 4, and he denied the employee’s claim for continuing permanent total disability benefits.  The employee appeals.

One of the issues at the 2005 hearing was whether the employee’s retirement from 3M Company barred her from receiving permanent total disability benefits.  The compensation judge concluded that it did not and found that the employee was physically permanently and totally disabled from sustained gainful employment as a result of her personal injury.  In his 2011 findings and order, the compensation judge found that, as of March 1, 2004, the employee had withdrawn from the labor market to a retirement status and that she had not rebutted the presumption of Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, requiring permanent total disability benefits to cease at age 67.  On appeal, the employee contends that the judge’s 2005 finding as to the effect of the employee’s retirement from the employer is res judicata.  That is, the employee argues, the employee’s retirement cannot now be used as a basis for denying her claim for permanent total disability benefits.  As such, under the principles of collateral estoppel, the employee argues, the judge’s 2011 finding, that the employee failed to rebut the statutory retirement presumption, must be reversed.  We are not persuaded.

Principles of res judicata are applicable in workers’ compensation proceedings.  Alexander v. Kenneth R. LaLonde Enters., 288 N.W.2d 18, 31 W.C.D. 407 (Minn. 1980). However, res judicata applies only with respect to issues that are litigated and decided.  Fischer v. Saga Corp., 598 N.W. 2d 449, 48 W.C.D. 368 (Minn. 1992).  Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a limited form of res judicata whereby a prior judgment is conclusive in a later suit between the same parties as to determinative issues finally decided in the former suit.  Travelers Ins. Co., v. Thompson, 163 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1969).  Application of collateral estoppel may be appropriate in the following circumstances: (1) the issue is identical to an issue in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.  Nelson v. American Family Ins. Group, 651 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 2001).

Collateral estoppel may be applied only if the issue before the compensation judge in 2011 was identical to an issue before the judge in 2005.  In 2005, the employer and insurer denied liability for permanent total disability benefits on grounds that the employee had voluntarily retired from her employment.  The judge disagreed, determining that the employee’s retirement was involuntary because she was unable to work due to her injury-related physical condition.  Thus, the issue before the compensation judge in 2005 was whether the employee’s retirement was voluntary or involuntary.  In contrast, the issue in the most recent litigation was whether the employee rebutted the statutory presumption that she retired from the labor market at age 67.  As such, the question was whether the employee would have retired at 67 even had she not been disabled.  Further, the two proceedings involved claims for benefits for different periods of time.  Where the issue is one of benefit eligibility for a period subsequent to an earlier decision, that earlier decision is generally res judicata only with respect to the period considered in the prior hearing.  See, e.g., Hatfield v. Lenort, 69 W.C.D. 285 (W.C.C.A. 2009).  In the present case, the issues in the two proceedings were not identical, and the periods of benefit eligibility were different, so collateral estoppel does not apply.

The compensation judge concluded that the employee failed to rebut the presumption contained in Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, and determined that she was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits after she reached the age of 67.  The employee contends that the judge misapplied the relevant factors in deciding the issue of presumptive retirement, and she further asserts that the judge’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence.

In Dillemuth v. Owatonna Tool Co., 59 W.C.D. 349 (W.C.C.A. 1999), this court identified six factors that may be considered in determining whether an employee retired from the labor market:

The employee testified that she never intended to retire because she could not afford to do so.  Her testimony to this effect is supported by rehabilitation records.  That is, in a report dated October 4, 2004, rehabilitation provider Ione Tollefson wrote,

With regard to the second factor, the record indicates that the employee applied for and was awarded Social Security disability benefits in 2003.  When, in 2009, the employee reached age 67, those benefits were automatically converted to retirement benefits.  For injuries occurring after January 1, 1984, an employee who receives Social Security benefits is presumed retired from the labor market.  Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 8.

The evidence as to the employee’s financial circumstances indicates that the employee receives Social Security payments of $1,360 a month and pension benefits of $760 a month, less a payment to BlueCross for health insurance premiums.  The employee’s husband receives Social Security benefits of approximately $500 per month, and he also operates a small business, with profits ranging from $2,500 up to $5,200 per year.  When the employee retired, she took approximately $150,000.00 out of her retirement fund and paid off her home mortgage and a car loan.  As of the date of the hearing, the employee had approximately $18,000 in an IRA and approximately $23,000 in savings accounts.  Prior to reaching age 67, the employee was receiving $141 per week in permanent total disability benefits.  The employee testified that she and her husband are able to meet their daily living expenses out of their income from Social Security and pension payments.

As to the fourth factor in Dillemuth, it is essentially undisputed that the employee initiated the discussion regarding retirement.

In summary, the first Dillemuth factor probably weighs in the employee’s favor, but the other three support the compensation judge’s conclusion that the employee failed to rebut the retirement presumption.  On balance, we cannot conclude the judge’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence of record.  We therefore affirm that decision.