The employer and insurer appeal from the compensation judge’s finding of an employment relationship and from her consequent award of permanent partial disability compensation for the employee’s asbestos-related occupational disease.  We affirm.

In 1969, Theodore J. Coles [Coles] began working for W.E. Neal Slate Company [Slate] as an installation carpenter.  At all times related to this claim, Slate’s offices and manufacturing plant were located in Eden Prairie, Minnesota. Slate manufactures and installs visual display boards, writing surface boards, tack boards, and display cases.  The manufacturing plant is not a union shop, but during the time period here relevant the installation carpenters were members of the carpenters union, and Slate worked under contract with that union.  Coles was one of the union carpenters employed by Slate and, from 1975 until 1989, was one of Slate’s foremen.

In about May of 1989, Slate’s contract with the carpenters union expired, and Slate chose not to renew it.  Because some of Slate’s installation contracts required that the work be performed by union carpenters, and because Slate had chosen not to deal with the union, it became necessary to make other arrangements.  Slate therefore entered into an agreement with Riesgraf Installation Company [Riesgraf], a union shop, to hire Slate’s union carpenters.  Riesgraf was located in Belle Plaine, Minnesota, and its primary business was installing store fixtures.  Under the oral agreement between Slate and Riesgraf, Slate’s installers would continue to perform Slate installation work, but those carpenter installers, including Coles, would now be paid by Riesgraf.

Coles worked as a foreman installer until his retirement in 1993.  From 1989 until his retirement, Coles’ salary and contributions to his union benefits were paid by Riesgraf.  As for the performance of his job during this time, however, he continued to take orders from Slate’s two owners and from Gary O’Day, Slate’s vice president and head of installation.  Coles received all of his job assignments directly from Mr. O’Day, he reported to O’Day when the job was completed, and, if there was a problem on the job, he would contact O’Day.  Mr. O’Day would control the day-to-day management of Slate’s installation projects.  He would choose the foreman for the job and would provide that person with a plan or shop drawing.  The foreman would choose the crew and complete the work.  If there was a major problem, Mr. O’Day would go out to the job.  All of the foremen had previously worked directly for Slate.  According to Coles, Coles had the same co-workers at Riesgraf as he had had at Slate.

Once on the job, the carpenters provided their own hand tools.  Power tools used on the job were initially purchased by Slate and accompanied Slate’s installers under the agreement with Riesgraf.  All of the materials to be installed were manufactured by Slate and were delivered to the jobsites by Slate’s own trucks or by a common carrier.  Slate would arrange for delivery time and would pay the expense.  The carpenters on Slate jobs would submit their timecards to Mr. O’Day, who kept track of the hours worked on each job.  O’Day also would track mileage and other out-of-pocket expenses.  The carpenter payroll information would then be tabulated by Slate and submitted to Riesgraf.  Riesgraf would pay the employees and would then submit a bill to Slate for reimbursement.  Slate reimbursed Riesgraf for 100% of the payroll expense associated with Slate jobs, including FICA and unemployment taxes.  Slate also reimbursed Riesgraf for workers’ compensation and liability insurance costs and all contributions made to the union for employee benefits.  On top of reimbursement for these administrative expenses, Slate paid Riesgraf an 8% fee for handling these functions.

Mr. O’Day’s counterpart at Riesgraf was Paul Fogarty, Riesgraf’s project manager since 1985.  Fogarty described Riesgraf’s primary business as installing store fixtures.  The company’s largest contract is with Target Corporation.  As a project manager, Mr. Fogarty would bid all jobs and would assign the foreman and the crew.  According to Mr. Fogarty, Mr. O’Day handled all of the assignments on the Slate projects.  Riesgraf employees who had not previously worked for Slate helped out on Slate projects only occasionally.  If Riesgraf people could not fill in when needed, O’Day would ask Fogarty to request people out of the union hall.  As project manager for Riesgraf, Mr. Fogarty never met Mr. Coles.

On October 21, 2005, Coles filed a claim petition for compensation for a 75% permanent partial disability against Slate and its insurer, Chubb Group of Insurance [Chubb], as well as certain other parties, for the occupational disease of asbestosis and/or asbestos-related pleural disease.  The employee entered into Pierringer-type settlements^[1] with all parties except for Slate/Chubb.  The litigation between Coles and Slate/Chubb continued after the Pierringer settlements, and the matter was submitted to a compensation judge upon joint exhibits,^[2] certain stipulated facts, and legal memoranda of counsel.  For purposes of this litigation, the parties stipulated that Mr. Coles does have the claimed disease condition and that he has sustained a 75% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole as a consequence of it.  The parties agreed also that Mr. Coles was last exposed in a significant way to the hazards of his occupational disease during the period 1989 to 1993.  At trial, Mr. Coles claimed that an employment relationship continued to exist between himself and Slate during the period in question.  Slate denied that an employment relationship existed after May 1989.  In a findings and order issued April 20, 2011, a compensation judge determined that an employment relationship existed between Mr. Coles and Slate during the period at issue.  Slate and Chubb appeal.

At Finding 12, the compensation judge concluded that

On appeal, while both parties have addressed theories of “joint employment” and “loaned servant,” both have more directly argued the long-applied five-factor test to determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists.  Those factors include (1) the right to control the means and manner of performance (2) the mode of payment (3) the furnishing of materials or tools (4) the control of the premises where the work is done and (5) the right of the employer to discharge.  Newland v. Overland Express, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Minn. 1980).  The most important factor in determining the existence of an employment relationship is the right of the employer to control the performance.  Id., at 618; Hunter v. Crawford Door Sales, 501 N.W.2d 623, 624 48 W.C.D. 637, 639 (Minn. 1993).  Further, as a general rule, the “nature of the relationship is to be ascertained, not from the label given to it by the parties themselves, but from the consequences which the law attached to their arrangements and to their conduct.”  Hunter, 501 N.W.2d at 624, 48 W.C.D. at 639 (quoting Edelston v. Builders and Remodelers, Inc., 304 Minn. 550, 551, 229 N.W.2d 24, 25, 27 W.C.D. 909, 910 (1975)).

Slate argues that Riesgraf was Cole’s sole employer during the period at issue.  At the time of the Slate/Riesgraf agreement, it argues, Slate downsized its business to eliminate performing the installation work and Riesgraf simply expanded its business to include the installation of Slate’s products.  It was Riesgraf, Slate argues, that paid Coles for his work between 1989 and 1993.  Similarly, Slate contends, it was Riesgraf that withheld and paid the appropriate taxes, provided workers’ compensation coverage, made payments to the union for employee benefits, and issued W-2 forms at the end of the year.  Therefore, Slate argues, substantial evidence in the record does not support the judge’s finding of an employment relationship between Coles and Slate.  We are not persuaded.

We cannot conclude that the compensation judge erred in her factual findings, or in her conclusion, as stated in her memorandum, that the only difference in Coles’ relationship with Slate after its 1989 agreement with Riesgraf was the administrative functions assumed by Riesgraf.  There is no dispute here regarding the administrative details of the Slate/Riesgraf agreement, but it cannot fairly be argued that Riesgraf involved itself in any meaningful way with Coles’ performance of Slate installations.  The following facts are essentially undisputed: (1) all of Coles’ work from 1989 to his retirement in 1993 was on Slate projects; (2) Coles never received work assignments from Riesgraf and never went to Riesgraf’s office; (3) all Coles’ job assignments were made by Gary O’Day, vice president and head of installation for Slate; (4) Mr. O’Day, of Slate, always assigned the foreman to work on the Slate projects; (5) the carpenters provided their own hand tools, but power tools used by the Slate installers accompanied Slate’s people who were “transferred” to Riesgraf; (6) all of the materials needed for Slate projects were furnished by Slate; (7) Slate arranged for delivery of the materials to the Slate projects, either by its own trucks or by delivery through a common carrier; (8) Mr. Fogarty, Riesgraf’s project manager, never even met the employee in the four years from 1989 to 1993; (9) Coles, as well as other “transferred” installers always submitted their work hours to Mr. O’Day of Slate; and (10) Slate personnel compiled the work hours of the employee and other payroll information and then faxed that information to Riesgraf.

There is substantial evidentiary support for the judge’s findings of fact.  Practically speaking, there is little to distinguish Coles’ relationship with Slate before 1989 and after 1989.  Coles was a skilled and experienced carpenter who did not require a great deal of supervision on the job.  The test, however, is the right, not just the exercise, of the employer to control the details of the work.  Hunter, 501 N.W.2d at 624, 48 W.C.D. at 639.  Under the facts of this case, the judge’s conclusion that Slate continued to control the means and manner of performing the installation work between 1989 and 1993, and that an employment relationship existed between Coles and Slate, is affirmed.  Because we have affirmed the judge’s decision on grounds that Slate continued to control the means and manner of performance, we need not address other legal theories raised by the judge’s decision.