The employer and insurer appeal from the compensation judge’s determination that the employee’s stipulated disability was the result of a work injury.  We affirm.

At the hearing in this matter on June 18, 2009, the parties stipulated that the employee, Michelle Baker, was temporarily totally disabled from February 5 to March 15, 2008, as the result of a left-side and left knee injury.  The issue for the compensation judge’s determination was whether the disability was the result of a work injury which the employee claimed occurred on February 1, 2008.

Michelle Baker was employed as a cook by T. Maxwells on Friday, February 1, 2008.  She testified that, as she was leaving work at about 10:15 P.M., she slipped on ice in the employer’s parking lot and fell, injuring her left knee and left side.

After she fell, she went home, took a shower to clean up, and then went to see her boyfriend, Vernon Rinerson.  The employee testified that Mr. Rinerson put a bandage on her skinned knee and that she and Mr. Rinerson talked for a while.  At around 1:30 A.M., she left to go to the house of her friend, Kelly.  Mr. Rinerson testified at the hearing and corroborated the employee’s testimony.

The employee testified that she went Kelly’s house because Kelly was moving and the employee had told him that she would stop by his moving party to say goodbye.  Most of the guests had already left when she arrived, so Ms. Baker talked with Kelly for about twenty minutes and then went home.

Ms. Baker called her supervisor, Darrel McFredies, the next day and reported the injury to him.  Mr. McFredies, who testified by deposition, confirmed that Ms. Baker called him on Saturday and told him she fell in the parking lot.  Ms. Baker also went to the emergency room at Lakeland Health in Staples, Minnesota, on February 2, but left when she was told it would be quite some time before she could be seen there because another emergency room patient was being treated.

Ms. Baker returned to the emergency room on February 5.  The chart note of that date by the emergency room physician indicates “she fell on Friday on the ice outside of a [blank] she was working as a cook and was evidently leaving at the time.”  She was given pain medication and sent home.  On follow-up on February 12, Dr. Jonathan Claussen took the employee off work from February 5, 2008.

At the hearing, the employer and insurer presented a different version of events.  Jacob Crosno, a coworker of Ms. Baker, testified that he saw Ms. Baker arrive at Kelly’s party around 11:00 P.M. and he saw her leave about 2:00 A.M.  Mr. Crosno said he saw her fall at the party a number of times when she and some other guests were standing outside smoking.  Mr. Crosno’s roommate, Daniel Phelps, also testified that he saw Ms. Baker fall at the party and also said that Ms. Baker told him that she had hurt her arm when she fell.  On cross examination, Mr. Phelps said that he was intoxicated and Mr. Crosno described himself as “kind of tanked up like drunk.”

In his Findings and Order of August 28, 2009, the compensation judge determined that Ms. Baker’s injuries occurred in the parking lot of T. Maxwells when she was leaving work.  She was awarded workers’ compensation benefits.  The employer and insurer appeal.

The essential question for the compensation judge at the hearing was one of credibility.  The employee’s claim would be accepted if the compensation judge believed the employee and the claim would be denied if the employer’s witnesses were believed.

In his decision, the compensation judge found the employee’s testimony to be credible.  He stated that her testimony was supported by the evidence provided by her supervisor, her boyfriend, and the medical records.  The compensation judge found the testimony of Mr. Crosno and Mr. Phelps to be “questionable” and did not adopt the position of the employer and insurer.

At this point in a decision, this court often cites Even v. Kraft, 445 N.W.2d 831, 42 W.C.D. 220 (Minn. 1989), for the proposition that determination of credibility is within the unique province of the factfinder.  For the present case, it is important to note the reason behind that proposition.  This court reviews a written record but a compensation judge is able to view the witnesses as the evidence is given and is able to evaluate their demeanor and behavior.  As a result, this court is reluctant to reverse a compensation judge’s decision based on a credibility determination.  We conclude that, especially in this case, a credibility determination made after observation of the witnesses is important.

Nevertheless, the employer and insurer have asked this court to reverse the compensation judge in this matter and remand this case for further proceedings.  Two arguments are advanced in support of their appeal.

The first argument is based on the fact that, in considering the testimony of witnesses, the compensation judge used the words “conceivable” and “inconceivable” in his decision.  It is argued that his use of the word “inconceivable,” for example, in describing the evidence submitted by the employer and insurer’s witnesses means that the evidence presented was impossible to accept, citing to one possible dictionary definition.  The employer and insurer argue that the statements of their witnesses were not impossible to accept and that since the compensation judge used that standard in assessing credibility, he erred. We believe this to be an overly-literal reading of the compensation judge’s decision.  A reasonable reading of the decision leads to the conclusion that the compensation judge was simply setting out the reasons why he did not accept the testimony of the employer and insurer’s witnesses.  While, in retrospect, a choice of different words would have been preferable, we conclude that the compensation judge meant that he simply did not find the testimony to be credible.

The employer and insurer also raise an issue about the language used by the compensation judge in Finding 8. In that finding, the compensation judge stated that it was “conceivable” the employee had fallen at Kelly’s party but that there was no evidence that she had hurt her left side or knee there. The employer and insurer point out that that the employee denied any such fall and question how the compensation judge was able to conclude that the employee had met her burden of proof if he did not fully accept her testimony.  The employer and insurer argue that remand is necessary so that this question might be addressed.  We disagree.

In reviewing the record and the decision, it is evident that there was no good reason for the compensation judge to issue Finding 8. He had already concluded that the employee was credible, that her testimony was supported by other credible evidence, and that the testimony of the employer’s witnesses was questionable. We believe this finding was an attempt by the compensation judge to reconcile the testimony in the case and to lessen what might be perceived as harshness in stating that he did not believe Mr. Crosno or Mr. Phelps. We see no basis in the compensation judge’s language for concluding that a different standard of proof was created or that the compensation judge was questioning the employee’s credibility.

The second argument refers to the compensation judge’s comments in his decision that Mr. Phelps was intoxicated and Mr. Crosno had been drinking beer during the party at Kelly’s house.  According to this argument, these comments reflect the compensation judge’s “unsupported assumption that inability to recall events is a consistent and certain result of alcohol use.”  The employer and insurer contend that this case should be remanded for the compensation judge to make specific findings on the effect of alcohol on witnesses and their credibility.  We find no merit to this argument.

In the present case, the question of the effect of intoxication on the ability of a witness to accurately recall events was raised by the employer’s own witness.  Mr. Crosno expressed uncertainty in his testimony as to when the employee left Kelly’s party and then explained, “I was kind of tanked up.”  Likewise, Mr. Phelps was less than definite on some points in his testimony and admitted during cross examination that he was intoxicated during the party.  Given this evidence, we believe the compensation judge did not err in noting the intoxication of these witnesses when considering the credibility of their testimony.

We return to our initial statement regarding this matter.  The sole issue for the compensation judge was the credibility of the witnesses.  He determined the employee and the evidence she presented was more believable than the testimony presented by the employer and insurer.  On the record before us, we cannot say that the compensation judge erred in his determination and we find no reason for reversing the compensation judge’s conclusions.  The decision of the compensation judge is affirmed.