TAWA J. BROWN, Employee, v. MIDWEST SPECIAL SERVS., SELF-INSURED/ASU RISK MGMT. SERVS., Employer-Insurer/Appellants.

 

WORKERS= COMPENSATION COURT OF APPEALS

DECEMBER 16, 2003

 

HEADNOTES

 

JOB OFFER - PHYSICAL SUITABILITY.  Where the employee=s post-injury work duties required work beyond the employee=s work restrictions, substantial evidence supported the compensation judge=s determinations that the employee=s post-injury work was not physically suitable, that no light-duty work was offered to the employee by the employer, and that the employee=s reduction in earning capacity after August 24, 2001, was causally related to her work injury.

 

TEMPORARY PARTIAL DISABILITY - CALCULATION OF BENEFITS.  Where the employee was temporary partially disabled as a substantial result of her first work injury, and therefore was entitled to payment of temporary partial disability benefits at the time of her second injury, and where the employee was temporarily totally disabled as a result of her second work injury, the employee was entitled to payment of ongoing temporary partial disability benefits from her first employer pursuant to Kirchner v. Iowa Natl. Mutual Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 908, 36 W.C.D. 335 (Minn. 1983) (Kirchner I), and Kirchner v. Iowa Natl. Mutual Ins. Co., 410 N.W.2d 825, 40 W.C.D. 197 (Minn. 1987) (Kirchner II).

 

Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

 

Determined by Rykken, J., Johnson, C.J., and Stofferahn, J.

Compensation Judge: Joan G. Hallock

 

Attorneys:  Matthew H. Jones, Brown & Carlson, Minneapolis, MN, for the Appellants.  Brendan Cody, Cody Law Firm, St. Paul, MN, for the Respondent.

 

OPINION

 

MIRIAM P. RYKKEN, Judge

 

The self-insured employer appeals from the compensation judge=s award of temporary partial disability benefits and from the finding that after a second work injury on March 6, 2002, the employee was entitled to benefits calculated with the formula set forth in Kirchner v. Iowa Natl. Mutual Ins. Co., 410 N.W.2d 825, 40 W.C.D. 197 (Minn. 1987).  We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.

 

BACKGROUND

 

On February 7, 2000, Ms. Tawa Brown, the employee, was employed as an assistant program instructor by the self-insured employer, Midwest Special Services.  On that date, the employee also worked at a second job, working for Hammer Residences, Inc., as an assistant program manager, and  earned a stipulated combined weekly wage totaling $1,177.52 (based on $336.33 earned from Midwest and $841.19 from Hammer Residences). 

 

The employee=s position with Midwest consisted of assisting physically and mentally disabled clients with normal daily activities.  The employee=s clients were bussed to her work site daily, and returned to their homes at night.  Since most of her clients used wheelchairs, the employee was required to off load her clients from the bus, wheel them inside, transfer them from a wheelchair into a stationary chair, assist clients with toileting, feeding, cleaning and transfers, and conduct activities with them.  In February 2000, the employee was assigned responsibility for four clients, three of whom used wheelchairs.  The employee=s second job at Hammer Residences involved assisting mentally disabled residents with their daily living activities. 

 

On February 7, 2000, while working for Midwest, the employee sustained an admitted injury to her left shoulder  while transferring a patient from a chair to a bed or table.  She initially treated with Dr. Karen Kane who diagnosed an impingement syndrome of the left shoulder related to a strain of the rotator cuff.  Dr. Kane referred her for physical therapy and assigned restrictions with no lifting more than 10-15 pounds and no reaching over shoulder level.  After her injury, the employee was restricted to no work with her left arm, but  returned to work for both employers.  At Hammer Residences, she modified her duties to include no use of her left arm.  However, the employee testified that her job at Midwest did not change following her injury.  Although the employee was reassigned to two clients in wheelchairs and two ambulatory clients who used walkers, care for these residents at Midwest still required use of her left arm.

 

By late February, Dr. Brian O=Neill diagnosed a left shoulder rotator cuff tendinitis with possibility of a rotator cuff tear, and prescribed a steroid injection.  An MRI on April 25, 2000, confirmed a rotator cuff tear and impingement syndrome.  The employee=s prescribed conservative treatment did not relieve her symptoms of persistent shoulder pain and decreased strength in her shoulder.  On July 27, 2000, Dr. O=Neill performed surgery on the employee=s left shoulder,  in the nature of an arthroscopic subacromial decompression and mini open rotator cuff repair.  The employee reported no improvement following her surgery.  She remained off work completely for two weeks, and then returned to both jobs.  The employee=s treating physician, Dr. Kane, assigned work restrictions which included no use of her left arm.  The employee communicated these restrictions to her primary supervisor and other supervisory staff at Midwest, and advised her supervisor that her work activities were aggravating her left shoulder condition, but, she contends, the employer did not modify her assigned duties.  Although the employee=s supervisor testified that the employee=s job post-surgery included simply observing and assisting clients, plus transferring patients, pushing wheelchairs and assisting with toileting if she was able to do so with one arm, the employee testified that her job after her injury was virtually identical to her pre-injury job.  The record contains no written documentation of light-duty work provided to the employee following her shoulder surgery. 

 

In March 2001, the employee took a family medical leave of absence for approximately six to seven days to assist her husband.  On August 2001, the employee took a two-week leave of absence to assist her daughter following the birth of her daughter=s baby.  During those two weeks off work, the employee=s symptoms improved while she was not performing work activities.  On August 23, 2001, the employee returned to work from her second leave of absence.  She worked that day and also August 24, 2001.  Following her return to work the employee immediately noticed an increase in her symptoms.  On August 24, 2001, the employee asked for another two-week leave of absence; she testified that she advised the employer=s vice president, Steve Howard, that she needed to take two weeks off work to think about what to do with respect to her ongoing difficulties with her shoulder.  The employee=s supervisor, Mr. Kevin McCaleb, testified that he met with the employee on August 29, and advised her that the employer was unable to grant another leave of absence.  According to Mr. McCaleb, the employee advised him that she was resigning and he asked her to provide a written confirmation of her resignation. 

 

The employee testified that after Mr. McCaleb advised her that the employer could not grant a leave of absence, he then stated that she would need to either return to work immediately or give up her job.  The employee then informed Mr. McCaleb that she was resigning because she was unable to perform her job due to her shoulder condition.  Although the employee advised Mr. McCaleb that she would deliver a signed document the following day, she did not do so.  Instead, the employee=s counsel sent a letter to the employer, stating that the employee was not resigning from her position, and requesting that light-duty work be provided to the employee within her restrictions.  The employer has not offered the employee light-duty work within her restrictions, but neither has the employer terminated the employee=s position.[1]  As a result of this series of events, the employee=s last day of work for Midwest was August 24, 2001.  

 

On January 15, 2002, the employee underwent an independent orthopedic examination with Dr. Mark Friedland, at the employer=s request.  Dr. Friedland concluded that she sustained a small rotator cuff tear as a result of her February 7, 2000, injury, but also concluded that the employee appeared to have pain in her left shoulder far beyond her objective findings.  He found that he was unable to perform appropriate apprehension testing on examination due to marked guarding of the left shoulder, and therefore was unable to determine whether the employee had any instability of her shoulder which might be causing her postoperative pain. Dr. Friedland therefore recommended that the employee be examined with her left shoulder under anesthesia, to determine if a laxity in the employee=s shoulder might render her a candidate for an arthroscopic shoulder surgery.  He recommended against a repeat decompression and repeat attempt at a rotator cuff repair, which had earlier been suggested by Dr. Mark Gregerson.  Dr. Friedland also concluded that the employee has not reached maximum medical improvement from her shoulder injury, and assigned work restrictions of no work with the left arm above waist level, no lifting with the left arm and no repetitive push/pull activities with her left arm nor work with her arm extended away from her body.

 

The employee continued working at Hammer Residences, and worked solely at that position until she started an additional new position with Heartland Home Care (Heartland) on February 25, 2002.  She worked in a hospice setting for Heartland between February 25 and March 6, 2002.  On March 6, 2002, she was involved in a work-related car accident while working for Hammer Residences, and was totally disabled thereafter at least until the date of hearing held on December 17, 2002.  The employee continued to receive medical treatment for her left shoulder.  At Dr. Kane=s referral, she was examined by Dr. Daniel Buss in April 2002.  He recommended physical therapy at the Sister Kenny Institute and cessation of narcotic pain medication in lieu of additional surgery.

 

Following the employee=s injury, Midwest paid the employee temporary partial disability benefits between August 7, 2000 and July 5, 2001, a total of $724.31 during that 29.3 week period, which calculates to an average weekly amount of $24.72.  A hearing was held before a compensation judge on December 17, 2002, to address the employee=s claims for temporary partial disability benefits between August 24, 2001, and her second injury on March 6, 2002, and for payment of ongoing temporary partial disability benefits following her second work injury on March 6, 2002.  At hearing, the self-employed employer denied the employee=s claims, asserting that on August 24, 2001, the employee left a suitable job that she was able to perform within her physical work restrictions, and as a result was not entitled to the claimed benefits.  The hearing record closed on January 10, 2003, after submission of briefs by counsel.

 

In Findings and Order, served and filed on March 11, 2003, the compensation judge found that the employee did not leave suitable employment with the employer, Midwest, on August 24, 2001, and found that the employee was entitled to payment of temporary partial disability benefits between August 25, 2001, through March 6, 2002.  The compensation judge also found that the employee was entitled to continued payment from Midwest for temporary partial disability benefits following her second work injury on March 6, 2002, with such temporary partial disability benefits calculated based on the formula set forth in Kirchner v. Iowa Natl. Mutual Ins. Co., 410 N.W.2d 825, 40 W.C.D. 197 (Minn. 1987).  The self-insured employer appeals.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

On appeal, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether "the findings of fact and order [are] clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted."  Minn. Stat. ' 176.421, subd. 1 (1992).  Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, "they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate."  Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).  Where evidence conflicts or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings are to be affirmed.  Id. at 60, 37 W.C.D. at 240.  Similarly, findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, "unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.@  Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).

 

DECISION

 

Entitlement to Temporary Partial Disability Benefits

 

The employer appeals from the compensation judge=s award of temporary partial disability benefits since August 24, 2001.  Temporary partial benefits are payable while an employee is employed, Aearning less than [her] weekly wage at the time of injury, and the reduced wage the employee is able to earn in [her] partially disabled condition is due to the injury.@  Minn. Stat. ' 176.101(2)(b).  An employee must show (1) a work-related injury resulting in disability, (2) an ability to work  subject to that disability, and (3) an actual loss of earning capacity that is causally related to the work-related disability.  Morehouse v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 313 N.W.2d 8, 34 W.C.D. 314 (Minn. 1981); Krotzer v. Browning-Ferris, 459 N.W.2d 509, 43 W.C.D. 254 (Minn. 1990); Dorn v. A.J. Chromy Constr. Co., 310 Minn. 42, 245 N.W.2d 451, 29 W.C.D. 86 (1976).  In order to be eligible for temporary partial benefits, the employee must establish a reduction in earning capacity that is causally related to the work injury.  Arouni v. Kelleher Constr., Inc., 426 N.W.2d 860, 864, 41 W.C.D. 42, 48 (Minn. 1988).  "[T]emporary partial benefit awards are generally based on post-injury wages because post-injury wages are presumptively representative of an employee's reduced earning capacity.  In appropriate circumstances, however, this presumption can be rebutted with evidence indicating that employee's ability to earn is different than the post-injury wage."  Einberger v. 3M Co., 41 W.C.D. 727, 739 (W.C.C.A. 1989) (citation omitted).

 

The compensation judge found that the job at Midwest which the employee left on August 24, 2001, was not suitable as it was not within the employee=s physical work restrictions.  Inferring that the employee=s job did not establish the employee=s post-injury earning capacity and that the employee=s reduction in earning capacity after August 24, 2001, was causally related to her work injury, the compensation judge found that the employee was entitled to temporary partial disability benefits after August 24, 2001.

 

The self-insured employer appeals, contending that because the employee=s post-injury job at Midwest was physically suitable, and is still available to the employee, the job established her earning capacity.  The employer argues that since the employee sustained no loss of earning capacity as a result of her injury, she was not entitled to payment of temporary partial disability benefits after leaving her job with the employer.  In support of its argument, the employer relies on the testimony by the employee=s supervisor that the employee was limited to one-arm work and was asked to request help in performing any tasks that required work with her left arm.  The employer argues that the employee=s testimony, that the job required tasks beyond her physical work restrictions, was not credible.


However, the compensation judge concluded that the employee=s post-injury job was not physically suitable.  The compensation judge concluded that the employee continued working for the employer, outside of her restrictions, for more than a year and a half post-injury while her shoulder condition worsened until she could no longer perform her required job duties.  In her memorandum, the compensation judge referred to the testimony presented by the employee and her supervisor regarding her post-injury job duties, and specifically credited the employee=s testimony over that of her supervisor in reaching her conclusion that the employee=s post-injury job exceeded her restrictions.

 

A compensation judge may rely on the testimony of the employee and the employee=s ability to perform work following the injury in support of the finding that she has restrictions on her ability to work as a result of the original injury.  See, e.g., Carlson v. Northland Paper Supply, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Jan. 8, 1999) (an employee=s testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support finding of restrictions and entitlement to rehabilitation consultation); Nelson v. Northern Milk Prods., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Dec. 11, 1998) (an employee=s testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support finding that the employee has a disability which affects his ability to work and which limits his earning capacity); see generally  Brening v. Roto-Press, Inc., 237 N.W.2d 383, 28 W.C.D. 225 (Minn. 1975) (an employee's testimony alone may serve as a sufficient basis for determination of the physical demands of a job and their relationship to specific symptoms).  Assessment of witness credibility is the unique function of the factfinder.  Tews v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 430 N.W.2d 178, 180, 41 W.C.D. 410, 412 (Minn. 1988).  We will not evaluate the credibility and probative value of witness testimony and choose different inferences from the evidence than the compensation judge.  Krotzer v. Browning-Ferris/Woodlake Sanitation Serv., 459 N.W.2d 509, 513, 43 W.C.D. 254, 260-61 (Minn. 1990).

 

  We conclude that substantial evidence, including the employee=s testimony and her medical records, supports the compensation judge=s determination that the employee was physically unable to continue working at her job with the employer after August 24, 2001, as a substantial result of her work injury.  The compensation judge reasonably concluded that the employee=s previous job with the employer did not establish her post-injury earning capacity and that the job did not rebut the presumption that the employee=s wages after August 24, 2001, represented her reduced earning capacity.  See Einberger, 41 W.C.D. at 739.  The compensation judge=s finding that the employee was entitled to temporary partial disability benefits after August 24, 2001, is substantially supported by the record, and we therefore affirm the award of temporary partial disability benefits.

 

Calculation of Temporary Partial Disability Benefits

 

The compensation judge addressed two periods of temporary partial disability benefits: the period of time between August 24, 2001, and the employee=s second injury on March 6, 2002, and the period since March 6, 2002.  The employer and insurer=s liability for temporary partial disability benefits between August 24, 2001, and March 6, 2002, is based upon the difference between the employee=s stipulated date-of-injury wage rate of $1,177.52 and her earnings from Hammer Residences and Heartland Home Health Care during that period of time. 

 

The compensation judge also found that following the employee=s second injury on March 6, 2002, that occurred while she was working for Hammer Residences, the employee was entitled to payment of ongoing temporary partial disability benefits from Midwest, with those benefits calculated pursuant to Kirchner v. Iowa Natl. Mutual Ins. Co., 410 N.W.2d 825, 40 W.C.D. 197 (Minn. 1987).  The compensation judge determined that Midwest=s ongoing liability was $224.22 per week, and that Hammer Residences, the employer at the time of the employee=s second injury, owed a weekly temporary total disability benefit of $525.78, which would result in a total weekly payment of $750.00, the maximum compensation rate in effect on the date of the second injury.[2]

 

The self-insured employer asserted on appeal that if temporary partial disability benefits were awarded by the compensation judge, Kirchner would apply to calculation of benefits payable after the employee=s second injury on March 6, 2002.   However, the employer disputes the calculation method proposed by the compensation judge and argues that the judge incorrectly calculated the respective liability of the two employers.  The employer argues that the compensation judge=s calculations were based, in part, on her mistaken belief that the employee was working at Midwest on both dates of injury.[3]  The employer further argues that in order to calculate Kirchner benefits, one must compare only the employee=s average weekly wage earned while working for Heartland to that which she earned from Midwest, contending that the employee sustained no injury-related diminution in her wages from Hammer Residences. 

 

The decisions issued in Kirchner I and II outline the method for calculating the responsibilities of the respective employers and insurers for payment of wage loss benefits due to an injured employee who was partially disabled and receiving temporary partial disability benefits at the time of a subsequent work-related injury resulting in the employee=s total disability.  An employee may be entitled to concurrent temporary partial disability and temporary total disability benefits following a second work injury, provided that the aggregate temporary partial disability and temporary total disability benefits do not exceed the statutory maximum for temporary total disability benefits in force at the time of the second injury.

 

This court has previously summarized Kirchner I and II as follows:

 


The employee in Kirchner sustained a work-related injury in 1977, which reduced his earning capacity and gave rise to eligibility for temporary partial benefits from Iowa National Insurance Company.  A second work injury in 1979, for which Home Insurance Company was liable, further reduced Kirchner=s earning capacity and made him totally incapable of working.  The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Iowa National was responsible for continuing temporary partial benefits at the 1977 wage rate and that Home was to pay, concurrently, temporary total disability benefits based on Kirchner=s 1979 part-time wage rate.  Kirchner I, 399 N.W.2d 908, 913, 36 W.C.D. 335, 342 (Minn. 1983).  In Kirchner II, the court clarified that the combined amount of temporary partial and temporary total benefits may not exceed the statutory maximum for temporary total benefits in effect for the injury that caused the employee=s total disability - in that case, the 1979 injury - and that, Awhen temporary partial and temporary total disability benefits are reduced because of a statutory maximum, the obligation of the earlier insurer is calculated first and the later insurer pays the remainder.@  Kirchner II, 410 N.W.2d 825, 829, 40 W.C.D. 197, 202 (Minn. 1987).

 

Horstmann v. American Can Co., 49 W.C.D. 26, 30-31 (W.C.C.A. 1993).

 

The calculation methods proposed by the parties and outlined by the compensation judge in this case do not accurately reflect the formula set forth in Kirchner I and II, and should be revised in order to account for the difference in the weekly wages earned by the employee at the time of her 2000 and 2002 injuries.  However, the record contains minimal references to the employee=s wages earned on March 6, 2002, and the judge made no finding of the employee=s wages earned on March 6, 2002.[4]  As a result, there is inadequate information on which this court can determine  the amount of temporary partial disability owed by Midwest following the employee=s March 6, 2002, injury.

 

We therefore affirm the compensation judge=s finding that Midwest is liable for payment of temporary partial disability and related interest following the employee=s injury on March 6, 2002, and that such payment is to be calculated pursuant to Kirchner I and II, but we reverse her determinations that temporary partial disability benefits are owed by Midwest at a weekly rate of $224.22.  We remand this matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a determination of the employee=s wage rate on March 6, 2002, based upon her combined earnings from Hammer Residences and Heartland Home Health Care, and for a related finding of the weekly temporary partial disability benefits owed by Midwest following the employee=s injury on March 6, 2002.

 

 



[1] The employee testified that the only time the employer indirectly offered her a light-duty position was during her conversation with Kevin McCaleb.  She testified that after she advised him that she was resigning, the employer commented that although he hated to see her go, the only light duty job was in St. Paul and she lived too far from that location.  The employee resides in Big Lake, Minnesota, and worked at a Plymouth, Minnesota, location on the date of her injury, approximately 45 miles from her residence.  The employee estimated that a commute to St. Paul would be a 1 2 hour-long drive.

[2] The compensation judge adopted the position of the employee concerning calculation of benefits, and arrived at the $224.22 by calculating a weekly compensation rate based solely on the wages earned by the employee at Midwest on February 7, 2000 (wages of $336.33 x 2/3 = $224.22).

[3] On both injury dates, February 7, 2000 and March 6, 2002, the employee worked for Hammer Residences.  However, on February 7, 2000, she was employed by Midwest Special Services and Hammer Residences.  On March 6, 2002, she was employed by Heartland Home Health Care and Hammer Residences.

[4] The record contains information on the weekly temporary total disability benefits paid by Hammer Residences after the employee=s injuryBeither $536.00 or $536.18 per week.  Evidently the employee=s weekly wage earned at Hammer Residences on March 6, 2002, was approximately $804.00.  However, there is no exact wage rate listed in the record.  Wage records submitted into evidence document the wages the employee earned from Heartland between February 7 and March 6, 2002, but the parties did not submit calculations of the Heartland wage rate nor do the findings and order contain a determination of the employee=s weekly wage earned at Heartland.