This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C1-98-219

C8-98-234

Kathleen Bonner,

Respondent,

vs.

State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company,

Respondent (C1-98-219),

Appellant (C8-98-234),

Reliance Insurance Company,

Defendant,

National Casualty Insurance Company,

Appellant (C1-98-219),

Respondent (C8-98-234).

Filed July 7, 1998

Appeal dismissed

Klaphake, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 97-10178

Mark R. Kosieradzki, Kosieradzki & Associates, 601 Carlson Parkway, Ste. 1150, Minnetonka, MN 55305; and

Logan N. Foreman III, 701 Fourth Ave. S., Ste. 300, Minneapolis, MN 55415 (for respondent Bonner)

R. Gregory Stephens, Katherine A. McBride, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P., 4200 Multifoods Tower, 33 S. Sixth St., Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for State Farm)

Scott R. Drawe, Stich, Angell, Kreidler, Brownson & Ballou, P.A., The Crossings, Ste. 120, 240 Second Ave. S., Minneapolis, MN 55401 (for National Casualty)

Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KLAPHAKE, Judge

In this action for determination of no-fault benefits, the trial court certified the question of whether the injuries sustained by the insured arose out of the use of a motor vehicle as required under Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (1996). We dismiss the appeal because we conclude that the question was not proper for certification.

FACTS

On July 20, 1991, respondent Kathleen Bonner was abducted and robbed as she drove a rental vehicle in Minneapolis. She initiated a claim for no-fault benefits against appellant National Casualty Insurance Company, the rental car insurer, and against appellant State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, her personal automobile insurer. Both companies denied coverage on the basis that her claimed losses did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle. The trial court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, finding that her injuries arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. The parties, on stipulated facts, moved the trial court to certify the liability issue. The trial court certified the following question to this court as important and doubtful:

Do the injuries sustained in this incident arise out of the use of a motor vehicle as required under Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1, to establish a right to no-fault basic economic loss benefits?

D E C I S I O N

As a preliminary matter, this court must determine whether the question was proper for certification: "[T]he standard for a certified question * * * must be strictly followed." Massie v. City of Duluth, 425 N.W.2d 858, 860 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Sept. 16, 1988). Where the trial court errs in certifying a question, the appellate court must dismiss the appeal. See Proprietor's Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 451 N.W.2d 904, 906 (Minn. App. 1990) (appellate court dismissed appeal where certified question not important and doubtful). A question certified as "important and doubtful" must be from an order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or an order denying summary judgment. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(h). "An issue is important if its resolution will have statewide impact. A doubtful issue is an issue on which there is no controlling precedent." Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. 1992) (citations omitted).

We conclude that the issue in this case is not proper for certification. First, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(h) allows certification from either an order denying a motion to dismiss or an order denying a motion for summary judgment. As the trial court granted summary judgment to respondent, the question should not have been certified. Second, the certified question is not important and doubtful. An answer to the question would not have statewide impact because it is dependent on specific facts; the only question is how the law applies to "the injuries sustained in this incident." Further, both sides rely on several cases that are arguably on point. The question is only doubtful in a narrower sense--in how existing law applies to the specific facts. For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.