This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C6-97-2005

In Re the Marriage of:

Bonnie Marie Giemza, petitioner,

Respondent,

vs.

Ronald Donald Giemza,

Appellant.

Filed June 2, 1998

Affirmed

Harten, Judge

Winona County District Court

File No. F096000827

James R. Forsythe, Streater & Murphy, 64 East Fourth Street, P.O. Box 310, Winona, MN 55987-0310 (for appellant)

Howard K. Kruger, 301 West Broadway, Winona, MN 55987 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Harten, Judge, and Schultz, Judge.[*]

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HARTEN, Judge

Appellant-husband claims that the district court should not have amended the parties' stipulated dissolution judgment to allow respondent-wife additional time to purchase his interest in certain land. We affirm.

FACTS

The September 23, 1997, judgment dissolving the marriage of appellant-husband Ronald Giemza and respondent-wife Bonnie Giemza allowed wife 30 days to pay husband for his interest in certain land. On the 30th day, wife tendered part of the payment and sought an ex parte order extending the 30-day period. Because the remainder of the funds wife wanted to use to pay husband were subject to a federal law requiring a three working-day delay to allow a buyer to rescind a purchase agreement, they were not yet available. On October 27, 1997, after argument by both parties' counsel, the district court orally extended the 30-day period. The next day, the district court orally "clarified" its order and husband appealed. On November 6, the district court issued a written order "clarifying" its oral ruling.

D E C I S I O N

The district court extended the payment period, finding the three-day delay "was apparently overlooked by everyone until the checks were to be delivered." Therefore, functionally, the district court modified the judgment for mistake. See Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 (1) (1996) (allowing district court to reopen judgment for "mistake"). Whether to reopen a judgment under Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(1) for mistake is discretionary with the district court. Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1996).

The part of the judgment in dispute was based on the parties' stipulation. The district court stated that when it approved the stipulation, it was not aware that there would be a three-day delay in wife's ability to secure the funds she needed to pay husband. Further, at the October 27 hearing, the district court stated:

[Counsel] picked the 30 days which, of course, I could have changed if I thought it was going to be of any problem whatsoever. I never dreamed that this thing would come popping back because you couldn't make it in 30 days. I would have, if that would have been up to me, I would have extended a little time knowing that this is how things work in this world.

(Emphasis added). A district court may "refuse to accept the terms of [a] stipulation in part or in toto." Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn. 1989). Thus, here, the district court (a) had authority to accept or alter the parties' stipulation; (b) stated it would have altered the 30-day period if it thought that period was going to be a problem; and (c) was, when it approved the stipulation, unaware of the three-day delay which caused the 30-day period to be a problem. As a result, the district court's post-judgment extension of the 30-day period is, essentially, its doing what it would have done originally if it had fully understood the circumstances. Husband has not shown such a ruling to be an abuse of the district court's discretion.

We reject any argument that Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 does not apply here.

See Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 n.3 (Minn. 1997) (noting linguistic and functional similarities between Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2 and Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02); Artz v. Artz, 361 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating rule 60.02 was not intended "to correct judicial error" or to allow district court to correct error it "feels" it made). In the cases typified by Artz, an appeal of the allegedly mistaken ruling was available. Here, however, because the parties asked the district court to adopt the stipulation, neither party could have been aggrieved when the district court did what the parties asked it to do. Therefore, neither party could have appealed. See Twin Cities Metro. Pub. Transit Area v. Holter, 311 Minn. 423, 425, 249 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1977) ("[a] party who is not aggrieved by a judgment may not appeal from it").

Affirmed.

[*] Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. Art. VI, § 10.