Kirk O. Kolbo, Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, LLP, 3300 Norwest Center, 90 South Ninth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondent Phoenix Ins.)

Louise Dovre Bjorkman, Mark A. Solheim, Karen Imus Johnson, 2000 Metropolitan Centre, 333 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and Crippen, Judge.

Appellant Sal-Vendor Corporation and defendant William Conaway are jointly obligated on a judgment in favor of William's brother, who was injured by William in an incident that occurred in June 1995. Sal-Vendor appeals a summary judgment declaring that William was not covered under a homeowner's insurance policy issued by respondent Phoenix Insurance Company to William Conaway's parents. We affirm.

William Conaway, 24-years-old, rented a room at $175 per month in June 1995, at the home of Coral Olstad. He kept only a "shirt or two" at his parents' home and slept overnight on their sofa "off and on." The same kind of contact had existed for over five years and William had no intention of living indefinitely with his parents. His father said William was not wanted at the home because of William's drinking and that the parents furnished no financial support for him. The record shows a dispute as to where William got his mail: at one time he said he received all of his mail at his parents' home and at another time he said most of his mail was delivered to the Olstad address.

A determination of residency for the purposes of insurance coverage is a question of fact. Fruchtman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Minn. 54, 55, 142 N.W.2d 299, 300 (1966); Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1987). The supreme court has recognized three factors to consider in determining whether a person is a resident of a named insured's household: (a) whether the person lives "under the same roof" with his family, (b) whether the individual and his family have a "close, intimate and informal relationship," and (c) whether the duration of the person's stay is "likely to be substantial" and such that it would be reasonable for the family to consider the relationship in contracting on a matter such as insurance. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Viktora, 318 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Minn. 1982) (citation omitted). While the intended duration of a stay need not be permanent, "something more is required than `a mere temporary sojourn.'" Olson, 402 N.W.2d at 624 (citation omitted).

The trial court found that William's stays with his parents "did not amount to more than a `mere temporary sojourn'" and correctly determined that there is inadequate proof to show Conaway lived at his parents' home, that he had a close relationship with his parents, or that he intended to stay at his parents' home indefinitely. In Fruchtman, we upheld a summary judgment on non-residency where a 27-year-old had not stayed in his mother's home for more than a week or two at a time but had kept most of his belongings at his mother's home and used her mailing address. Fruchtman, 274 Minn. at 55-58, 142 N.W.2d at 300-02. The evidence of residency is even more slight here.

Appellant argues that there is ample evidence to create a fact question of whether William spent more than an occasional overnight stay sleeping on his parents' couch. William's mother testified "Bill was often with us in that stretch." But she added "I don't know how often. He was there once in a while. I - I can't remember." All evidence directly stated on this issue indicates that William had only occasionally stayed overnight at his parents' home and never for more than a week at a time. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment.

Affirmed.