Daniel J. Moulton, Moulton Law Office, 976 14th Ave. S.W., Rochester, MN 55902 (for appellant C.C.F.)

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota St., St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent state)

Raymond F. Schmitz, Olmsted County Attorney, David S. Voigt, Geoffrey A. Hjerleid, Richard W. Jackson Jr., Assistant County Attorneys, 151 S.E. Fourth St., Rochester, MN 55904 (for respondent state)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Willis, Judge, and Forsberg, Judge.^**

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

This appeal is from a juvenile delinquency dispositional order that requires appellant C.C.F., following his adjudication of delinquency for fourth-degree and fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, to register as a sex offender and provide a sample for DNA testing. We affirm.

In reviewing a claim that a statute is unconstitutional, this court applies a de novo standard of review. In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn. 1993). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Minn. 1993).

C.C.F. argues that the sex offender registration statute violates a child's right to due process under the state constitution. This court, however, has held that applying the registration statute to a juvenile offender does not violate due process. In re Welfare of C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d 431, 433-34 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1997). This court ruled that the registration requirement is not punitive nor is it inconsistent with the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court system. Id.

C.C.F. also argues that the sex offender registration statute violates the state constitution because it imposes dispositional terms that are beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This argument also fails. The sex offender registration statute does impose a reporting requirement that extends beyond C.C.F.'s 19th birthday, when the juvenile court's jurisdiction ends. But a violation of the reporting requirement would not invoke juvenile court jurisdiction as a violation of the dispositional order; it is, rather, a new offense. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5 (1996) (person required to register who knowingly violates registration provisions is guilty of gross misdemeanor). C.C.F. cites no authority to support his argument that this violates the state constitutional guarantee of due process.

Nor is there any support for C.C.F.'s argument that the registration statute violates the "certain remedy" clause of our state constitution. See Minn. Const. art. I, § 8 (every person is entitled to a certain remedy for injuries received). The clause ensures that, if a common law right to a remedy is taken away, the legislature must replace it with a reasonable substitute. Schmidt v. Modern Metals Foundry, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 538, 540-41 (Minn. 1988). This argument does not apply here; C.C.F. has shown no common law right abrogated by the registration statute. Further, because this court has held that the sex offender registration statute is not punitive, C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d at 433-34; State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995), we must also reject C.C.F.'s argument that the statute imposes cruel and unusual punishment.

C.C.F. argues that the sex offender registration statute violates the confidentiality of juvenile court files. See Minn. Stat. § 260.161, subd. 2(1996) (protecting juvenile records from public disclosure). Sex offender registration data are not public, but rather "private data on individuals," which may be released only selectively. See Minn. Stat. §§ 13.02, subd. 12 (1996) (definition of "private data on individuals"), 243.166, subd. 7 (1996) (classifying registration data as "private data on individuals"). The statute does not violate the confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings.

Affirmed.