This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C1-96-2192

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Iraj M. Fard,

Appellant.

Filed November 10, 1997

Affirmed

Thoreen, Judge

[*]

Dakota County District Court

File No. T19632270

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent)

Rollin Crawford, West St. Paul City Attorney, Daniel J. Beeson, Korine L. Larsen, Assistant City Attorneys, 633 South Concord Street, South St. Paul, MN 55075 (for respondent)

Iraj M. Fard, 5295 Audubon Avenue, Inver Grove Heights, MN 55077 (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Huspeni, Presiding Judge, Amundson, Judge, and Thoreen, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

THOREEN, Judge

This appeal is from a petty misdemeanor conviction of two counts of speeding in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2 (1996). Appellant Iraj Fard argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Iraj Fard was charged by citation with two counts of petty misdemeanor speeding. The first citation alleged that on August 8, 1996, Fard was travelling at 47 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone. The second citation charged Fard with travelling 45 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone on August 20, 1996.

The officer who ticketed Fard for the first offense testified that he was parked on Butler Avenue with his radar unit on when he saw a car pass him at a high rate of speed, which he estimated at 46 m.p.h. The radar unit, which the officer testified was working properly, was properly calibrated, and had been tested at the beginning of his shift, clocked Fard's car at 47 m.p.h. The speed limit at that location was 30 m.p.h.

The officer who ticketed Fard for the second offense testified that he was driving northbound on Robert Street when he saw a southbound car going at high speed, which his radar unit clocked at 52 m.p.h. The officer testified that the radar unit was working properly, was properly calibrated, and had been tested at the beginning of his shift. The speed limit at the location was 35 m.p.h.

D E C I S I O N

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to permit the factfinder to reach the verdict that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence is the same whether the factfinder is the court or the jury. See State v. Oanes, 543 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 1996) (applying same standard of review to court finding of guilt).

Fard argues that the officers gave false testimony. This court, however, must assume the factfinder believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence. State v. Sullivan, 360 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Apr. 12, 1985). Fard has presented no reason why the trial court should have disbelieved the officers' testimony that Fard was speeding, particularly when that testimony was corroborated by radar readings in each case.

The state satisfied the conditions for the admission of radar evidence. See Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 10 (1996). The officers estimated Fard's speed was well above the speed limit, and testified that he admitted to driving at an excessive rate of speed at the scene. The evidence was amply sufficient to support Fard's conviction. Cf. State, City of St. Louis Park v. Bogren, 410 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Minn. App. 1987) (radar evidence of speeding sufficient by itself to sustain conviction).

Affirmed.

[ ]* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.