This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C5-97-522

Michael R. Sjodin, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

Candice L Sjodin,

Respondent.

Filed October 7, 1997

Affirmed

Short, Judge

St. Louis County District Court

File No. F595600400

Jill A. Eichenwald, 920 Alworth Building, 306 West Superior Street, Duluth, Minnesota 55802, (for appellant)

Daniel C. Berglund, Falsani, Balmer, Berglund & Peterson, 1200 Alworth Building, 306 West Superior Street, Duluth, Minnesota, 55802, (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and Crippen, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SHORT, Judge

This dissolution case involves issues of custody, visitation, and dependency tax exemption. On appeal from a denial of a motion to amend the judgment and decree, Michael J. Sjodin argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) granting his former spouse sole legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, and (2) failing to allocate visitation transportation costs or establish a visitation schedule that adequately serves the best interests of the child or grant him the dependency tax exemption. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

A trial court has broad discretion to decide custody issues and visitation, and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion as evidenced by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law. See Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn. 1993) (holding scope of appellate review of custody determination is limited to whether trial court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by evidence or by improperly applying law) (citing Lenz v. Lenz, 430 N.W.2d 168, 169 (Minn. 1988); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (holding scope of appellate review limited to finding errors and correcting them); see also Manthei v. Manthei, 268 N.W.2d 45, 45-6 (Minn. 1978) (holding discretion of trial court in deciding questions relating to visitation is extensive) (citing Bryant v. Bryant, 264 Minn. 509, 119 N.W.2d 714 (1963)). A trial court's findings must be sustained unless clearly erroneous. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210 (citing Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985)). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See Hansen v. Hansen, 284 Minn. 1, 5, 169 N.W.2d 12, 14 (1969) (holding appellate courts will be slow to interfere with trial court's ruling in custody matters absent arbitrary action).

I.

Sjodin agrees the trial court made the required statutory findings on custody. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (1996) (listing thirteen factors relevant to best interests of child). However, Sjodin argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding facts contrary to the evidence. The record demonstrates: (1) both parents sought sole physical custody of the child; (2) the child was too young to express her custodial preference; (3) both parents maintained a close intimate relationship with the child; (4) the child developed a close relationship with the family and Sjodin's former spouse; (5) the child was well adjusted, in good health, and thriving in the care of Sjodin's former spouse; (6) neither party contemplated a change in their living arrangements; (7) neither parent is mentally ill or has physical problems that would impede their ability to parent the child; and (8) both parties are able to give the child love, affection, and guidance. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination, and deferring to the trial court's opportunity to judge witness credibility, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sole physical custody of the child to Sjodin's former spouse. See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210 (holding trial court's role is to make findings based on credibility of witnesses).

Sjodin also argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sole, as opposed to joint, legal custody. However, the record demonstrates: (1) the court-appointed social worker concluded the parents do not have an ability to cooperate; (2) the court-appointed social worker concluded the parties are unable to resolve issues through mediation or between themselves; and (3) the court-appointed guardian ad litem found no evidence suggesting either parent will cooperate in the future. Because the record contains extensive evidence of the parties' inability to cooperate, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sole legal custody. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 2 (1996) (listing four factors courts must examine in determination of joint physical or joint legal custody); see also Estby v. Estby, 371 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding trial court must consider factors set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 2 when determining joint legal custody).

II.

Sjodin argues the trial court abused its discretion by not allocating visitation transportation costs between the parties. We disagree. The record demonstrates: (1) Sjodin has visitation with his daughter every other weekend, and one week in the summer; (2) Sjodin currently pays $75 per month in child support; (3) his former spouse is currently receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children; and (4) Sjodin's monthly income is $555. Given these facts, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. See Shepard v. Shepard, 352 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn. App. 1984) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require custodial parent to pay half of the costs of transporting child to and from Washington each summer).

Sjodin also argues the court's visitation schedule does not adequately serve the best interests of the child. However, the child is only three years old. The trial court determined Sjodin would have visitation: (1) every other weekend, from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday; (2) on Christmas Day; Thanksgiving Day, Father's Day, the Fourth of July, and Labor Day; and (3) one week during the summer until the child is older. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. See Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 51 (Minn. 1984) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying noncustodial parent overnight visitation with his five- and six-year-old children).

Sjodin further argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award him the dependency tax exemption. See Fudenberg v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding state courts may allocate dependency tax exemption to noncustodial parents). We disagree. It is undisputed that Sjodin's income is minimal, and his former spouse expressed a desire to gain employment in the future. Given these facts, and Sjodin's ability to seek a modification of the trial court's decree if his income increases, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. See Greeler v. Greeler, 368 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding dependency tax exemptions may be modified in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 518.64).

Affirmed.