This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C4-97-284
In the Matter of the Welfare of: E.W.B., Juvenile.
Filed October 14, 1997
Affirmed
Short, Judge
Scott County District Court
File No. 9612707
Dean S. Grau, 3933 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN
55402 (for appellant )
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 102 Capitol Building, St. Paul, MN
55155, and
Thomas J. Harbinson, Scott County Attorney, Susan K. McNellis, Assistant County
Attorney, 428 South Holmes Street, Shakopee, MN 55379 (for respondent.
Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and Short,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SHORT, Judge
E.W.B. appeals from an adjudication of delinquency based on his violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (1996) (assault in the third-degree). On
appeal, E.W.B. argues the trial court erred in: (1) finding probable cause for
him to stand trial; (2) determining the evidence was sufficient to establish
the elements of assault; and (3) refusing to allow him to inquire regarding a
civil lawsuit. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
A juvenile court's finding of probable cause will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. See In re Welfare of
Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 1981) (holding findings of juvenile
court will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous); Minn. R. Crim.
P. 11.03 (holding record must establish probable cause to believe defendant
committed crime); Minn. R. Juv. P. 19.04, subd.3(B) (holding showing of
probable cause shall be made pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 11). When a
juvenile challenges a delinquency adjudication on the basis of insufficient
evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
decision and assume the trial court believed the state's witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. See In re Welfare of J. G.
B., 473 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn. App. 1991) (quoting State v.
Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978), and applying this rule to a
delinquency adjudication). Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of
that discretion. State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 101-02 (Minn.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132 (1981). If there is a
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the
excluded evidence had been admitted, then the erroneous exclusion of evidence
is prejudicial. State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.
1994).
I.
E.W.B. argues the trial court's use of the phrase "may have
committed" rather than "has committed," together with the alleged weakness in
the state's case, compel a finding of doubt, not probable cause. We disagree.
The record includes: (1) photographs of the victim's injuries; (2) statements
from the victim and other witnesses that E.W.B. was the only person who could
have caused the victim's injuries; and (3) statements from defense witnesses
that the victim was the aggressor and someone other than E.W.B. caused the
victim's injuries. The trial court found nothing to suggest the defense
witnesses were more believable than the state's witnesses. Under the
circumstances, we cannot say the trial court's finding of probable cause was
erroneous. See State v. Dunagan, 521 N.W.2d 355, 356 (Minn.
1994) (holding probable cause properly found where elements of causation were
contradicted by defense witnesses but credibility of testimony was not
established).
II.
E.W.B. also argues the evidence was not sufficient to show he
intended to cause injury to the victim or to overcome his self-defense theory.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1 (1996) (authorizing use of
reasonable force in resisting an offense against person); State v.
Raymond, 440 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Minn. 1989) (holding "intent" is an
inference drawn from totality of circumstances); see also State v.
Housley, 322 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1982) (holding state must prove
beyond reasonable doubt that defendant used unjustifiable force). However, the
record demonstrates: (1) E.W.B. was asked to leave, given an opportunity, and
refused to leave the party; (2) when asked to leave, E.W.B. approached the
victim and pushed him; (3) E.W.B. and the victim wrestled; (4) the victim
sustained a deep cut to his chin; (5) medical experts testified the injury was
not caused by a kick or a blow to the head, and it was highly unlikely the
wound was caused by falling on a sharp object on the ground; (6) the victim's
head did not touch the ground during the fight; and (7) E.W.B. received
superficial abrasions and complained of chest pain but was not seriously
injured. Given these facts, the trial court reasonably could conclude E.W.B.
intended to assault the victim and exceeded the boundaries of reasonable
force.
III.
Finally, E.W.B. argues the trial court erred in refusing to permit
questions concerning a witness's involvement in a civil lawsuit against E.W.B.
See State v. Underwood, 281 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1979) (holding
evidence of witness's pending civil lawsuit admissible to impeach). After a
careful review of the record, we conclude E.W.B. has failed to show a
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the
excluded evidence had been admitted. See Post, 512 N.W.2d at 102
(holding error prejudicial if there is reasonable probability verdict might
have been different if excluded evidence had been admitted). Under these
circumstances, the trial court did not commit prejudicial error.
Affirmed.