Orrin Gregory Haugen, petitioner, Appellant, vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent. C7-97-635, Court of Appeals Unpublished, September 16, 1997.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996)

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C7-97-635

Orrin Gregory Haugen, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,

Respondent

Filed September 16, 1997

Affirmed

Schumacher, Judge

Wabasha County District Court

File No. C9-96-585

Thomas E. Gorman, Patrick J. Arendt, Gorman & Gorman, Ltd., 1626 Old West Third Street, Red Wing, MN 55066 (for appellant)

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Steven H. Alpert, Assistant Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN 55103-2106 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and Willis, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SCHUMACHER, Judge

Appellant Orrin Haugen challenges the district court's order sustaining the revocation of his driver's license under the implied consent law, arguing the arresting officer conducted an unconstitutional investigatory stop. We affirm, holding the stop was based on the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion that Haugen was driving in violation of the traffic laws.

FACTS

On November 30, 1996, early in the morning, Deputy Novak of the Wabasha County Sheriff's Office stopped a pickup truck operated by Orrin Haugen. Deputy Novak stopped the pickup truck because he believed the rear license plate was not properly illuminated in violation of the traffic laws. After stopping Haugen, Deputy Novak determined that Haugen was under the influence of alcohol and arrested him. Subsequently, the Department of Public Safety revoked Haugen's driver's license and the district court sustained the revocation. Haugen appeals.

D E C I S I O N

The constitutionality of an investigative stop is a mixed question of fact and law. Berge v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985). In reviewing an appeal from a suppression motion, we apply the "clearly erroneous" standard to the district court's factfindings. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). We will overturn incorrect conclusions of law. Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Minn. 1990).

To conduct an investigative stop, a law enforcement officer must have a "particular and objective basis for suspecting" that the subject is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Minn. 1989) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 (1981)). In determining the validity of an investigative stop, the courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, giving due regard to an officer's training and experience in law enforcement. State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695).

An officer may conduct an investigative stop upon observing a violation of the traffic laws, even if the infraction is insignificant. George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. Under Minnesota law, the rear license plate of a motor vehicle must be illuminated with a white light and legible from a distance of 50 feet. Minn. Stat. § 169.50, subd. 2 (1996). A violation of this traffic law would provide the requisite reasonable and articulable basis for a traffic stop.

At the implied consent hearing, Deputy Novak testified that when he encountered Haugen's pickup truck, he did not observe any plate lights and could not read the license plate from a distance of 50 feet. Based on his observations, Deputy Novak decided to conduct an investigatory stop. Deputy Novak followed Haugen along a seven-mile stretch of highway before initiating the stop as a safety measure, testifying that he prefers to stop individuals closer to town rather than on the highway. The district court found Deputy Novak's testimony credible. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (on review "* * * due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."). From this testimony, the district court could properly conclude that the stop was based on the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion that Haugen was driving in violation of the traffic laws.

Affirmed.