Rory Christopher Strub, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent. CX-97-614, Court of Appeals Unpublished, September 23, 1997.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

CX-97-614

Rory Christopher Strub, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed September 23, 1997

Affirmed

Short, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 92001662

Lawrence W. Pry, Assistant State Public Defender, 875 Summit Avenue LEC 304, St. Paul, MN 55105 (for appellant )

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul MN 55101, and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent )

Considered and decided by Short, Presiding Judge, Parker, Judge, and Crippen, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SHORT, Judge

A jury convicted Appellant Rory Christopher Strub of third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (1990). The trial court sentenced Strub to an executed term of 98 months in prison. Almost three years later, Strub filed a petition for postconviction relief. On appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, Strub argues the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient as a matter of law. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

On appeal from a summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief, the reviewing court is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support findings of the postconviction court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. 1996). When reviewing a claim based on the sufficiency of the evidence, we ascertain whether, based on the facts in the record and any legitimate inferences that can be drawn from them, a jury could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense charged. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978); see State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989) (holding based on state witnesses' version of facts evidence sufficient to support guilty verdict).

Strub argues the evidence in this case is insufficient to support his conviction because the victim's testimony was not corroborated and her testimony was marked with inconsistencies. We disagree. First, in criminal sexual conduct cases, corroboration of a complainant's testimony is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement. State v. Ani, 257 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Minn. 1977); see also Marshall v. State, 395 N.W.2d 362, 365-66 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding evidence sufficient to sustain guilty verdicts despite absence of strong evidence corroborating complainant's testimony), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1986). Second, minor inconsistencies between prior statements and trial testimony are not grounds for reversal. See State v. Hamilton, 289 N.W.2d 470, 477 (Minn. 1979) (holding evidence sufficient to sustain guilty verdicts despite minor inconsistencies in state's case and relative inconclusiveness of supporting evidence); see also Marshall, 395 N.W.2d at 366 (noting postconviction court found inconsistencies in claimant's testimony were due to passage of time between incident and trial and stress from courtroom experience). Any inconsistencies between the victim's previous statements and her trial testimony were highlighted by Strub's trial counsel and argued to the jury. Resolution of conflicting testimony is exclusively within the jury's province. See State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn. 1988) (concluding that in all cases jury determines credibility and weight given to testimony of individual witnesses).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record demonstrates: (1) the night of the assault, the victim made a prompt complaint to friends and received medical treatment; (2) medical experts confirmed the presence of sperm in the victim and could not eliminate Strub as a possible source; (3) pieces of the victim's clothing were found inside and outside Strub's apartment; (4) on the day of the assault, witnesses saw Strub and the victim enter Strub's apartment building and heard "crying noises" and "hollering and screaming" coming from Strub's room; (5) a witness saw the victim run out the back door; and (6) witnesses described the victim as "crying and upset," "kind of hysterical," "frightened," and "angry" after the assault. Given these facts, a jury could reasonably conclude Strub was guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.

Affirmed.