This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C7-97-389

In the Matter of the

Welfare of:

R.G., Child.

Filed September 9, 1997

Affirmed

Klaphake, Judge

Anoka County District Court

File No. J3-96-52507

Wright County District Court

File No. J9-96-50814

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Charlann Winking, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant R.G.)

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and

Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, M. Katherine Doty, Assistant Anoka County Attorney, Anoka County Courthouse, 2100 Third Avenue, Anoka, MN 55303; and

Wyman A. Nelson, Wright County Attorney, Anne L. Mohaupt, Assistant Wright County Attorney, Wright County Government Center, 10 - 2nd Street NW, Room 150, Buffalo, MN 55313 (for Respondent Counties)

Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Davies, Judge, and Peterson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KLAPHAKE, Judge

Sixteen-year-old R.G. appeals from an order adjudicating him delinquent for committing the offense of misdemeanor theft. Appellant argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial because his adjudication was based upon an inadmissible, prior witness statement. He further argues that the disposition ordered was arbitrary because it was not in his best interest and was not the least restrictive alternative necessary to restore him to law-abiding conduct. We disagree and affirm.

D E C I S I O N

I.

Appellant argues that he was denied a fair trial because inadmissible evidence was introduced by the prosecutor, not objected to by defense counsel, and not excluded by the trial court sua sponte. We find no merit to this claim because we conclude that the evidence was admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). That rule provides that a prior witness statement is not hearsay if the witness testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination, and the statement was consistent with the witness's trial testimony and was helpful to the trial court in evaluating the witness's credibility. Those conditions were met here.

Even if the statement was inadmissible, appellant received a fair trial because other evidence supports the trial court's finding that appellant committed theft. The victim testified that appellant took his sunglasses and refused to return them. Appellant testified that he asked the victim if he could look at the sunglasses and admitted that he did not return the glasses even after the victim asked for them. While appellant claimed that he gave the sunglasses to a friend and never saw them again, his initial admissions were sufficient to prove theft. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(1) (1994) ("theft" occurs when one "intentionally and without claim of right takes, uses, transfers, conceals or retains possession of movable property of another without the other's consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property"); In re Welfare of R.L.N., 371 N.W.2d 84, 86 (Minn. App. 1985) (evidence sufficient to show intent to steal when juvenile found searching storage locker at night in secretive manner and gave implausible explanation for conduct).

II.

An appellate court will affirm a trial court's delinquency disposition "[a]bsent a clear abuse of discretion." In re Welfare of J.A.J., 545 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Minn. App. 1996). A disposition must serve the child's best interests and reflect the least restrictive alternative necessary to restore the child to law-abiding conduct. Minn. Stat. § 260.185, subd. 1 (1994). The trial court must make written findings to support its choice of disposition. In re Welfare of L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Minn. App. 1985).

In this case, the trial court found that appellant's best interests were served by placement in a secure detention center program for five to ten days. The court further considered but rejected the proposed alternative disposition of placement in the program for a longer period of time. Although the trial court's findings in this case could have been more detailed, we conclude that the disposition ordered was justified by the record.

Examination of appellant's prior record reveals that appellant has committed a series of escalating offenses since 1995, including disorderly conduct, fifth-degree assault, felonious possession of a controlled substance, and felonious third-degree assault. Appellant's probation officer recommended a secured detention because he believed appellant needs to be held accountable for his continued criminal behavior and his bullying of fellow students. Finally, appellant agreed that some period of detention is appropriate but merely disagreed over the length of time he should be detained. Under these circumstances, the trial court's choice of a brief period of secure detention was not arbitrary.

We therefore affirm the order adjudicating appellant delinquent and imposing disposition.

Affirmed.