This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C7-96-2231

In the Matter of the Welfare of:

A. E., Child.

Filed June 3, 1997

Affirmed

Harten, Judge

Clay County District Court

File No. J5-96-50596

James F. Lester, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 9673, 921 Second Avenue South, Fargo, ND 58106-9673 (for Appellant)

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 14th Floor NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent)

Scott G. Collins, Assistant Clay County Attorney, Clay County Courthouse, 807 North 11th Street, Moorhead, MN 56560 (for Respondent)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Harten, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HARTEN, Judge

The district court adjudicated A.E. delinquent for making terroristic threats in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (1996). A.E. asserts on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his delinquency adjudication because the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

To challenge successfully the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a delinquency adjudication, a juvenile must show that the trier of fact reasonably could not find that he committed the charged acts. In re Welfare of T.M.V., 368 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Minn. App. 1985). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. In re Welfare of M.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 727 n. 1 (Minn. 1984). We cannot retry the facts and must assume that the district court believed the prosecution witnesses and disbelieved any contradictory evidence. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978).

A.E. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the district court decision that he made terroristic threats in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (1996) because the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility. A.E. cites State v. Kemp, 272 Minn. 447, 450, 138 N.W.2d 610, 612 (1965), for the proposition that this court may reverse a criminal conviction when the evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence is dependent on a single witness whose testimony is of dubious veracity in light of the record as a whole. In Kemp, the court reversed the defendant's conviction and granted a new trial because the testimony of the complaining witness was uncorroborated and the factfinder had not been presented with evidence impeaching the testimony of the complaining witness or evidence corroborating the defendant's alibi. Id. at 449-50, 138 N.W.2d at 611-12.

In the instant case, however, A.E.'s adjudication of delinquency was based not only on the testimony of the complaining witness but also on the testimony of two other witnesses who corroborated that testimony. Furthermore, in an attempt to impeach the prosecution witnesses, A.E. testified that they had reputations for untruthfulness. Despite this evidence, the district court concluded that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was credible based on "demeanor and manner of testifying." Our standard of review prohibits this court from second-guessing the district court's express credibility determination that the prosecution's witnesses rendered a consistent and credible account of the incident. See State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn. 1984) (resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the factfinder "because it has the opportunity to observe * * * the witnesses"); Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 ("due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness"). We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the delinquency adjudication.

Affirmed.