This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C1-96-1768

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Della Marlene Joslin,

Appellant.

Filed April 15, 1997

Affirmed

Klaphake, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 95-097324

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, 300 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for Respondent)

Melissa Haley, 431 South Seventh Street, Suite 2505, Minneapolis, MN 55415 (for Appellant)

Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Willis, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KLAPHAKE, Judge

Appellant Della Marlene Joslin challenges the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss the complaint based on Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (1994), which prohibits multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments. Because the arson and refusal to submit to chemical testing offenses involved separate and distinct states of mind, the second prosecution did not violate the statute. Therefore, we affirm.

D E C I S I O N

When reviewing a trial court's determination of whether sentences are barred by Minn. Stat. § 609.035, this court examines the record. See State v. Norby, 448 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Minn. App. 1989). When the offenses include both intentional and unintentional crimes, the critical question is whether the offense "[arose] out of a continuing and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment." State v. Sailor, 257 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. 1977). Application of section 609.035 is a fact determination. See State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 123, 142 N.W.2d 635, 637 (1966); State v. Bishop, 545 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn. App. 1996) (not mechanical test).

On the evening of October 12, 1995, Minneapolis police officers responded to a reported residential burglary. As they approached the scene, one officer stopped appellant as she drove out of the alley adjacent to the residence with her car lights extinguished. After failing sobriety field tests, appellant failed to provide an adequate breath sample on the Intoxilyzer and was charged by the City of Minneapolis with aggravated test refusal and gross misdemeanor driving while under the influence.

A few days before appellant pleaded guilty to the refusal to provide an adequate sample charge, Hennepin County filed a complaint alleging appellant had committed arson and burglary prior to her arrest for DWI on October 12. The arson investigation had linked appellant to the crime with evidence of white paint found on her shoes, pants, and car and soot on her hands and face. Appellant entered a plea to the arson count, conditioned on the district court's decision on her motion to dismiss the arson complaint. The district court later denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

Contrary to appellant's argument, this is not an "avoidance-of-apprehension" case. The ideation and behavior constituting the basis for the two complaints and charges were distinct and separate. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 468 N.W.2d 345, 346 (Minn. App. 1991). Due to the unrelatedness of the underlying motivations for the offenses, two separate prosecutions did not violate section 609.035. See State v. Clark, 486 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Minn. App. 1992) (concluding burglary offense was not part of same behavioral incident as DWI and fleeing police officer).

Affirmed.