Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, 50 W. Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for Respondent)

Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Willis, Judge.

Appellant Alvin Rozell Stafford challenges the trial court's jurisdiction to decide his fifth-degree controlled substance offense (possession of cocaine), claiming that the case should have been dismissed because it was not tried within the six-month period required for bringing the case under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, Minn. Stat. § 629.292 (1994). We agree and reverse with directions to dismiss the complaint against appellant.

The state took no further action on the complaint until April 3, 1996. The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with UMDDA, concluding that the delay was not willful and caused no prejudice to appellant. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that appellant was denied his right to a speedy trial.

A criminal defendant is entitled to a speedy trial under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. In determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Supreme Court requires consideration of the following factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted the right; and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93 (1972). State courts, through their supervisory authority, may establish a presumptive time period during which a case must be tried. Id. at 530 n.29, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 n.29.

Consistent with Barker, Minnesota law requires a criminal trial to be held within six months after a defendant requests one. See Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 3. This statute is also consistent with Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.10, which requires that a trial be commenced within 60 days of a defendant's demand for trial. As the reason for the delay in this case is attributable exclusively to the state, and the state did not show good cause for the delay, the complaint should have been dismissed. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 (state bears responsibility for negligence in prosecuting cases); State v. Miller, 525 N.W.2d 576, 582 (Minn. App. 1994) ("where a defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated, 'dismissal of the charge irrespective of its gravity' is the only remedy").

We regret the waste of scarce public resources in the handling of this case. First, the state offered no reason for its failure to prosecute this case. Second, although the state conceded in a letter to this court that "no good cause was shown" for its failure to prosecute, it still contested this appeal. Third, neither party moved to dismiss this appeal, despite the state's concession. We caution that similar conduct, upon proper motion, could result in assessment of costs and other sanctions in future cases.

Reversed and remanded.